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Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Abbreviations  
Unless provided, or the context requires otherwise, each of the following terms, acronyms, and 
abbreviations shall herein stand for the corresponding expression as provided below:     
ADLI  - Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation, which has been the principal 
official development strategy of Ethiopia under the EPRDF-led Government;  
AusAID -  Australian Agency for International Development;  
Birr/ETB - Birr/Ethiopian Birr, which is the currency and basic monetary unit of Ethiopia; 
BoA/BoARD  -  Bureau of Agriculture, which was referred to as Bureau of Agriculture and Rural 
Development before it was re-established and renamed as such in 2010; 
BoFED -  Bureau of Finance and Economic Development; 
CIDA -  Canadian International Development Agency;  
CSA  -  Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia;  
Derg  -  Amharic for “committee” or “council”, used to refer to the military junta that 
grabbed power in Ethiopia upon the overthrow of the country’s last imperial 
government led by Emperor Haile Sellassie I (r. 1930-1974) in the 1974 
“Revolution”, and ruled until it was replaced by the EPRDF in May 1991; 
DFID -  Department for International Development of the UK;  
EC -  Ethiopian Calendar; 
EDRI -  Ethiopian Development Research Institute; 
EEA -  Ethiopian Economic Association; 
EEPRI  -  Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute; 
EPRDF  -  The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front - the political 
organisation currently in power in Ethiopia, which has been ruling the country 
since it assumed power after the Derg regime was overthrown in May 1991; 
EU  -  European Union;  
FAO/UNFAO  -  United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation; 
FDRE  - Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the official nomenclature of Ethiopia 
since it was re-established and renamed as such under the FDRE Constitution, 
which the EPRDF put into effect as supreme law of the land on 21 August 1995;  
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FGD  -  Focus Group Discussion;  
FSS  -  Forum for Social Studies; 
GDP  -  Gross Domestic Product; 
HDI -   Human Development Index; 
IDS  -  Institute of Development Studies; 
IFAD  -  International Fund for Agricultural Development; 
IFPRI  -  International Food Policy Research Institute; 
IIED  -  International Institute for Environment and Development; 
IMF  -   International Monetary Fund; 
Kebele - The administrative level below a Special Woreda or a Woreda in most parts of 
Ethiopia, and the unit below the Kebele level is usually referred to 
interchangeably as a “village” or a “community”; 
KII  -  Key Informant Interview;  
MEDAC -  Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation of Ethiopia;  
MoA/MoARD  -  Ministry of Agriculture, which was referred to as Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development before it was re-established and renamed as such in 2010; 
MoFED  -  Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Ethiopia;  
MoI -  Ministry of Information of Ethiopia, which has been re-established and renamed 
as “Ministry of Government Communication Affairs;  
MoPED  -  Ministry of Planning and Economic Development of Ethiopia, which has been re-
established as MEDAC, and then most recently as MoFED;  
NEP - New Economic Policy;  
NGO - Nongovernmental Organisation;  
OECD  -  Organisation of Economic Development and Cooperation;  
PADETES  -  Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System;  
PDRE  -   Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the official name the Derg had given 
Ethiopia after it introduced its Constitution with the same name in 1987, which 
remained effective until it was replaced in power by the EPRDF in May 1991; 
PMAC  -   Provisional Military Administrative Council, which the Derg had established in 
1974 immediately after taking political power in Ethiopia, and through which it 
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ruled the country by decree until it put into effect the PDRE Constitution in 1987;  
PRSP -   Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; 
Regional State - One of the nine members states of the FDRE under the federal state structure that 
was introduced after the fall of the Derg and currently in force in Ethiopia;  
SAERP  -  Sustainable Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation Programme;  
SDPRP -   Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme; 
SIDA -  Swedish International Development Agency; 
SNNPRS - The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, which is one of 
the nine members states of the FDRE; 
Special Woreda - An administrative division below a Regional State in Ethiopia’s current federal 
structure, which has status equivalent to a Zone for most administrative purposes;  
TGE -  Transitional Government of Ethiopia; 
TNC -  Transitional National Conference; 
TPCE  -  Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia; 
UN  -  United Nations; 
UNDP  -  United Nations Development Programme; 
UNECA  -  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; 
UNFPA  -  United Nations Population Fund; 
UNICEF  -  United Nations Children’s Fund; 
UNOCHA -  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;  
UNSO -  United Nations Soudano-Sahelian Office;  
USAID -  United States Agency for International Development;  
WHO -  World Health Organisation; 
WFP -  World Food Programme; 
Woreda - The administrative level below a Zone in most parts of Ethiopia, which is 
equivalent to a district; and 
Zone - The administrative level below a Regional State within Ethiopia’s current federal 
and administrative arrangements, such as the Sidama Zone of the SNNPRS.  
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A Map of Ethiopia  
(A map released by the Ethiopian Mapping Agency in 2004 showing the [unofficial] 
international and sub-national boundaries of Ethiopia, which has been restructured as a 
federal state since the fall of the Derg and the coming to power of the EPRDF in May 
1991, after the country was officially re-established and renamed as “the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [FDRE]” under the FDRE Constitution, which has been 
in force as “the supreme law of the land” since it was put into effect on 21 August 1995). 
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Abstract  
Ethiopia has experimented with land law reforms linked to agriculture-led national development 
strategies that Emperor Haile Sellassie I, Derg, and EPRDF introduced since Emperor Menelik II 
enacted modern Ethiopia’s first reform intended for development in 1908. Nonetheless, the country’s 
smallholder productivity averaged 1.0 ton/hectare and its poverty ranked 174th in the UNDP Human 
Development Index in 2011. This thesis examines whether and how land law reform can be used to 
help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia notwithstanding the challenges of 
legal pluralism. By drawing upon evidence from law and development research and experience and 
analysing it in the Ethiopian context, the thesis argues that reform can help raise smallholder 
productivity, but only by recognising legal pluralism and changing the land tenure system’s formal 
state or non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions which constrain the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights that enhance tenure security, facilitate 
the transfer of rights over land, and authorise the collateralisation of land rights; and tackle poverty by 
thereby increasing food supplies, raising incomes, and improving health, education, and other 
necessities for the country’s predominantly rural population. Specifically, the thesis explores the 
possibility of using reform to adopt a hybrid state-private-customary land policy that combines the 
advantages of state land ownership policy that the government enforces, private ownership that critics 
favour, and non-formal arrangements that society uses. It then highlights how within the framework of 
this hybrid policy reform may help issue land laws boosting the provision of land rights that enhance 
tenure security by specifying definition of state, private, and communal landholdings, certification of 
lifelong usufructuary landholding, stricter eviction and confiscation procedures, and clearer 
expropriation and compensation mechanisms; that facilitate transfer by easing lease, donation, and 
succession restrictions; and that authorise collateralisation conditionally. Finally, it demonstrates how 
reform may help establish land institutions that improve implementation by incorporating non-formal 
arrangements, establishing a federal executive institution, clarifying the mandates of regional 
institutions, and assigning the judiciary greater dispute resolution role. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
1. 1. Background 
Land law reform and its relationship to smallholder agricultural productivity and poverty has been at 
the top of the national development agenda of Ethiopia particularly since Emperor Menelik II (r. 1889-
1913) founded the modern Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th century and introduced the 1908 land 
law reform.1 As Dunning noted, previous land law reforms enacted in the country had been primarily 
political exercises “designed to reward one group or to punish another, and ultimately to consolidate 
the power of the ruler.”2 However, the 1908 land law reform could be considered as Ethiopia’s first 
designed for national development. That is because it sought to introduce formal land policies, laws, 
and institutions that were hoped would help bring modernisation to the country’s land tenure system.3 
Basically, the land tenure system is part of the legal system that constitutes the land law framework 
governing the provision and implementation of rights and duties pertaining to such issues as who may 
control, use, and transfer land and concomitant resources, for how long, and under what conditions.4 
Ethiopia has subsequently experimented with three major land law reform programmes that claimed to 
have been designed to serve as a means towards national development under, respectively, the 
governments of Emperor Haile Sellassie I, who was crowned in 1930 after a period of power struggle 
that followed the end of Menelik II’s reign in 19135; the Derg military junta, which assumed power in 
the 1974 Revolution that deposed Haile Sellassie I6; and the incumbent EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front)7, which is composed of ethnic-based liberation movements that 
                                                 
1
  Aberra, 1998:5 and 98-100. A typical Ethiopian name comprises the given names of the person, father, and paternal 
grandfather, with no family name passed down from generation to generation. Since conventional references citing 
only the author’s second name make no sense for Ethiopian authors, they are cited here using their first names. The 
full names of the authors so cited, including their and their fathers’ given names, can be found in the bibliography. 
2
  Dunning, 1970:277. See, also, Pankhurst, 1966. 
3
  Scholler, 2006:9 and 2008:100; Aberra, 1998:98-100; Selamu and Vanderlinden, 1967:411-415. 
4
  Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997:1317. 
5
  Perham, 1963:262; Gebru Tareke, 1991:80-83. 
6
  Andargachew, 1993:68-69. 
7
  The EPRDF was formed in 1989 under the TPLF (Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front) after it controlled Tigray, the 
province it was founded to liberate, and comprised the TPLF, EPDM (Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement), 
which was later renamed ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic 
Organisation), and SEPDF (Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Front), which joined in 1994 and was renamed 
later SEPDM (Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Movement), (Assefa Fiseha, 2006:61-62; Scholler, 2006:99).  
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helped overthrow and succeeded the Derg in May 1991.8 These land law reforms were linked to the 
agriculture-led national development strategies the three governments adopted, which sought to use 
agricultural growth as an engine for tackling poverty and fostering overall economic development. The 
three governments pursued land law reform to help raise productivity and achieve agricultural growth, 
although the low productivity of the country’s smallholder-based agriculture is widely recognised as 
being the primary source of poverty in Ethiopia. Devereux and Guenther have succinctly described this 
ambivalence, noting that “Successive Ethiopian regimes have located the source of Ethiopia’s 
economic stagnation and vulnerability in the agriculture sector, yet they have also looked to 
smallholder agriculture as potential source of economic growth, food security, and poverty reduction.”9 
There is evidence to be drawn from established law and development research and experience that land 
law reform could help raise smallholder productivity, thereby tackle poverty, and even foster overall 
economic development in countries with smallholder-based economies and agriculture-led national 
development strategies in roughly comparable position with Ethiopia, such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Asia. Though causality and linkage remain to be issues of debate amongst development 
analysts, practitioners, and funders, it is generally thought that since land law reform includes formal 
state actions changing the land policies, laws, and institutions that comprise the land tenure system, 
and because land is the most important factor of production in smallholder agriculture, the manner of 
provision and implementation of smallholder land rights it establishes is thought to be a critical 
determinant of smallholder productivity, and as smallholder agriculture constitutes the primary source 
of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy, smallholder productivity is thought to be a critical 
determinant of poverty in those countries.10 That is specifically because of the following five reasons. 
First, land law reform, defined broadly here, includes formal actions that the state carries out using its 
legislative, executive, and judicial organs to establish, amend, or abolish part or all of the land tenure 
system’s land policies that specify possible forms of property rights in land, land laws that set out 
provisions of land rights as per the land policies’ specifications, and land institutions that undertake 
implementation by applying the land laws’ provisions in the course of administering land, managing 
land relations, enabling exercise by rights holders, and resolving disputes.11 Second, land is the most 
                                                 
8
  Vaughan, 2003:13. 
9
  Devereux and Guenther, 2009:5.  
10
  See, for example, Hårsmar, 2010:1-4; DFID, 2004a:3. 
11
  See, for example, IFAD, 2008:27; Bruce, 2006a:2-3; USAID, 2006:11; McAuslan, 2003:9 and 25; World Bank and 
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important factor of production for most smallholders, who mainly depend on the use of their plots of 
land, along with family labour, farm animals, often “backward” farming implements, and rainwater, to 
produce for self-subsistence and where possible the local market, due to technical problems related to 
the lack of access to modern agricultural inputs, such as improved seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, and 
pesticides, advanced ploughing, weeding, and harvesting equipment, and credit, research, 
communication, and marketing services.12 Third, because smallholder agriculture constitutes the 
primary source of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy, poverty is widely accepted as being 
closely linked to low smallholder productivity in those countries, which have proportionally the 
highest rates of poverty in the world, and where smallholders make up the majority of the population 
and the poor.13 Fourth, structural problems of the land tenure system pertaining to land policies, laws, 
and institutions that constrain the provision and implementation of the land rights of smallholders with 
a bearing on their productivity is one of the two major factors identified as the cause of low 
smallholder productivity and thus poverty in those countries, besides technical problems of the 
smallholder sector’s modus operandi related to lack of access to modern agricultural inputs, 
implements, and services.14 Fifth, land law reform that is designed to change land policies, laws, and 
institutions in a way which addresses structural problems of the land tenure system and improves the 
provision and implementation of those land rights of smallholders with a bearing on their productivity, 
and that is introduced as part of an agriculture-led national development strategy along with agrarian 
reform aimed at alleviating technical problems of the smallholder sector is therefore generally thought 
can help raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty in such countries.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Deininger, 2003: xxii–xxix and 1; Maxwell and Wiebe, 1999:825; Dorner, 1972:17-19. 
12
  See, for instance, IFAD, 2012:5; Tsegaye Moreda, 2012:6-7; Thapa, 2010:1; Dixon et al., 2004:1; Narayanan and 
Gulati, 2002:5; Wiggins, 2009:4; Lipton 2005; Huvio et al., 2005; Dixon et al., 2003; Heidhues and Brüntrup, 2003. 
13
  See, for example, Australian Government and Grewal, Grunfeld, and Sheehan, 2012:14; Quan, 2011:2 and 2000:31-
32; Devereux and Guenther, 2009:3; DFID, 2003b:3; Diao, 2010:5; IFPRI and Asenso-Okyere and Samson, 2012:5.  
14
  World Bank, 2000:170; Jayne, Mather, and Mghenyi, 2010:1386 and 2006:1; Jayne et al., 2003:270; Hoben, 2000:7; 
EEA, 2011:53; EEA/EEPRI, 2002:vi; Coates et al., 2007:12; International Institute for Labour Studies, 1967:2. 
15
  Note that although land law reform is aimed at addressing structural problems of the land tenure system, whilst 
agrarian reform at dealing with technical problems of the smallholder sector, which is how the two terms are 
understood here, it is not uncommon to see them being employed differently. For example, Kariuki and 
Thiesenhusen use the term “agrarian reform” to refer to both land law reform and agrarian reform (Kariuki, 2009:1; 
and Thiesenusen, 1989a:7). Others like Piyakuryal employ the term agrarian reform broadly to include structural 
reforms (land distribution, landholding ceilings setting, tenure reforms), development reforms (marketing reforms, 
development of rural infrastructures, micro-finance), and social reforms (farmers mobilization, training, awareness 
creation) that are intended to promote equity, productivity, and environmental protection (Pyakuryal, 2003:23-25). 
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The term “land policy”, defined broadly here, relates to a general statement the state promulgates using 
its legislative organ that specifies the possible forms of property rights in land as per the essential 
national interest concerning land, which thus broadly reflects the purpose, composition, and operation 
of the overall land tenure system, highlights the administration of land, guides the management of land 
relations, and directs the manner of provision and implementation of specific land rights.16 And the 
term “land law”, also defined broadly here, pertains to more specific legislation that the state issues 
through its legislative organ, or parts of the executive branch to which the legislature delegates 
lawmaking power, that set out provisions recognising, amending, or repealing land rights, through 
which the general statement of the land policy is specified, clarified, and translated into action.17 In 
contrast, the term “land institution”, also defined broadly here, refers to structures that the state 
establishes and runs to undertake the implementation of the land law’s land rights provisions in 
accordance with the land policy’s specifications, including parts of the executive through application in 
the course of administering land, managing land relations, and enabling exercise by land rights holders, 
as well as the judiciary through interpretation, explanation, and enforcement in dispute resolution.18  
On the other hand, “land” is understood here not as a “thing”, but as “property”. As Lund concisely put 
it, “property is not a thing but a social relation or contract determining how rights to use and duties not 
to use a specific resource are distributed.”19 And as Sjaastad and Bromley argued, “a ‘social contract’ - 
an agreement, tacit or explicit, on the legitimacy of the specific form of land holding - must precede 
individual appropriation of resources.”20 Therefore, the term “land rights” is broadly defined here as 
“property rights” concerning relations amongst people pertaining to rights and duties recognised by 
society regarding issues such as the manner of control, use, and transfer land and the concomitant 
resources.21 As such, the term “land rights” is employed here to refer to a wide range of rights 
pertaining to access, use, management, alienation, and exclusion rights over land, depending on the 
possible forms of property rights in land specified in the land policy in force.22 For example, in cases 
where a land policy involving private land ownership is in force, land rights may encompass a number 
of different rights related to ownership, which confers upon the land rights holder the rights of usus, 
                                                 
16
  See, for example, McAuslan, 2003:3-9 and 251. 
17
  See, for instance, Bruce, 2006a:2. 
18
  See, for example, World Bank and Deininger, 2003: xxii–xxix. 
19
  Lund, 2000:17. 
20
  Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997:551. 
21
  See, for instance, Singer, 1996:71; Munzer, 1990:16; Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997:1317. 
22
  Ostrom, 2000:339; Ostrom and Schlager, 1996:133; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992:250-251. 
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which is the right to occupy and use the land, fructus, which is the right to collect and use fruits of the 
land like crops and rents, and abusus, which is the right to alienate or dispose of the land and its 
fruits.23 In contrast, in cases where a land policy involving state or communal land ownership is in 
force, land rights may encapsulate rights related to, for instance, usufruct, which bestows on the land 
rights holder, though not an owner, the rights of usus and fructus, minus abusus, although customary 
communal land rights, often being hereditary, may differ from the “life interest that typically 
characterises usufruct under Roman law”.24 Thus, the concept of land rights as understood here may 
specifically include the rights to access, occupy, and use land to produce crops, rear animals, collect 
fruits, etc.; make investments and improvements; sell, donate, mortgage, lease, bequeath, or otherwise 
transfer or dispose of the land, its fruits, or improvements; exclude others from those rights; and seek 
administrative and judicial enforcement of the land rights provisions so as to protect the rights holder.25 
It is generally thought that land law reform can help raise smallholder productivity in countries like 
Ethiopia if designed to change the land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system in a 
way that brings improvement in the provision and implementation of the land rights of smallholders 
with a bearing on their productivity. Following Schlager and Ostrom’s “property as a bundle of rights” 
approach, those land rights of smallholders with a bearing on their productivity will here be grouped 
based on their potential implications and referred to as “the three bundles of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights”.26 The first group of these land rights is to do with smallholders’ tenure 
security, which, defined broadly here, pertains to the assurance, confidence, or expectation of 
smallholders to remain in physical possession of, and enjoy the rights to, and the fruits of their 
landholdings, as well as the value of investments and improvements they make, continuously without 
interruption, imposition, or interference from outside sources, including the state, private individuals, 
and other entities, either in the course of use or upon transfer.27 Therefore, one way in which land law 
reform is believed can help raise smallholder productivity is by putting into effect land policies and 
laws improving the provision of smallholder land rights contributing towards the enhancement of 
tenure security, such as those that clearly define land access, occupation, and use rights, guarantee the 
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exclusion of others from such rights, outline management obligations, stipulate stricter eviction and 
confiscation requirements, specify expropriation and compensation mechanisms, as well as land 
institutions, administrative and judicial, entrusted with substantive and procedural powers that ensure 
implementation and the protection of the rights holder. It is thought that the enhancement of tenure 
security would provide smallholders with incentive to properly manage, undertake long-term 
investments on, and make improvements to their landholdings, which is believed would help raise 
smallholder productivity and lead to sustainable land use.28 The second group pertains to the transfer of 
rights over land, which, also defined broadly here, relates to the process in which smallholders pass 
their land rights and the concomitant benefits over to other persons29, either with consideration through 
sale, lease, exchange, barter, or in the form of security or payment of debt as in the case of mortgage30, 
or without consideration through donation or succession.31 Accordingly, the other way in which land 
law reform is believed can help raise smallholder productivity is by putting into effect land laws 
improving the provision of smallholder land rights entailing facilitation of the transfer of rights over 
land temporarily or permanently via different means, including sale, lease, exchange, barter, donation, 
or succession, depending on the land ownership policy and the corresponding property rights in land, 
such as ownership, usufruct, or other possible forms of property rights in land, as well as land 
institutions, administrative and judicial, with substantive and procedural powers tasked with 
implementation. It is thought that the facilitation of the transfer rights over land would give rise to a 
dynamic land market that could enable more successful and entrepreneurial smallholders to access 
more land and allow those who are not to transfer their landholdings and seek salaried employment, 
join other economic sectors, or migrate to urban areas, thereby leading to a more effective and efficient 
land use involving the reduction of soil erosion and land scarcity, the diversification of rural 
livelihoods, the consolidation of fragmented landholdings into larger, economically viable units, and 
ultimately growth in smallholder productivity. The third group concerns the authorisation of the 
collateralisation of land rights, which, also defined broadly here, refers to the use by smallholders of 
their land rights as surety to obtain credit.32 Thus, the third way in which land law reform is believed 
can help raise smallholder productivity is improving the authorisation of the collateralisation of land 
rights for smallholders by putting into effect land laws that recognise the use of smallholder land rights 
                                                 
28
  World Bank, 2007b:139; Wily, 2003: 8, 23, and 52; Place and Swallow, 2000:11; Roth and Haase, 1998:1. 
29
  Rolfes, 2006:119. 
30
  Giovarelli, 2006:89. 
31
  Rolfes, 2006:159; Giovarelli, 2006:95. 
32
  Deininger and Jin, 2006:1248; Bledsoe, 2006:152; Chalamwong and Feder, 1988:188. 
14 
 
as collateral for credit, as well as land institutions, administrative and judicial, and micro-credit 
agencies with clear substantive, procedural, and financial powers to ensure implementation. It is 
thought that the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights would enable more successful and 
entrepreneurial smallholders to obtain the means they need to access more land and modern 
agricultural inputs, implements, and services, and those who are not to switch or diversify their 
livelihoods, thereby leading to sustainable land use and growth in smallholder productivity.33 
Moreover, it is generally thought that growth in smallholder productivity can help tackle poverty 
directly and significantly in countries like Ethiopia, where smallholder agriculture provides livelihood 
for the majority of the population and the poor and is the mainstay of the economy.34 This is because 
growth in smallholder productivity is believed can enable smallholders to not only attain household 
food sufficiency, but also contribute towards greater and cheaper supply of food, as smallholders 
mostly produce staple crops that are mainly consumed and traded locally and have lower elasticity of 
demand.35 It is thought that this can enable the rural and urban poor, who spend most of their incomes 
on food, to access more food and have larger disposable incomes for expenditure on other basic 
necessities, and help the countries save the foreign exchange they spend on importing food for 
investment on health, education, and other economic, social, and political provisions.36 Growth in 
smallholder productivity is also believed can help increase the incomes of smallholders, as they can be 
able to sell more products in the market and save assets they would have spent to buy food, which 
would help them have larger disposable incomes that can enable them to increase their consumption.37 
And smallholders’ attainment of food security and higher incomes for expenditure on such services as 
health and education is thought can improve their nutrition, health, and literacy, which would in turn 
promote their productivity.38 Furthermore, it is generally thought that, as agriculture continues to 
modernise and supply cheap food, release labour, provide raw materials, expand market, and boost 
demand for nascent manufacturing and service industries, growth in smallholder productivity can, 
through the indirect effect it may have on growth in other sectors, help foster overall “economic 
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development”, which can be defined as involving the transformation of an economy from one that is 
largely agricultural to one that is more extensively based on manufacturing and service industries.39  
However, although the land law reforms that the governments of Haile Sellassie I, the Derg, and the 
EPRDF introduced claimed to have been intended to help raise agricultural productivity, thereby tackle 
poverty, and foster overall economic development, the land tenure systems and smallholder land rights 
they established were different from each other. As Devereux, Amdissa, and Sabates-Wheeler noted, 
“Any Ethiopian over 40 years old has lived through three remarkably different political regimes: the 
feudal imperial era under Emperor Haile Sellassie; the socialist military dictatorship of Colonel 
Mengistu’s Derg; and the market-oriented, Western-aligned democracy of Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi. Each regime has imposed an entirely different set of policies on smallholder agriculture, 
where over 80 per cent of the population makes its living, yet all three have presided over an 
agricultural sector that is stagnant and acutely vulnerable to recurrent drought and other livelihood 
shocks.”40 Indeed, none of the land law reforms appears to have helped achieve the smallholder 
productivity and poverty outcomes each government had hoped. According to data released in 2011, 
Ethiopia continued to have amongst the world’s lowest smallholder productivity, averaging just around 
1.0 ton/hectare.41 Moreover, despite the remarkable overall economic growth rates registered recently, 
the country remained one of the poorest by many standards, ranking 174th out of 187 countries in the 
2011 UNDP Human Development Index.42 Even the slight growth of agriculture by 2.0% during the 
imperial era, 0.6% under the Derg rule, and 2.3% during the incumbency of the EPRDF was achieved 
largely due to the expansion of cultivated land, not growth in productivity. Besides, although the share 
of agriculture in Ethiopia’s GDP has slightly declined from 68.0%, to 55.6%, and then to 47.3%, 
respectively, during the three periods, the fact that agriculture still accounts for close to one-half of 
GDP and thus structural transformation of the economy has not been achieved shows none of the land 
law reforms has helped foster overall economic development. Notably, most of the overall economic 
growth rates registered during these three periods was achieved thanks to the manufacturing and 
service sectors, which have grown relatively more rapidly, respectively in order of their appearance 
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during the three periods, by 7.0%, 3.6%, and 5.3% and by 7.3%, 3.8%, and 6.9% (Appendix 4, Table 
443; Appendix 5, Table 544; Appendix 7, Table 745; Appendix 8, Table 846; Appendix 9, Table 947). 
The ideological and policy orientations of the three governments may help explain the fact that due to 
the vital economic, social, and political significances of land, the forms and contents of the land law 
reforms, land tenure systems, and smallholder land rights each introduced might have been, despite the 
purposes they proclaimed to serve, decided not just based on the economic considerations of raising 
agricultural productivity and tackling poverty, but taking into account the social interests and political 
calculations associated with land. In Ethiopia, land is vital not only economically, as the primary factor 
of production in agriculture and the principal form of wealth; but also, as a country where cultural 
identity is tied to specific places, socially, as the principal determinant of cultural identity and class48; 
and politically, as the most formidable power source and governance instrument for the ruling elite.49 
Specifically, the government of Emperor Haile Sellassie I introduced Ethiopia’s first comprehensive 
and systematised land law reform embodied mainly in the 1960 Civil Code50 and other codes issued 
during the “The Era of Codification”51 and related to the country’s first agriculture-led national 
development strategy adopted in the 1950s and 1960s.52 Yet, due to the government’s feudalistic 
nature, this land law reform did not help address the problem of concentration of land in the hands of 
absentee landlords, including members of the upper echelons of the royal family, the nobility, the 
army, the police, the civil service, the business community, and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.53 As 
Markakis, Nega, and Bahru observed, it was the rampant landlessness, arbitrary eviction, and tenancy 
of peasants that fuelled the 1974 Revolution, which rallied around the slogan “Land to the Tiller”.54 
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Nor did the land law reform help avert the 1973 famine that ravaged northern Ethiopia, which, as 
Andargachew noted, was kept secret to the rest of the country and the world, but exposed in a 
documentary film produced by Jonathan Dimbleby, and used as immediate cause for the culmination 
of the Revolution in the deposition of Haile Sellassie I and Ethiopia’s last imperial government.55 
Subsequently, junior military officers who assumed power in the 1974 Revolution, proclaimed to have 
espoused “Marxism”, and officially referred to themselves as the PMAC (Provisional Military 
Administrative Council), or simply “the Derg” in Amharic, enacted the 1975 land law reform 
programme embodied mostly in “The PMAC Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of 
Rural Lands, Proclamation No. 31/1975”56, which is considered as the most “radical” in the country’s 
history.57 The Derg’s land law reform abolished all imperial-era land tenure systems that it believed 
buttressed the feudalistic order, nationalised all land without compensation, and introduced the policy 
of state ownership of land, which declared that “All rural lands shall be the collective property of the 
Ethiopian people”, that “No person or business organisation or any other organisation shall hold rural 
land in private ownership”, and that “No compensation shall be paid in respect to rural lands.”58 The 
Derg’s land law reform, which was linked to its agriculture-led national development strategy known 
as “agrarian socialism” that sought to achieve Soviet-style “socialist transformation of agriculture”59, 
guaranteed every adult citizen equal rights of access to a maximum of 10 hectares of agricultural land 
free of charge with usufruct rights, excluding rights to transfer through sale, lease, collateralisation, and 
succession, except to primary family members.60 Yet, despite its land law reform, the Derg, which 
grabbed power by publicising and capitalising on the 1973 famine, ended up presiding over an even 
worse famine in 1984, which Assefa Fiseha described as “the worst famine in the country”.61 
Most recently, the EPRDF, which has been in power since it helped overthrow and succeeded the Derg 
in May 199162 and proclaims to be an adherent of a mixed Marxism-liberalism ideology that it calls 
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“Revolutionary Democracy”63, has enacted its own land law reform. As Crewett and Korf, Merera, and 
Abbink observed, the EPRDF is a successor of the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front), a Marxist 
ethnic-based liberation movement that still constitutes the backbone of the current political 
organisation and government of the EPRDF, which had fought an armed struggle against the Derg 
claiming ethnic-based oppression and seeking ethnic-based solution for Ethiopia’s problems, including 
those pertaining to land law reform, smallholder agriculture, and poverty, and has since framed 
virtually all aspects of life in the country along ethnic lines as per its commitment to what it called “the 
national question”.64 Accordingly, the FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) Constitution 
the EPRDF put into effect on 21 August 199565, which proclaims to have been adopted by “the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”66 and to be “the supreme law of the land”67, 
restructured Ethiopia into a federal polity. This federal arrangement is composed of a federal 
government, nine regional states, including Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-
Gumuz, SNNPRS (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Regional State), Gambella, and 
Harari, and two city administrations, namely Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa68, which are formed mainly 
along ethnic lines and designed to have their own largely independent legal systems made up of 
legislative, executive, and judicial organs with corresponding powers that they exercise on matters 
placed in their jurisdictions under the Constitution.69 As Atakilte and Hussein suggested, because of its 
Marxist background, the EPRDF has under its land law reform maintained significant continuities from 
the Derg’s, including continuing the Derg’s policy of state ownership of land.70 However, it has also 
recognised the right to compensation for investment made on land upon expropriation, lifted the 10-
hectare restriction on maximum plot size, abolished the prohibition of tenancy and hired labour, 
allowed the leasing of land, expanded the succession of land rights from spouses and children to all 
family dependents, and decentralised land governance by dividing power between the federal and 
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regional governments.71 The FDRE Constitution, which embodies the current land policy of the 
country, recognises that “Every Ethiopian citizen has the right to the ownership of private property”72, 
though it qualifies this right when it comes to land and validates the EPRDF’s policy of state 
ownership of land, declaring that “The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all 
natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia.”73 Moreover, though 
the Constitution clarifies that “Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange”74, it also recognises that 
“Ethiopian peasants have right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction from 
their possession”, and pledges that “The implementation of this provision shall be specified by law.”75 
The Constitution further states that “Every Ethiopian shall have the full right to the immovable 
property he builds and to the permanent improvements he brings about on the land by his labour or 
capital. This right shall include the right to alienate, to bequeath, and, where the right of use expires, to 
remove his property, transfer his title, or claim compensation for it”, and promises that “Particulars 
shall be determined by law.”76 But it then qualifies that “Without prejudice to the right to private 
property, the government may expropriate private property for public purposes subject to payment in 
advance of compensation commensurate to the value of the property.”77 The EPRDF’s land law reform 
is linked to its agriculture-led national development strategy called ADLI (Agriculture Development-
led Industrialisation), which had the objective of helping achieve food security, attain agricultural 
growth, and foster “pro-poor” economic development mainly by raising smallholder productivity in 
staple crops.78 Yet, despite the EPRDF’s land law reform, as Dessalegn noted, “As recently as 
2002/03, there was starvation in many parts of the country affecting more than 13 million rural people. 
In 2009, over 22% of the rural population was dependent on a combination of emergency food aid and 
safety net programs. While the number of people seeking emergency food assistance has decreased 
since then, nearly eight million rural people continue to be supported by safety net programs.”79  
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However, the ideological and policy orientations of the three governments cannot help fully explain 
the failure of the land law reform they enacted to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty. To begin with, though the extent might vary, land has similar economic, social, and political 
significances in countries around the world. As such, there can be value-neutral or value-free land law 
reform only in theory, but not in practice. In other words, though the degree might vary, the forms and 
contents of land law reforms enacted particularly in developing countries like Ethiopia will be decided 
not only based on the economic considerations of raising agricultural productivity and tackling 
poverty, but also taking into account the social and political interests associated with land. As Brietzke 
put it, “While law-in-the-abstract is value-neutral, particular laws necessarily embody value choices, 
be they socialist, capitalist, or those of the status quo. The use of law is not restricted to certain types of 
economic or political systems”.80 And as Gebru Mersha and Githinji observed, land issues “have 
always and everywhere been” economic, social, and political matters. Thus, the allocation of land 
rights, the distribution of agricultural products, and the fate of poverty have “never been decided solely 
in agriculture or by farmers”, or based on economic considerations, but by the interplay of internal and 
external forces representing diverse economic, social, and political interests, including the state, 
landlords, corporations, and bilateral and multilateral funders, such as the World Bank and the IMF.81 
More importantly, despite the possible social interests and political calculations associated with land, 
land law reform has been successfully used to help raise smallholder productivity, thereby tackle 
poverty, and even foster overall economic development in countries that have smallholder-based 
economies and agriculture-led national development strategies like Ethiopia, where land has vital 
economic, social, and political significances as in Ethiopia, and that were or are in roughly comparable 
position with Ethiopia. Arguably the most successful recent experience is that of the East Asian green 
revolution countries, notably China, which like Ethiopia had a background of being ruled under a 
feudalistic monarchy, a smallholder-based agricultural economy, a large, predominantly rural 
population, an experience of a Marxist-oriented political economy controlled by a one-party state, and 
a land tenure system involving the policy of state land ownership.82 However, with the contribution of 
land law reform and growth in smallholder productivity, China has since managed to lift millions of its 
citizens out of poverty, achieve agricultural growth, structurally transform its economy, and become a 
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global economic powerhouse.83 Though not as remarkably as that of China or other East Asian green 
revolution countries, sub-Saharan African countries such as Ghana84, Burkina Faso85, and Niger86, 
which have smallholder-based economies like Ethiopia, have doubled or more their agricultural 
production since they started to introduce land law reforms from the 1980s onwards.87 Particularly in 
Ghana, according to the 2008 World Development Report, the rate of poverty had fallen from 51.7% in 
1991 to 28.5% in 2005 largely due to agricultural growth driven by smallholder-based agriculture.88 
Therefore, to find possible explanation for land law reform’s smallholder productivity and poverty 
outcomes in Ethiopia, it is imperative to examine if the change that land law reform had brought to the 
pre-existing land tenure system has led to the restriction of the provision and implementation of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights. The change land law reform brought to the land tenure 
system of Ethiopia that has the most significant impact on the manner of provision and implementation 
of smallholder land rights in the country is legal pluralism, which, defined broadly, relates to the 
existence of two or more legal systems governing the same type of relation within the same country.89 
Menelik II began in 1908 the enactment by successive governments of land law reforms involving the 
importation, transplantation, and introduction of foreign-modelled formal state land policies, laws, and 
institutions to the land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land 
rights, which the governments have been establishing and operating using their legislative, executive, 
and judicial organs based on written laws often claiming the reforms have been intended to help raise 
smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty.90 Before that, mostly indigenous traditional land 
tenure arrangements that are characterised by their largely unwritten, flexible, negotiable, and location-
specific nature, and are usually managed by a village chief, traditional ruler, or council of elders based 
on local practices were in exclusive existence and operation in the country, although they themselves 
were the product of a long process of “legal stratification” involving the experiences, norms, and 
practices of various cultural groups and the principles of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other local 
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religions.91 Yet, even after the state started to enact land law reform and introduce new land policies, 
laws, and institutions, which have since come to be known as “formal state land tenure arrangements”, 
the pre-existing indigenous ones, which have since come to be known as “non-formal customary land 
tenure arrangements”, have continued to exist, operate, and be used by society, despite often being not 
consistent with, and recognised under the formal state ones, thereby leading to legal pluralism.92 In 
view of that, the term “legal pluralism” will be broadly used here to refer to the largely independent 
existence and operation of the formal land policies, laws, and institutions the state has been 
establishing and operating through land law reform using its legislative, executive, and judicial organs 
alongside the pre-existing non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions, whether or not 
consistent with, or recognised under the formal state ones, within the land tenure system governing the 
provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights in countries like Ethiopia.  
Moreover, the term “formal” will be broadly used here to refer to the land tenure system established 
and operated by the state through land law reform, the land policies, laws, and institutions that 
constitute it, and the land rights that pertain to it. Whereas, the term “non-formal” will be broadly 
employed here to refer to the pre-existing customary land tenure systems established and used by 
society, the land policies, laws, and institutions that constitute it, and the land rights that pertain to it. 
This contrasts with the term “informal”, a commonly employed, but a misleading characterisation that 
tends to associate customary land tenure systems with squatting. Nonetheless, as Bruce accurately put 
it, in countries like Ethiopia, “Custom in fact represents an alternative formality, reflecting culturally 
embedded values and clear claims of right, managed by sub-national social institutions with important 
interests and often political influence. The situation is quite different from that of squatters.”93 That is 
in view of the fact that since “land rights” are “property rights” contingent on recognition by society, 
non-formal customary land rights and land tenure systems recognised as “legal” by society in countries 
like Ethiopia should be accepted as “legal”, at least as much as the formal state ones that are 
recognised as “legal” by the state in those countries, or by society in the “developed world” are 
accepted as such. After all, as Platteau cogently argued, “if property has no social legitimacy, it is no 
property because it lacks the basic ingredient of property, recognition by others”.94 Similarly, as Rolfes 
                                                 
91
  Connolly, 2005:7; Brietzke, 1975:46. 
92
  See, for instance, Crewett, Ayalneh, and Korf, 2008:5. 
93
  Bruce, 2006b:13. 
94
  Platteau, 1995:46. 
23 
 
argued, “For a land right to be valid, other people must recognize it as legitimate. This might be as 
simple as neighbouring users acknowledging each other’s land rights in a manner they all agree on.”95 
In short, to find possible explanation for land law reform’s smallholder productivity and poverty 
outcomes in Ethiopia, it is imperative to examine the challenges legal pluralism might pose. After all, 
due to legal pluralism, land law reform enacted to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty in the country operates to bring the change in the provision and implementation of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights that it needs to bring in order to deliver the smallholder 
productivity and poverty outcomes it is hoped would help achieve not just through the formal state 
land policies, laws, and institutions that it puts into effect, but in the context of a land tenure system 
that also comprises the pre-existing non-formal customary ones. As Brietzke, who expressed surprise 
at the “dramatic dualism of urban areas on the one hand, and the huge rural subsistence sector on the 
other”, and emphasised that “Ethiopia has two legal systems: one has evolved more or less 
spontaneously from the experiences of various cultural groups, while the other has been imported by a 
tiny elite and is sanctioned by the state”, succinctly put it, the legal pluralism would provide “a 
particularly fruitful starting point for the discussion of Ethiopian legal problems.”96 Within the above 
broad perspective, this thesis seeks to explore whether, how, and to what extent the legal pluralism it 
gave rise to in the land tenure system might influence the effect land law reform has on the provision 
and implementation of smallholder land rights and shape the smallholder productivity and poverty 
outcomes it delivers in Ethiopia. It also seeks to explore the scope and mechanisms available for 
intervention through land law reform to make this legal pluralism work to help promote the provision 
and implementation of smallholder land rights and improve smallholder productivity and poverty 
conditions in the country. Thus, the major objective of the thesis is to examine whether and how land 
law reform can be used to help raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty in Ethiopia 
notwithstanding the challenges that the legal pluralism in the land tenure system might pose.  
However, legal pluralism would provide “a particularly fruitful starting point” for the discussion of the 
challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty in Ethiopia not because it is 
peculiar to Ethiopia, or to the land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of 
smallholder land rights in the country. Legal pluralism in the land tenure system governing the 
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provision and implementation of smallholder land rights is a common feature that Ethiopia shares with 
many other developing countries around the world, including the abovementioned sub-Saharan African 
and Asian countries that had successful land law reform experience. As Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse 
noted particularly in relation to sub-Sahara African countries like Ethiopia, due to the legal pluralism 
that land law reform has given rise to in the land tenure system, “African farmers gain access to land 
through a blend of ‘customary’ and ‘statutory’, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, institutions [as] a range of 
customary, statutory and hybrid institutions and regulations having de jure or de facto authority over 
land rights co-exist in the same territory”.97 Instead, it is because despite having been theoretically 
delegitimised, abolished, and replaced by the state with the formal land policies, laws, and institutions 
introduced to the land tenure system through land law reform, as numerous studies suggest, the non-
formal customary land tenure arrangements have continued to be considered so important and 
legitimate by society as to govern more than 85% of land relations in Ethiopia, although they are often 
not consistent with, and recognised under the formal state ones.98 Moreover, the lack of clear hierarchy 
or other form of coordination between the formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, 
and institutions of the land tenure system can create confusion and adversely affect the provision and 
implementation of smallholder land rights, as, for example, parties to disputes over smallholder land 
rights may invoke different land laws to support competing claims, or may choose different land 
institutions that they feel would likely be favourable to their cause.99 As Tamanaha observed, “What 
makes this pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that there are multiple uncoordinated, 
coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, but that there is diversity amongst them. They may make 
competing claims of authority; they may impose conflicting demands or norms; they may have 
different styles and orientations. This potential conflict can generate uncertainty or jeopardy for 
individuals and groups in society who cannot be sure in advance which legal regime will be applied to 
their situation.”100 Certainly, the successful land law reform experience of the abovementioned 
countries illustrates that land law reform can indeed be used to help raise smallholder productivity, 
thereby tackle poverty, and even foster overall economic development in countries in roughly 
comparable position with Ethiopia, and can provide potentially useful insight into what they did or did 
not do that Ethiopia did not do or did in order to deal with the challenges that the legal pluralism in the 
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land tenure system might pose. However, since the context in which those countries attained their 
achievement is different from each other and from that of Ethiopia, it is essential for the challenges that 
the legal pluralism in the land tenure system might pose to land law reform, smallholder productivity, 
and poverty in Ethiopia to be assessed in the light of the specific context of the country. Finally, a 
question may be raised as to what the justification of the thesis is for focusing specifically on the 
challenges of legal pluralism whilst there can be several other possible factors that might have limited 
land law reform’s effectiveness in helping to raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty 
in Ethiopia. It is thus essential to examine if it is possible to fully explain the challenges of land law 
reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty in Ethiopia in terms of approaches commonly used in 
the diagnosis of reasons responsible and the prescription of solutions possible for land law reform-
related smallholder productivity and poverty problems in developing countries like Ethiopia. 
1. 2. Context  
This Section briefly examines in the context of Ethiopia the three approaches commonly used by law 
and development analysts, practitioners, and funders in the diagnosis of reasons responsible and the 
prescription of solutions possible for land law reform-related smallholder productivity and poverty 
problems in developing countries to find out if the challenges of land law reform, smallholder 
productivity, and poverty in Ethiopia can be fully explained in terms of those approaches and to 
highlight the justification of the thesis for focusing on the challenges of legal pluralism. The first is the 
“physical ecology” approach, which blames adverse natural resource endowment, including shortage 
of fertile land, recurrent drought and lack of water for irrigation, and unfavourable climatic conditions. 
Whereas, the second is the “political economy” approach, which invokes the unwillingness or inability 
of the state to make policy focus on agriculture and introduce agrarian reform measures to provide 
access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services. For example, according to Holt and 
Dessalegn, low smallholder productivity and pervasive poverty in Ethiopia is “a result not simply of 
drought but of an increasing shortage of the barest assets needed for agricultural survival”.101 In 
contrast, the World Bank points out that “Centuries of poor policies and institutional failures are the 
primary cause of Africa’s under-capitalised and uncompetitive agriculture. Adverse resource 
endowments have also had some direct effects.”102 As per analysts such as Byerlee, de Janvry, and 
Sadoulet and Tsegaye Moreda, since most of the newly-independent sub-Saharan African countries 
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adopted an “urban biased”, manufacturing-led national development strategy under the auspices of the 
UN or their former colonial masters103, agriculture was neglected and any growth achieved through the 
strategy benefitted the urban and politically-connected elite, whilst the majority of smallholders and 
the poor were left out, which left a legacy of huge urban-rural wealth disparities, as well as social and 
political cleavages, conflicts, and smallholder productivity and poverty problems that persist to date.104  
However, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that adverse natural resource endowment and the 
absence of state support in terms of making policy focus on agriculture and introducing agrarian 
reform measures intended to improve access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services 
cannot be the primary contributory factors to smallholder productivity and poverty problems in 
Ethiopia. For instance, as Mulat, Fantu, and Tadele observed, the country does have enormous fertile 
land, fairly sufficient rainfall and abundant water for irrigation, and climatic conditions generally 
suitable for agriculture.105 As regards policy focus on agriculture and rural areas, if anything, what 
successive governments are often criticised for is making excessive focus, particularly in their quest to 
control land and the smallholder community, which constitute the most formidable political power 
resources in the country. Crewett and Korf, have succinctly captured this obsessive focus, noting that 
as the state has historically done, “it is very unlikely that the Ethiopian government departs from the 
dependence path in rural politics and the practices to govern the rural populace and gives up its most 
precious power resource in the rural realm - the power to distribute land.”106 Moreover, agrarian 
reform measures intended to alleviate technical problems of the smallholder sector have been 
introduced by the governments of Haile Sellassie I107, the Derg108, and the EPRDF109, which are widely 
accepted as being effective, though considered insufficient in terms of intensiveness and extensiveness. 
The third is the “asset poverty” approach, which blames landlessness and skewed distribution of land 
rights, and recommends “pro-poor” redistributive land law reform as a solution. For example, a World 
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Bank study in India has identified landlessness as the greatest predictor of poverty, even more than 
scheduled castes.110 According to DFID, which stresses that in many developing countries agricultural 
productivity is low because “land ownership remains highly skewed”111 and that “the most deprived 
people are often the rural landless”112, proposes a land law reform that ensures access to land for the 
landless and equitable distribution of land rights for the poor to promote agricultural productivity and 
alleviate poverty.113 But landlessness and skewed distribution of land rights do not appear to be a 
major contributory factor to smallholder productivity and poverty problems in Ethiopia, particularly 
after the Derg promulgated the 1975 redistributive land law reform that introduced the policy of state 
land ownership and guaranteed every adult citizen in need of land equal rights of access to a maximum 
of 10 hectares per household free of charge with usufruct rights.114 The EPRDF has since continued the 
Derg’s policy of state land ownership and free usufructuary land access under its land law reform.115 
To conclude, it is difficult to fully explain the land law reform-related smallholder productivity and 
poverty problems in Ethiopia in terms of the abovementioned three approaches. Therefore, what is left 
is to examine whether, how, and to what extent legal pluralism, the defining change that land law 
reform brought to the country’s land tenure system, might have led to the restriction of the provision 
and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights. That would thus arguably provide 
the justification for the focus of the thesis on the challenges of legal pluralism in the case of Ethiopia.  
1. 3. The Same Challenges, Different Diagnoses and 
Prescriptions 
As mentioned earlier, law and development analysts, practitioners, and funders now unanimously 
acknowledge land law reform has failed to deliver the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes 
successive governments had anticipated in Ethiopia, as does also the government.116 Yet, despite 
unanimously recognising the unsustainability of the past approach involving the ADLI strategy and 
land law reform measures to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the country, and 
agreeing that change is necessary, they are divided within themselves and with the government in their 
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diagnoses of the reasons responsible and prescriptions of the solutions possible for the problem along 
perspectives that can be broadly subsumed into three. This Section highlights those three perspectives. 
The first perspective is that of analysts such as Devereux, Amdissa, Sabates-Wheeler, Guenther, 
Collier, Dercon, Hill, Zeitlin, Gebru Mersha, and Githinji, who are pessimistic about the utility of land 
law reform and the viability of smallholder agriculture to serve as an engine for tackling poverty in 
Africa, particularly in Ethiopia. As Wiggins noted, “Notwithstanding that the successes of the green 
revolution in Asia, and above all in China, were achieved largely by smallholders, scepticism about 
Africa’s small farmers is widespread. Amongst the reasons mentioned are that Africa’s physical 
geography - soils, climate, hydrology - means that the technical challenge of breeding higher-yielding 
crop varieties is more daunting and the possibilities for irrigation are less; and that governments were 
unprepared or unable to contemplate providing state support in the way Asian governments had”.117 
These analysts, who are thus critical of the policy focus on land law reform and smallholder agriculture 
for tackling poverty in Ethiopia citing such reasons as the country’s ever smaller and fragmented 
landholdings, lack of modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services, uncompetitive products, 
dysfunctional markets, and poor infrastructure, recommend a shift in policy focus towards the 
development of large commercial farms and the creation of livelihoods outside agriculture.118 
The second perspective is that of analysts such as Berhanu Nega, Berhanu Adenew, Seyoum, 
Dessalegn, Mulat, Samuel, the EEA, and the EEPRI, who support the continuation of the existing 
ADLI strategy centred on raising smallholder productivity in staple crops to tackle poverty in Ethiopia. 
These analysts blame the strategy’s disappointing performance on the land tenure system’s structural 
problems and the smallholder sector’s technical problems. Thus, they generally recommend the 
enactment of land law reform introducing the policy of private ownership of land, or a combination of 
private and state, or, to use the words of Dessalegn, “associative”119 land ownership, instead of the 
current state ownership policy, along with the intensification of the hitherto effective but insufficient 
agrarian reform measures, which they consider the major factors behind the strategy’s failure so far.120 
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The third perspective is that of the government, which appears to have made a practical, if not official, 
paradigm shift away from the existing ADLI strategy and land law reform aimed at raising smallholder 
productivity in staple crops for tackling poverty in Ethiopia. To begin with, the government has long 
ruled out enacting land law reform that introduces the policy of private ownership of land or 
accommodates other possible land ownership policies, insisting that there is no better alternative to the 
policy of state ownership of land it currently enforces.121 Moreover, the Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP), the first generation of the EPRDF’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) introduced in 2002 under the aegis of the World Bank and the IMF to serve as 
the country’s main PRSP until 2004/05, was built on four pillars, including ADLI, justice systems and 
civil service reform, decentralisation and empowerment, and capacity building, with the latter three 
having been designed to enhance the effectiveness of ADLI and the achievement of food security.122 
Although the SDPRP had also envisaged land law reform measures within the framework of the 
current policy of state ownership of land, that was what Crewett and Korf called a “dialectical” 
solution designed to please funders, get the SDPRP approved, and qualify for aid,  as those measures 
have yet to be fully implemented.123 That contrasts with the position the government later took in the 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), the SDPRP’s successor 
that served as Ethiopia’s main PRSP from 2005/06-2009/10, which had excluded ADLI from amongst 
its eight pillars, made no mention of land law reform, and did not envisage policy focus on raising 
smallholder productivity in staple crops for achieving food security and tackling poverty in the 
country.124 On its part, the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), the PASDEP’s successor for the 
current five-year period from 2010/11 to 2014/15, which makes no mention of even the name “ADLI”, 
the possibility of land law reform, and the pursuit of raising smallholder productivity in staple crops 
for tackling poverty, appears to suggest that the government has further made a shift away from 
agriculture towards manufacturing.125 In fact, the GTP seems to envisage an agriculture sector with a 
role focused on supporting the manufacturing sector, as it states that agriculture “serves as springboard 
to bring structural transformation in the long-run through contribution to industrial growth”; and 
anticipates that “In the plan period, the industry sector will receive utmost emphasis. The Government 
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program will focus on strengthening small-scale manufacturing enterprises, as they are the foundation 
for medium and large scale industries [and] encourages medium and large scale industry expansion.”126 
1. 4. Major Themes  
This thesis shares some of the views of each of the three perspectives discussed in the preceding 
section. It shares the view that Ethiopia needs creating livelihoods outside agriculture, redoubling 
agrarian reform measures to raise smallholder productivity, expanding large-scale commercial 
agriculture, commercialising smallholder agriculture, and intensifying small, medium, and large-scale 
manufacturing in order to effectively tackle the pervasive and deep-rooted poverty situation in the 
country. It is also of the view that Ethiopia needs to exploit the growth of the service sector, which has 
long been an important source of overall economic growth, including particularly the development of 
tourism, of which the country is considered to have an enormous potential and that is believed can be 
an important source of foreign exchange, although thus far the gains from this sector has been meagre 
(Appendix 5, Table 5127; Appendix 7, Table 7128; Appendix 8, Table 8129; Appendix 9, Table 9130). 
However, the major theme of the thesis is that since land law reform can help raise smallholder 
productivity and thereby tackle poverty in countries in roughly comparable position with Ethiopia, land 
law reform enacted as part of the existing ADLI national development strategy centred on raising 
smallholder productivity in staple crops should remain the primary area of policy focus for tackling 
poverty in the country. There are several reasons that justify this theme, most of which have been more 
or less discussed in the preceding sections. The theme is underpinned by the fundamental premise that 
policy focus on achievement of significant growth in smallholder productivity is necessary to tackle 
poverty in Ethiopia effectively for the following five reasons. First, raising smallholder productivity in 
staple crops is necessary, as the current national development need and priority of the country is 
achieving food security. Second, Ethiopia has few resources under commercial exploitation to use as a 
means towards tackling poverty other than a fairly large amount of fertile land, cheap labour force, 
abundant water resources, and climatic conditions generally suitable for agriculture.131 Third, Ethiopia 
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does not have the capital, technological, or hydrocarbon resources that it needs to fund, kick-start, and 
use the growth of large-scale “commercial” agriculture or the manufacturing and service sectors as an 
engine for tackling poverty. And the notion that the country’s smallholder-based agriculture can 
produce the surpluses and growth linkages necessary to kick-start and fuel the growth of large-scale 
“commercial” agriculture or the manufacturing and service sectors with a view to thereby tackling 
poverty and fostering overall economic development has long been tried and failed since the imperial 
times. Fourth, as long as the predominant, but stagnant smallholder agriculture sector continues to be 
able to barely feed the smallholders themselves, who account for the bulk of Ethiopia’s population, any 
possible rate of growth that might be achieved in large-scale commercial agriculture, or in the 
manufacturing and service sectors of the economy can have only marginal effect in tackling poverty in 
the country given their tiny share in providing livelihood and contributing to GDP (Appendix 1, Table 
1132; and Appendix 3, Table 3133; Appendix 5, Table 5134; Appendix 7, Table 7135; Appendix 8, Table 
8136; Appendix 9, Table 9137). Fifth, the achievement of a significant, sustainable growth in smallholder 
productivity and production is thus necessary to effectively tackle poverty in Ethiopia. After all, it is a 
country where smallholder agriculture has historically provided livelihood for close to 85% of the total 
population138, generated food and employment for urban residents accounting for around 14% of the 
rest of the population139, contributed around 95% of the aggregate agricultural output, which generates 
about 90% of the export earnings, supplies around 70% of the raw materials for the predominantly 
agro-based domestic manufacturing and service industries, and accounts for about 50% of GDP.140 
1. 5. Research Problems and Objectives   
As mentioned earlier, the major research problem this thesis seeks to explore is whether, how, and to 
what extent the legal pluralism land law reform gave rise to in the land tenure system might influence 
the effect it has on the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights and shape the 
smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes it delivers in Ethiopia. Therefore, the major objective 
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of the thesis is to examine whether and how land law reform can be used to help raise smallholder 
productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia by making the legal pluralism in the land tenure system 
work to help promote the provision and implementation of the three bundles of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights and thereby improve the conditions of smallholder productivity and poverty in 
the country. Whereas, the other more specific, but interrelated, research problems and objectives of the 
thesis relate to the forms, contents, and implications of the formal state and non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions that reflect the legal pluralism and constitute the land tenure system, in 
the context of which land law reform operates to bring the change in the provision and implementation 
of smallholder land rights that it needs to bring to deliver the smallholder productivity and poverty 
outcomes it is hoped would help achieve. The first specific research problem concerns the issue of land 
policy, which the thesis intends to address with the objective of exploring the advantages that the state 
land ownership policy the government currently enforces, the private ownership policy the critics 
mostly favour, and the non-formal customary land tenure systems society frequently uses have and the 
possibility of adopting a hybrid state-private-customary land policy that enables to establish a land 
tenure system promoting the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights. The second is 
about land laws, which the thesis aims to take up with the objective of highlighting the composition 
and implication of formal and non-formal land laws that set out provisions of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights in the past and present, and identifying the possible forms and contents of land 
laws that would contain optimal provisions of such smallholder land rights in the future. The third 
relates to land institutions, which the thesis seeks to tackle with the objective of outlining formal state 
institutions tasked with the implementation of provisions of smallholder land rights, as well as 
capturing the strengths and shortcomings that the formal state institutions have, the legitimate power, 
practical role, and potential contribution that the judiciary has, and the role, treatment, and potential 
that non-formal customary institutions have in this regard. The remaining parts of this Section will 
further explain those research problems and objectives below. 
1   - Land Law Reform’s Role and Potential concerning Smallholder Productivity and Poverty  
Research that, like this thesis, examines the topic concerning the challenges of land law reform, 
smallholder productivity, and poverty in Ethiopia from the perspective of law is limited in number, 
scope, and quality.141 In view of this, the thesis will primarily employ a legal study approach to explore 
the role and potential land law reform has concerning smallholder productivity and poverty in the 
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country using as reference the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights it brings about through the land policies, laws, and institutions it introduces to the land tenure 
system. Yet, as the subject matter of the topic is multidisciplinary that involves economic, social, and 
political issues and warrants an interdisciplinary approach informed by other perspectives, although it 
is primarily a legal study, the thesis will also combine economic, social, and political approaches. 
Furthermore, the existing literature lacks a comprehensive analysis based on substantive empirical data 
about the role and potential of land law reform concerning smallholder productivity and poverty in 
Ethiopia. This thesis will thus explore the relationship land law reform has to smallholder productivity 
and poverty in the country using as a reference data made available since the collection of national 
statistics on agriculture started in the 1960s.142 This period provides a suitable starting point to assess 
land law reform’s effect as it also marks the enactment of Ethiopia’s first comprehensive land law 
reform linked to its first agriculture-led national development strategy adopted by Haile Sellassie I.143  
2    -  Land Policies and Choice of Land Ownership Policy Promoting Smallholder Land Rights 
As mentioned earlier, on the one hand, land policy plays a critical role in making land law reform 
effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty, and, on the other, land and land-
based smallholder agriculture has historically been a resource of vital economic, social, and political 
importance in Ethiopia.144 Consequently, the choice of a land ownership policy that land law reform 
should introduce to be effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the 
country has been a subject of debate between the government and its supporters defending the policy 
of state ownership it has been enforcing145, and critics arguing against this policy and in favour of the 
introduction of private land ownership policy.146 This debate arose during the heady days of the 1974 
Revolution that deposed Haile Sellassie I, as the issue of whether the policy of state or private 
ownership is preferable for Ethiopia became contentious amongst the discrete groups that were behind 
the Revolution.147 However, the Derg assumed power, enacted the 1975 land law reform that 
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introduced the policy of state land ownership, and claimed it has realised the Revolution’s “land to the 
tiller” rallying cry and put the debate to rest.148 Yet, the debate was rekindled earnestly in the period of 
uncertainty following the fall of the Derg and the coming to power of the EPRDF in May 1991. Many 
development analysts, practitioners, and funders expected a move towards privatisation, considering 
that the country was undergoing a “post-socialist transition”149, and that in discussions held during this 
period of uncertainty it was generally agreed that the policy of state land ownership had detrimental 
effect on smallholder productivity and poverty during the Derg era.150 But the EPRDF persisted with 
its decision to continue the Derg’s policy of state ownership it declared in the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) the TGE issued in November 1991151, which it later validated under the FDRE Constitution.152 
The existing literature is preoccupied with the discussion of this debate, though it has not yet been able 
to help resolve it. For example, Dessalegn, who, though a critic of the current policy of state land 
ownership, does not employ the state vs. private land ownership policy dichotomy, but suggests a third 
way of “associative” land ownership 153, has addressed the possible implications of the preoccupation 
of the literature with the discussion of the debate. According to Dessalegn, the debate has been 
revolving around a narrowly-framed issue, restricting the scope and the quality of research, making the 
positions of the supporters and the critics of the government appear polarised and irreconcilable, and 
preventing a civilised, data-based discussion that can have enabled the country to make an informed 
choice to effectively use land law reform to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty.154  
Therefore, this thesis will analyse the antagonistic arguments of the two poles to the debate and 
examine if the debate is driven more by ideological considerations and economic, social, and political 
interests rather than empirical data as Tekie, Hussein, and Crewett and Korf claimed.155 It will also 
question if the debate is narrowly-framed, which does not provide a sufficient framework to approach 
the challenges of land law reform in Ethiopia, a country that accommodates numerous, diverse non-
formal customary land tenure systems, and is based on a questionable assumption involving a false, 
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binary land ownership policy choice.156 Moreover, the thesis will explore if it is possible for Ethiopia 
to adopt a hybrid policy combining the advantages both the formal state and private ownership policies 
and the non-formal customary land tenure systems offer in promoting smallholder land rights, and seek 
to demonstrate what form and content this hybrid state-private-customary land policy should have. 
3    -  Land Laws and the Provision of Productivity-raising Smallholder Land Rights 
Land laws play a critical role in making land law reform effective in helping raise smallholder 
productivity and tackle poverty in countries like Ethiopia. Land laws set out provisions of smallholder 
land rights that are directly binding, relied upon, and applied during implementation by executive land 
institutions, exercise by smallholders, and enforcement by dispute resolution mechanisms. It is also 
through land laws that land law reform is enacted, the composition of the land tenure system shaped, 
the land policy specified, and the substantive and procedural powers of land institutions determined.157  
However, because the existing literature lacks a comprehensive analysis that systematically outlines 
the provisions of productivity-raising smallholder land rights set out in Ethiopia’s land laws, it has not, 
for example, helped to settle the controversy that has been going on between the government’s 
supporters and critics since the EPRDF officially continued the Derg’s policy of state land ownership 
on whether the land laws the EPRDF issued as part of its post-Derg land law reform have brought 
about change in the provision of smallholder land rights from those set out in the land laws enacted by 
the Derg.158 Consequently, the controversy has contributed to the widespread confusion regarding the 
forms and contents, and jeopardised the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions that have 
actually been set out in the post-Derg land laws. Therefore, this thesis will elaborate the competing 
perspectives and seek to put the controversy to rest by systematising based on their potential 
implications into those that enhance tenure security, facilitate the transfer of rights over land, and 
authorise the collateralisation of land rights, and comparing and contrasting the smallholder land rights 
provisions that are set out in the land laws issued under the post-Derg and the Derg land law reforms. 
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Moreover, the existing literature does not adequately analyse the implications that the federalism the 
EPRDF introduced in post-Derg Ethiopia has to land laws and smallholder land rights provisions they 
set out. The FDRE Constitution has specified the federal government “shall enact laws for the 
utilisation and conservation of land”159, and authorised regional states “To administer land in 
accordance with Federal laws”.160 However, since the federal government has in the land laws it issued 
given regional states power to “enact rural land administration law, which consists of detailed 
provisions necessary to implement this [federal] Proclamation”161, Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and 
SNNPRS have enacted their own land laws setting out smallholder land rights provisions. As this 
implies that due to the federalism the EPRDF introduced smallholder land rights in post-Derg Ethiopia 
have been subject to five different formal land laws, the thesis will explore in detail the salient features 
and possible implications of the post-Derg federalism pertaining to the division of federal and regional 
powers on land matters to the forms and contents land laws setting out the provisions of productivity-
raising smallholder land rights in Ethiopia. It will also examine the nature, relationship, and interplay 
of the federal and regional land laws, as well as the constitutionality and legality particularly of the 
regional land laws and the harmonisation of the smallholder land rights provisions that the regional 
land laws set out with each other and with those embodied in the land laws of the federal government. 
Furthermore, the existing literature does not adequately analyse the role and potential non-formal 
customary land laws might have with respect to setting out smallholder land rights provisions, though 
they govern more than 85% of land relations. Therefore, this thesis will analyse the practical role and 
potential contribution non-formal customary land laws might have in that regard by systematising the 
smallholder land rights provisions they set out. It will also explore the formal treatment given to non-
formal customary land laws, and highlight the relationship and interplay of formal federal and regional 
state and non-formal customary land laws as regards setting out provisions of smallholder land rights. 
4    - Land Institutions and the Implementation of the Provisions of Smallholder Land Rights 
Land law reform cannot be effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in 
countries like Ethiopia without land institutions ensuring implementation of the smallholder land rights 
provision of the land laws. As Bruce noted, “Stipulating the desired situation in law is not enough. All 
                                                 
159
  FDRE Constitution: Article 51(5). 
160
  FDRE Constitution: Article 52(2) [d]. 
161
  FDRE Proclamation 2005b: Article 17(1). 
37 
 
of us who work in this area know of elegant laws that had little impact for want of implementation.”162 
However, the existing literature tends to focus on assessment of smallholder land rights provisions as 
they appear on paper (law-in-the-books), and does not adequately examine the implementation of those 
land rights in practice, as well as the role land institutions play in this regard (law-in-action). Yet, in 
Ethiopia, implementation is an equally significant problem as the provision of smallholder land rights. 
For instance, Crewett, Ayalneh, and Korf have explained why implementation is an equally important 
problem, noting that “we do not investigate differentiations of rights of actors who on paper are 
entitled to same bundle of rights, though we are very aware there are marked de facto imbalances with 
regard to land rights in Ethiopia.”163 Thus, this thesis will make a detailed analysis involving not only 
the assessment of smallholder land rights provisions on paper, but also examination of implementation 
of those land rights in practice, as well as exploration of the land institutions involved in the process. 
The existing literature does not also adequately analyse the implications the federalism the EPRDF 
introduced in post-Derg Ethiopia has to formal state executive institutions, and thus to implementation 
of smallholder land rights provisions. The FDRE Constitution conferred upon the federal government 
not only legislative, but also executive power over land matters. According to the Constitution, the 
Council of Ministers, which is the highest executive organ of the federal government along with the 
Prime Minister, shall ensure “implementation of laws and decisions adopted by the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives.” In contrast, though the Constitution has authorised regions “To administer land in 
accordance with Federal laws”, it did not provide definition of what this power “to administer land” 
constitutes.164 Despite that, since the federal government has in the land law it issued conferred upon 
the regions power to “establish institutions at all levels that shall implement rural land administration 
and land use systems”165, Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPRS have put into effect their own formal 
land institutions dealing with smallholder land rights. Thus, this thesis will explore the formal federal 
and regional state executive land institutions carrying out implementation of smallholder land rights 
provisions, as well as the constitutionality, legality, and consistency of regional state land institutions. 
Moreover, the existing literature does not adequately analyse the role that the judiciary composed of 
formal regular courts has in ensuring the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions, and 
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thereby making land law reform effective. However, it is well-documented that the judiciary plays a 
critical role in this regard through the interpretation, explanation, and application of land rights 
provisions that it conducts whilst performing its traditional function of dispute resolution, as well as by 
way of the public confidence and reliable legal environment the mere fact of its existence creates.166 
The FDRE Constitution has declared that “Judicial Powers, both at Federal and State levels, are vested 
in courts”167, and that federal courts have “judicial power over federal matters.”168 Despite that, the 
judiciary appears to have been excluded from the function of dispute resolution pertaining to 
smallholder land rights provisions, as this function is now performed mostly by non-formal customary 
institutions, and, where formal state institutions are involved, by the Kebele office or the so-called 
“social courts”, which are part of the executive at the grassroots-level. As Baker accurately put it, 
“Land disputes first go to customary mediation chaired by the Kebele chairperson who is a member of 
the Land Administration Commission. They may also go to Social courts.”169 The thesis will thus in 
detail explore the judiciary’s legal power, practical role, and potential contribution in ensuring 
implementation of smallholder land rights provisions and broadly in making land law reform effective. 
Furthermore, the existing literature does not adequately analyse implications of legal pluralism to the 
implementation of smallholder land rights provisions. However, in Ethiopia, besides formal federal 
and regional state land institutions, implementation of smallholder land rights provisions is conducted 
by non-formal customary land institutions, to which smallholders resort more frequently.170 This thesis 
will thus examine what role and treatment those non-formal institutions have; if there are legal and 
practical impediments or other reasons that make smallholders shun formal institutions and more 
frequently use non-formal ones; and what advantages and disadvantages non-formal institutions have. 
1. 6. Hypothesis  
This thesis examines the proposition that land law reform can be used to help raise smallholder 
productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia, but only by recognising legal pluralism and concentrating 
                                                 
166
  Rolfes, 2006:142; Bruce, 2006a:4; World Bank and Deininger, 2003:7, 151-152, and 155-156; FAO, 2002a:4; 
USAID, 2004: ix; DFID, 2004b:9; AusAID, 2000:44; IFAD, 2008:18-19, and 2012:8. 
167
  FDRE Constitution: Article 79(1). 
168
  FDRE Constitution: Article 80(1). 
169
  Baker, 2013:213. 
170
  Connolly, 2005:7; Aberra, 1998; Beckstrom, 1973:571; Hailegabriel, 2004; Berhanu, Berhanu, and Seyoum, 2003; 
EEA/EEPRI, 2002; Yigremew, 2002; Aberra, 1998; Shiferaw, 1995; Pausewang, 1983; Krzeczunowicz, 1963. 
39 
 
limited legal resources, implementation capacity, and popular receptivity upon changing just those 
formal or non-formal land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system that most constrain 
the provision and implementation of bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights enhancing 
tenure security, facilitating transfer of rights over land, and authorising collateralisation of land rights. 
1. 7. Research Questions   
1   - Land Law Reform’s Role and Potential concerning Smallholder Productivity and Poverty  
a) Whether and how can land law reform be used to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty in general, and in Ethiopia in particular? 
b) Whether, how, and to what extent does legal pluralism in the land tenure system influence land 
law reform’s effect on smallholder land rights, smallholder productivity, and poverty in 
Ethiopia; and how may land law reform be used to make legal pluralism contribute positively? 
2    -  Land Policies and Choice of Land Ownership Policy Promoting Smallholder Land Rights 
a) What advantages do the state land ownership policy the government currently enforces, the 
private ownership policy the critics mostly favour, and the non-formal customary land tenure 
systems society frequently uses offer in promoting productivity-raising smallholder land rights? 
b) Is it possible for Ethiopia to adopt a hybrid state-private-customary policy combining 
advantages state and private land ownership policies and non-formal customary arrangements 
offer in promoting smallholder land rights; if so, what form and content should the policy have? 
3    -  Land Laws and the Provision of Productivity-raising Smallholder Land Rights 
a) To what extent do Ethiopia’s formal state land laws set out smallholder land rights provisions? 
b) What role do non-formal customary land laws have in providing for smallholder land rights?  
4    - Land Institutions and the Implementation of the Provisions of Smallholder Land Rights 
a) Which formal state land institutions undertake implementation of the provisions of smallholder 
land rights in Ethiopia; and what legal powers and practical roles do those institutions have? 
b) What role, treatment, and potential do non-formal customary institutions have in this regard? 
1. 8. Methodology 
As the study is interdisciplinary in nature, library-based and field researches were conducted, and a 
combination of research methods and techniques for data collection, analysis, and interpretation was 
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employed.171 The bulk of quantitative data used to assess the role of land law reform regarding 
smallholder productivity and poverty was generated from secondary sources. But primary sources 
have also been employed to supplement and augment the secondary sources and to obtain contextually 
specific qualitative information about the interplay of formal state and non-formal customary land 
tenure systems governing smallholder land rights at the local level, and to capture the experiences, 
judgements, and perceptions of smallholders and development analysts, practitioners, and funders. 
The library-based research included review of the literature on the formulation and implementation of 
land law reforms intended to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in general, and in 
Ethiopia in particular. Specifically, it included: (i) analysis of land policies, laws, and institutions the 
country’s governments established through land law reform; (ii) examination of monographs, reports, 
and other materials issued by local and international law and development analysts, governmental and 
nongovernmental organisations, bilateral and multilateral funders, and other institutions; and (iii) 
assessment of pertinent best practices and experiences. Whereas, the field research included: (i) 
assessment of non-formal customary land tenure systems; (ii) formal and informal interviews with law 
and development analysts, practitioners, and funders involved in, or having knowledge of Ethiopia’s  
land law reform experience; (iii) focus group discussions with smallholders; and (iii) pilot community-
level observation visits. Finally, the data so collected was organised and cross-referenced. Then, the 
data was entered, analysed, and interpreted, which provided the bases for study results set forth here. 
1. 9. Scope 
Chronologically, the study focuses primarily on land law reform, smallholder agricultural productivity, 
poverty, and the challenges of legal pluralism in Ethiopia since the fall of the Derg and the coming to 
power of the EPRDF in May 1991. However, neither law nor development is static. As such, relevant 
pre-May 1991 issues will also be discussed in as much as they are useful to provide a historical 
background and comparative reference for the main themes of the study within the defined timeframe. 
Demographically, the scope of the study is limited to exploring land law reform’s relationship to 
smallholder productivity, poverty, and legal pluralism in rural Ethiopia for three reasons. First, the 
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land tenure system in force in rural areas has a direct bearing on smallholder productivity and poverty 
in the country and is thus more relevant to the subject matter of the thesis. Second, since the vast 
majority of Ethiopians, close to 85% of them, are smallholders living in rural areas, they can arguably 
represent the country’s overall population sufficiently. Third, the land tenure system operating in rural 
areas affects all Ethiopians, as it pertains to smallholder agriculture, which provides livelihood for the 
vast majority of the population, is the mainstay of the economy, and determines economic, social, and 
political power relations in the country. The study does not, therefore, cover the effect of land law 
reform in urban areas, which, though similar in such aspects as the policy of state ownership of land 
enforced throughout Ethiopia, is markedly different and warrants a separate study by its own merit. 
Geographically, since components of the federal polity the EPRDF introduced were forged to have 
their own legislative, executive, and judicial powers under the FDRE Constitution172, the federal 
government and the regional states of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPRS, which thus constitute 
largely independent legal systems, have put into effect their own land laws and institutions governing 
smallholder land rights. The land tenure systems of the federal government and the regional states of 
Tigray, Oromia, and SNNPRS have thus been selected to be areas of primary focus for the study. That 
is because they are arguably capable of sufficiently representing post-Derg Ethiopia as regards the 
subject matter of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty, as well as in terms of their 
economic, social, and political importance. Apart from the Amhara region and the Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa City Administrations, where the federal government’s land tenure system is in force, those 
three regions together account for around 85% of the population, about 90% of the cultivated land, and 
close to 50% of the area of Ethiopia.173 They are also arguably sufficient representatives of Ethiopia’s 
diverse demographic, geopolitical, and socio-economic setup - Tigray the northern part, the federal 
government the central and the more urbanised, and Oromia and SNNPRS the rest of the country. 
Thematically, the principal focus of the study is the role of land law reform in improving the provision 
and implementation of smallholder land rights, thereby helping raise smallholder productivity, and 
tackle poverty in Ethiopia through the formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, and 
institutions of the land tenure systems established by the federal government and the regional states of 
Tigray, Oromia, and SNNPRS. The study will thus analyse formal and non-formal land policies, laws, 
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and institutions constituting the land tenure systems of the federal government and those regional 
states in terms of provision and implementation of smallholder land rights for three reasons. First, 
there is no such thing as “the land tenure system of Ethiopia” during the abovementioned principal 
timeframe of the study, but the land tenure systems of the federal government and of the regional 
states that they established through the post-Derg land law reform. Second, the land tenure systems of 
the federal government and the three regional states selected to be the areas of primary focus for the 
study comprise a large variety of land laws consisting in a wide range of texts and provisions, which 
requires an extensive separate study and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Third, the principal focus 
of the study is land law reform, the process, but not land law, which is only one effect of that process. 
1. 10. Chapter Outline  
Chapter 2 briefly reviews the relevant law and development literature to examine whether and how 
land law reform can help raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty, and to explore 
why, how, and to what extent legal pluralism shapes the smallholder productivity and poverty 
outcomes of land law reform in general both from theoretical and practical perspectives by way of 
analysis of the pertinent research and experience from countries in roughly comparable position with 
Ethiopia. The first section outlines the fundamental theoretical considerations that generally appear to 
underpin the land law reforms undertaken in Ethiopia and other sub-Saharan African and Asian 
countries, though not specifically stated as such in case. The second section elaborates the definitions 
and implications of the bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights to do with enhancement 
of tenure security, facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, and authorisation of collateralisation 
of land rights, explains why land law reform can help raise smallholder productivity if the change it 
brings to the land tenure system’s land policies, laws, and institutions improves the provision and 
implementation of those land rights, and outlines other factors critical for success. The third section 
then highlights how land law reform can by helping raise smallholder productivity contribute towards 
tackling poverty. The fourth section deals with the definition and origin of legal pluralism in the land 
tenure system that involves formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions 
governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights. Finally, the fifth section 
examines the implication of legal pluralism, including whether, how, and to what extent it shapes land 
law reform’s smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes in countries like Ethiopia. 
Chapter 3 discusses the political economy of land law reform, smallholder productivity, poverty, and 
legal pluralism in Ethiopia. The first section briefly outlines the salient features of the country that can 
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help explain the national importance of land-based smallholder agriculture both as a source of poverty 
and development potential, influence the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of land law 
reform, dictate the origin, condition, and implication of legal pluralism, and determine the concomitant 
fate of smallholder productivity and poverty in the past, present, and future in Ethiopia. The second 
and the third sections highlight the land law reform experience of the modern state of Ethiopia during 
the reigns of Emperors Menelik II and Haile Sellassie I, the rule of the Derg military junta, and the 
incumbency of the EPRDF. The two sections narrate the pertinent chronologies, ideological, policy, 
and constitutional frameworks, national development needs and priorities, influential internal and 
external settings, and continuities and discontinuities that possibly shaped the formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of the land law reforms enacted, impacted the condition and 
implication of legal pluralism, and affected the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes 
achieved in the country. Next, the fourth section specifically addresses the issue of legal pluralism in 
the context of the land law reform experience of Ethiopia, with particular emphasis on the formal 
treatment and the practical role of the non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions in the 
land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights, and 
explores why, how, and to what extent the manner of their treatment might have influenced the 
smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes that land law reform delivered. The fifth section 
concludes the Chapter by summarising the contributions that land law reforms introduced throughout 
the modern history of Ethiopia have made in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
Chapter 4 specifically addresses the issue of land policies and the choice of a land ownership policy 
that a land law reform should introduce in order to bring about a land tenure system improving the 
provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights in Ethiopia. The first 
section briefly introduces the definition and implication of land policy to the effectiveness of land law 
reform intended to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty, as well as the longstanding 
debate concerning the choice of a land ownership policy preferable for Ethiopia. The second section 
examines the justifications of the EPRDF government for upholding the Derg’s policy of state 
ownership of land. The third section investigates the arguments of the critics against the current policy 
and in favour of the introduction of a private land ownership policy. The fourth section then revisits the 
debate concerning the choice of a land ownership policy for Ethiopia, and outlines the advantages the 
state and private land ownership policies might have in promoting smallholder land rights. The fifth 
section considers if it is possible and preferable for Ethiopia to use land law reform to adopt a hybrid 
state-private-customary land policy that combines the advantages both the formal state and private land 
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ownership policies and the non-formal customary land tenure systems might offer in promoting 
smallholder land rights, and demonstrates the form and content that this hybrid policy should have. 
Chapter 5 analyses land laws, both formal federal and regional state and non-formal customary, that 
embody provisions of productivity-raising smallholder land rights in Ethiopia. The first section 
examines the forms and contents of the provisions of smallholder land rights set out in the formal land 
laws currently in force in the country, as compared to those that were in effect during the Derg era. The 
second section outlines formal land laws setting out smallholder land rights provisions pertaining to the 
enhancement of tenure security. The third section highlights formal land laws embodying smallholder 
land rights provisions related to the facilitation of transfer of rights over land. The fourth section 
explores formal land laws containing smallholder land rights provisions to do with the authorisation of 
collateralisation of land rights. The fifth section then addresses the implications of federalism and legal 
pluralism to land laws and their provisions setting out smallholder land rights in post-Derg Ethiopia. 
Chapter 6 deals with land institutions, both formal federal and regional state and non-formal 
customary, that currently carry out the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions set out in 
the land laws now in force in Ethiopia. The first section briefly introduces the definition and 
implication of land institutions to the effectiveness of land law reform intended to help raise 
smallholder productivity and tackle poverty, as well as the impact of federalism and legal pluralism on 
the composition and operation of land institutions, particularly in post-Derg Ethiopia. The second and 
the third sections explore, respectively, the formal federal and regional state executive institutions 
entrusted with the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions, highlight the composition and 
operation of, and identify the strengths and shortcomings that those institutions might have. The fourth 
section then addresses the interpretation, explanation, and application of smallholder land rights 
provisions in dispute resolution, and outlines the identity, structure, and procedure of the formal 
federal and regional institutions involved in this process. This section also discusses the legal power, 
practical role, and potential contribution the judiciary has in ensuring implementation by formal federal 
and regional executive institutions, exercise by smallholders, and enforcement by itself as dispute 
resolution mechanism of smallholder land rights provisions and thereby making land law reform 
effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia. The fifth section 
considers the exercise and enforcement of smallholder land rights provisions by the smallholders 
themselves. It particularly explores if there are legal, practical, or any other possible reasons that might 
motivate the country’s smallholders to resort to the non-formal customary land tenure systems for the 
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exercise and enforcement of their land rights more frequently than they do to the formal state system. 
Chapter 7 exclusively explores the scope and mechanisms available for intervention through land law 
reform to make legal pluralism in the land tenure system work to help promote the provision and 
implementation of smallholder land rights, and thereby improve smallholder productivity and poverty 
conditions in Ethiopia. The first section briefly highlights the relationship of the formal state and non-
formal customary land tenure systems, emphasises the impracticality of efforts made to repeal and 
replace one system by another, demonstrates the inherent inability of both systems to provide an 
adequate framework for raising smallholder productivity and tackling poverty by themselves as things 
stand now, outlines advantages both systems offer in the provision and implementation of smallholder 
land rights, and considers they complement rather than substitute one another. The second section 
specifically examines advantages of non-formal customary systems over formal state ones, particularly 
as regards the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights. The third section outlines the 
disadvantages of the non-formal systems, and sets the scene for the discussion of possible models for 
the formal treatment of the non-formal systems using land law reform. Specifically, the fourth section 
outlines the advantages, disadvantages, and practical examples of the models of total abolition, full 
non-interference, and complete incorporation. The fifth section then addresses the model of selective 
incorporation that the thesis considers as the most appropriate model for the treatment of non-formal 
systems in Ethiopia, and highlights the justifications, drawbacks, and practical cases of this model. 
Chapter 8 outlines the overall conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. It summarises the 
conclusions the study arrived at, and evaluates the thesis in light of what it set out to accomplish. The 
Chapter highlights major lessons learned about whether, how, and to what extent the legal pluralism in 
the land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights in 
Ethiopia that land law reform gave rise to, and in the context of which it operates might have 
contributed to the failure of past land law reforms to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty as successive governments anticipated. It also offers suggested ways forward on how the 
country may use land law reform to make this legal pluralism work to help promote the provision and 
implementation of smallholder land rights, thereby raise smallholder productivity, and tackle poverty.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review: Land Law Reform’s Relationship to 
Smallholder Productivity, Poverty, and Legal Pluralism  
As Schultz noted in his 1979 Nobel Prize Lecture, “Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we 
knew the economics of being poor, we would know much of the economics that really matters. Most of 
the world’s poor people earn their living from agriculture, so if we knew the economics of agriculture, 
we would know much of the economics of being poor.”174 As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is generally 
known that most people considered poor in the world earn their living from smallholder agriculture, 
and live in developing countries with smallholder-based economies, such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa, including Ethiopia. It is also generally thought that land law reform designed to change the 
constraining land policies, laws, and institutions, address structural problems of the land tenure system, 
and improve the provision and implementation of the land rights of smallholders with a bearing on 
their productivity, and is introduced as part of an agriculture-led national development strategy along 
with agrarian reform aimed at alleviating technical problems of the smallholder sector can help raise 
smallholder productivity, tackle poverty, and even foster overall economic development in those 
countries. However, a land law reform introduced in such countries operates to bring the change in the 
provision and implementation of smallholder land rights necessary to deliver the smallholder 
productivity and poverty outcomes it is thought would help achieve through a land tenure system 
characterised by legal pluralism, which comprises not only the formal state land policies, laws, and 
institutions established under the current and previous land law reforms, but also the pre-existing non-
formal customary ones.175 This Chapter briefly reviews the relevant law and development literature to 
examine whether and how land law reform helps raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in 
countries like Ethiopia notwithstanding challenges legal pluralism in the land tenure system might pose 
from theoretical and practical perspectives by way of analysis of the pertinent research and experience. 
2. 1. Theoretical Considerations 
Despite being undertaken in different contexts, the land law reforms that the governments of Haile 
Sellassie I, the Derg, and the EPRDF introduced in Ethiopia tended to be generally underpinned by 
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similar fundamental theoretical considerations, though not specifically stated as such in each case. 
Moreover, the land law reforms that were carried out in other sub-Saharan African and Asian countries 
that were or are in roughly comparable position with Ethiopia, including those that had successful land 
law reform experience, appear to have been underpinned by similar theoretical considerations. 
Generally, the land law reforms undertaken in Ethiopia and in those other sub-Saharan African and 
Asian countries tended to be underpinned by the following five fundamental theoretical considerations. 
First, land is an indispensable factor of production in any form of agriculture.176 However, land is even 
more important for smallholders in developing countries like Ethiopia than for, for example, farmers 
practising large-scale commercial agriculture, or those in developed countries.177 That is because 
smallholders often depend mainly on the use of their plots of land, along with family labour, farm 
animals, often “backward” farming implements, and rainwater, to produce for self-subsistence and 
where possible the local market.178 In contrast, the work of farmers practising large-scale commercial 
agriculture, or those in developed countries, is characterised by the use of modern external inputs, such 
as improved seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, and pesticides; more advanced farming implements; and 
access to credit, research, and the panoply of modern management practices and marketing services.179 
Smallholders are often referred to interchangeably as “peasant”, “small”, “family”, “subsistence”, 
“non-commercial”, “small-scale” “undercapitalised”, “low-technology”, “resource-poor”, “low-input”, 
or “low-output” farmers; and described in a manner that emphasises the constraints they broadly share 
as compared to other farmers, including the small size of their landholdings, shortage of capital and 
technology, lack of access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services, vulnerability to 
risk, and being subsistence-oriented.180 Yet, though most smallholders may indeed be land, capital, and 
technology constrained, more vulnerable to risk, and poorly linked to markets as compared to most 
large-scale commercial farmers, or those in developed countries, not all smallholders are equally 
constrained, vulnerable, and subsistence-oriented. In short, due to differences across and within 
countries and smallholder themselves, the term “smallholder” does not have a universal working 
definition. As Nagayets noted, “The sole consensus on small farms may be the lack of a sole 
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definition.”181 For instance, the 2008 World Development Report describes those working land of 2 
hectares or less as smallholders.182 Whereas, the Ethiopian government’s Central Statistical Agency of 
Ethiopia (CSA) defines smallholders as “peasants” cultivating less than 25.2 hectares of land, and 
classifies all others as large-scale commercial farmers.183 Nonetheless, close to 85% of Ethiopian 
smallholders cultivate land of 2 hectares or less (Appendix 1, Table 1184; and Appendix 2, Table 
2185).186 However, since definition is necessary, the most common way of defining a “smallholder” that 
this thesis follows emphasises the relative smallness of smallholders’ landholdings, which is around 2 
hectares, followed by other constraints and features they broadly share as compared to other farmers.187  
Second, because land is the most important factor of production in agriculture that smallholders in 
developing countries like Ethiopia use, the manner of provision and implementation of the land rights 
of smallholders is considered as a critical determinant of smallholder agricultural productivity in those 
countries. “Productivity” is a measure reflecting efficiency in turning inputs into outputs, with inputs 
valued at their social opportunity costs.188 It is measured in one of the following two ways. The first is 
partial or single-factor productivity, which is a measure of output per unit of one or some of the inputs 
used.189 In this way, smallholder productivity might be measured, for example, by calculating output 
per unit of land, which is called “yield”190, or labour, or both without regard to any other inputs. The 
other way is total factor productivity, which is a measure of output per unit of total inputs utilised.191 In 
this way, smallholder productivity might be measured, for instance, by calculating output per unit of all 
of the land, labour, and other external agricultural inputs, implements, and services used.192 Whichever 
measure is employed, however, smallholder productivity tends to be generally low in countries like 
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Ethiopia.193 For example, the average cereal yield of smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa was only 
around 1.0 ton/hectare during the period between 1960 and 2005, which is less than a fifth of the 
average yield of farmers in developed countries such as the USA.194 Moreover, the productivity gap 
between levels of smallholders’ actual yield and technical potential yield195 in sub-Saharan Africa was 
76% in 2005, which contrasts with the 11% average yield gap in East Asian countries such as China.196 
But since neither smallholders nor countries in sub-Saharan Africa are a homogenous bunch, there is a 
significant difference in smallholder productivity across the region. For instance, the average cereal 
yield of smallholders in Uganda during the period between 1991 and 2000 was almost 1.7 ton/hectare, 
more than double the close to 0.8 ton/hectare average yield of smallholders in Senegal.197 
Third, because smallholder agriculture constitutes the primary source of livelihood and the mainstay of 
the economy, poverty is widely considered to be closely linked to low smallholder productivity in 
countries like Ethiopia.198 This is evidenced by the fact that smallholders make up the majority of the 
population and the poor in most of those countries199, which have the highest and most pervasive 
poverty rates in the world.200 Though estimates vary, it is generally thought smallholder agriculture 
provides livelihood for close to 70% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa.201 For example, in 
Ethiopia, around 13 million households accounting for around 75 million or 85% of the country’s total 
population of about 90 million earned their livelihood from smallholder agriculture in 2008 (Appendix 
1, Table 1202; and Appendix 2, Table 2203). Smallholder agriculture has also historically contributed 
close to 95% of Ethiopia’s aggregate output in agriculture (Appendix 3, Table 3204), which generates 
around 88% of export earnings, supplies about 73% of raw materials for the predominantly agro-based 
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manufacturing and service industries, and accounts for more than 50% of GDP.205 
Since “poverty” is a concept that has been evolving continuously, different approaches have been 
developed to define and measure it.206 The standard approach in the economics literature is one that 
takes “money metric” indicator of welfare expressed in monetary terms.207 This approach identifies a 
shortage of income or consumption in monetary terms or in calorie intake as compared to a 
predetermined “minimum” level called “poverty line”, below which people are deemed poor.208 The 
poverty line used as a reference for comparison can be either international or national. For instance, for 
the purpose of a comparative measurement of income poverty between countries, international poverty 
lines are used, including the two dollar a day poverty line, and the one dollar a day extreme poverty 
line.209 In contrast, for consumption poverty, the intake of less than 1,960 calories a day is defined as 
hunger.210 However, this traditional approach has been increasingly sidelined since the 1980s211, as 
poverty evolved into a “multidimensional” concept that is understood to have “important non-
economic dimensions”.212 In contrast, the participatory and human development approaches that have 
since been gaining wider acceptance take a multidimensional view of poverty as the deprivation of 
basic necessities, including inadequate food and shelter, little or no access to health and education 
services, and sometimes add to this catalogue such features as powerlessness, insecurity, social 
exclusion, lack of access to basic infrastructure, and even exposure to violence.213 Specifically, the 
UNDP employs the Human Development Index that looks into life expectancy, literacy, and standard 
of living as indicators of poverty.214 Another approach that has taken shape with the advent of Sen’s 
“capability” theory in the early 1990s is one that defines and measures poverty in terms of the lack of 
ability or opportunity necessary for betterment.215 Yet another approach that has been gaining 
increasing acceptance recently is the “asset poverty” approach, which considers the extent of control 
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and enjoyment of assets such as land to define and measure poverty.216 A further approach defines and 
measures poverty by applying absolute or relative standards. Poverty is defined in relative terms as 
deprivation or lack of means to fulfil one’s needs, roles, and goals as compared to, for instance, the 
median or mean standard of the rest of society.217 On the other hand, proponents of an absolute 
definition in the sense of poverty having an absolute or fixed core warn against a relative definition, 
lest it stands in the way of disciplined debate and effective research and intervention efforts.218 
Therefore, a third group sees poverty as having both “universal” (non-contextual) and “particularistic” 
(contextual) aspects, and thus adopts a combination of the relative and absolute definitions.219  
None of the abovementioned approaches can alone usefully define and measure poverty. However, as 
Dercon noted, each approach provides some insights and helps get a complete picture of the cause and 
extent of poverty, and offers possible benchmarks against which development interventions can be 
formulated and evaluated.220 Since this thesis focuses on the role of challenges pertaining to provision 
and implementation of land rights as determinants of smallholder productivity and thus poverty, and 
the potential of land law reform as development intervention in helping raise smallholder productivity 
and thus tackle poverty, it adopts an approach that combines elements drawn from different approaches 
and takes into account not only the “statics”, but also the “dynamics” of poverty. Basically, the static 
aspect is about the description of poverty in terms of deprivation of basic necessities and other features 
that the approaches discussed above before Sen’s capability approach use to define and measure 
poverty.221 Whereas, the dynamic aspect draws from Sen’s capability and asset poverty approaches and 
looks into the ways in which, and the extent to which people move into and out of poverty.222  
Fourth, though described in different ways, two major factors are generally identified as contributing 
towards low smallholder productivity and therefore poverty in developing countries like Ethiopia. One 
is structural problems pertaining to the land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system 
that constrain the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights.223 To 
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specifically illustrate, drawing from representative household surveys conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zambia between 1990 and 2000, Jayne et al. have demonstrated the 
relationship that problems associated with the provision and implementation of land rights imputable 
to the land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system have with smallholder productivity 
and poverty.224 The other factor is technical problems in the smallholder sector’s modus operandi 
related to lack of access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services.225 For instance, IFPRI 
and Asenso-Okyere and Samson have noted that “Africa’s low agricultural productivity has many 
causes, including scarce and scant knowledge of improved practices, low use of improved seed, low 
fertiliser use, inadequate irrigation, conflict, absence of strong institutions, ineffective policies, lack of 
incentives, and prevalence of diseases.”226 In relation to Ethiopia, Coates et al. have observed that “As 
the agricultural techniques practiced in the rural areas are largely non-modernised and dependent on 
rainfall, it is not surprising that many households are highly vulnerable to regular shocks, including 
fluctuations in annual rainfall, crop blights, pest infestation, and livestock epidemics.”227 Moreover, a 
study the International Institute for Labour Studies published has captured the nature and contribution 
of those two major factors to low smallholder productivity and poverty in the country, noting that 
“Ethiopian agriculture is overwhelmingly small-scale peasant agriculture, characterised by backward 
land tenure systems, inefficient methods of cultivation and poor distribution facilities. The logical 
corollary of this state of affairs is low per capita productivity, income, consumption and savings.”228 
Fifth, it is therefore generally thought that land law reform designed to change the constraining land 
policies, laws, and institutions, address structural problems of the land tenure system, and improve the 
provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and is introduced as part 
of an agriculture-led national development strategy along with agrarian reform that alleviates technical 
problems of the smallholder sector can help raise smallholder productivity, thereby tackle poverty, and 
even foster overall economic development in countries like Ethiopia. Yet, as mentioned earlier, issues 
of causality and linkage remain to be the subject of debate and there is no “right” template for an 
effective land law reform project. This almost inevitably leads to the questions whether, why, and how 
land law reform might help raise smallholder productivity, which is the main focus of the next section. 
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2. 2. Land Law Reform’s Role in Raising Smallholder 
Productivity  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, land law reform is thought can help raise smallholder productivity 
by improving the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights with a bearing on their 
productivity through the change it brings to the land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure 
system. This Section will elaborate the meanings and significances of these smallholder land rights, 
which are here systematically grouped based on their potential implications into those that enhance 
tenure security, facilitate the transfer of rights over land, and authorise the collateralisation of land 
rights, and referred to as “the three bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights”. It will also 
explain why and how land law reform can help raise smallholder productivity if the change it brings to 
the land tenure system’s land policies, laws, and institutions leads to improvement in the provision and 
implementation of land rights that bring about the enhancement tenure security, facilitation of the 
transfer of rights over land, and authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights for smallholders. 
2. 2. 1. The Enhancement of Tenure Security  
One way in which land law reform is believed can help raise smallholder productivity is by putting 
into effect land policies and laws improving the provision of smallholder land rights contributing 
towards the enhancement of tenure security, such as those that clearly define land access, occupation, 
and use rights, guarantee the exclusion of others from such rights, outline management obligations, 
stipulate stricter eviction and confiscation requirements, specify expropriation and compensation 
mechanisms, as well as land institutions, administrative and judicial, entrusted with substantive and 
procedural powers that ensure implementation and the protection of the rights holder. The term “tenure 
security”, defined broadly here, pertains to the assurance, confidence, or expectation of smallholders to 
remain in physical possession of, and enjoy the rights to, and the fruits of their landholdings, as well as 
the value of investments and improvements they make with their labour or asset, continuously without 
interruption, imposition, or interference from outside sources, including the state, private individuals, 
and other entities, either in the course of use or upon transfer.229 A land law reform that brings about 
the enhancement of tenure security is thought can provide smallholders with incentive to properly 
manage, undertake long-term investments on, and make improvements to their landholdings, which is 
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believed would not only lead to sustainable land use, but also help raise smallholder productivity.230 
Though framed in different ways, definitions of tenure security emphasise the three core components 
that the concept comprises: breadth, duration, and assurance. For example, Place, Roth, and Hazel have 
elaborated these three components in their seminal work on land tenure security and agricultural 
performance in Africa.231 According to Place, Roth, and Hazel, “breadth” refers to the quantity and 
quality of the bundles of land rights held, with quantity pertaining to the number and quality to the 
importance of the land rights held. For instance, in terms of quantity, the bundle of land rights held by 
a smallholder with lifelong usufructuary access to land who has the right to bequeath the land is 
considered broader than that of another smallholder with lifelong usufructuary access to land but does 
not have the right to bequeath it. In contrast, in terms of quality, the bundle of land rights held by a 
smallholder with the right to sell the land, who is entitled to not only use, but also rent out the land, is 
considered broader than that of the bundle of land rights held by another smallholder who only has the 
right to use the land. Whereas, both in terms of quantity and quality, the bundle of land rights held by a 
smallholder with private ownership of land, who has the right to occupy, use, and alienate the land and 
its fruits, is considered broader than that of the bundle of land rights held by another smallholder with 
lifelong usufructuary access to land, who has the right to occupy and use, but not alienate the land and 
its fruits. It is generally thought that the broader the quantity and quality of the bundle of land rights 
held, the more the land tenure security will be. “Duration” relates to the length of time over which a 
smallholder occupies, uses, and alienates the land and its fruits, depending on the breadth of the 
bundles of land rights held. Duration is important because in order to be considered to have tenure 
security, one must possess a sufficient time horizon that enables to remain in physical possession of, 
make improvements to, and enjoy the benefits of one’s rights over land. For example, the duration of 
the land rights of a smallholder with lifelong usufructuary access who has the right to bequeath the 
land is considered longer than that of another smallholder with lifelong usufructuary access but does 
not have the right to bequeath it. It is generally thought that the longer the duration of the land rights 
held, the more the land tenure security will be. “Assurance” pertains to the ability of a smallholder to 
exercise one’s land rights exclusively and to seek the protection and enforcement those land rights in 
the event of interference from others. Therefore, the degree of assurance depends on not only the 
breadth and duration of the land rights held, but also the possibility and viability of competing claims 
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over, and the existence and strength of executive and judicial institutions for the implementation, 
protection, and enforcement of those land rights. For instance, despite the adequacy of the breadth and 
duration of the land rights held, assurance may be lacking where the land is subject to competing 
claims, or there is a weak institutional framework for implementation, protection, and enforcement. It 
is generally thought that the greater the degree of assurance, the more the tenure security will be.232 
Though from different perspectives, numerous other analysts have also dealt with the concept of tenure 
security, the three components it comprises, and the relationship it has to smallholder productivity, 
particularly in the context of sub-Saharan African countries like Ethiopia.233 For example, Roth and 
Haase have discussed tenure security by analysing the concept from the point of view of the distinction 
between the legal and economic dimensions embedded in the three components that make up the 
concept. As per Roth and Haase, the legal dimension refers to the breadth, duration, and assurance 
pertaining to the bundles of land rights held de jure, whilst the economic dimension relates to the value 
of the benefits derived de facto from the tenure security enjoyed over the land. Thus, the economic 
benefits derived de facto may diverge from the tenure security provided de jure due to such factors as 
weak implementation, costly enforcement, high transaction costs, and corrupt or illicit behaviour.234 
Conversely, tenure insecurity is said to exist in the event of lack of one or more of the breadth, 
duration, and assurance components constituting tenure security. As Place, Roth, and Hazel succinctly 
put it, tenure insecurity arises from a sense of, or a function of elements, including “inadequate number 
of absolute rights, inadequate duration in one or more rights, lack of assurance in exerting rights, or 
high costs of enforcing rights”.235 Tenure insecurity has been identified as a major problem that has 
significant implications to smallholder productivity, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries such 
as Ethiopia. For instance, Fantu Cheru has asserted that tenure insecurity is one of the major “non-
technical” problems constraining agricultural productivity in most of sub-Saharan Africa.236 Similarly, 
a recent empirical work conducted by Salami, Kamara, and Brixiova has identified tenure insecurity as 
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one of the major challenges to smallholder productivity in East Africa, including Ethiopia.237 
A number of other studies have also analysed the economic implications that the legal dimension of 
tenure insecurity pertaining to the lack of one or more of the breadth, duration, and assurance 
components might have to land use sustainability, smallholder productivity, and poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa. For example, according to UNECA, due partly to the lack of proper land management, 
investment, and improvement that is imputable to tenure insecurity, Africa has 500 million hectares of 
moderately or severely degraded land, which accounts for more than a quarter of the overall land 
degradation in the world.238 On their part, in their economy-wide, multimarket assessment of the 
poverty implications of agricultural land degradation in Ghana, Diao and Sarpong, who found 
extensive land degradation linked to tenure insecurity and identified it as a major challenge that would 
constrain agricultural productivity, have predicted that unless the current trend of land degradation is 
somehow reversed, Ghana’s agricultural income can decline by a total of US$ 4.2 billion over the 
period from 2006 to 2015, and the country’s national poverty rate can increase by 5.4% in 2015.239 
In view of the magnitude of the problem, the enactment of land law reform intended to bring about the 
enhancement of tenure security has therefore been at the top of the national development agenda of the 
state in many sub-Saharan African countries such as Ethiopia. A land law reform is considered to have 
resulted in the enhancement of tenure security when it changes the land tenure system’s land policies, 
laws, and institutions in a way that improves the provision and implementation of smallholder land 
rights that increase the breadth, duration, and assurance components constituting tenure security and 
thereby decrease smallholders’ likelihood or reasonable fear of losing the physical possession and the 
enjoyment of the rights to, and the fruits of their landholdings, as well as the value of investments and 
improvements they make without interference from others in the course of use or upon transfer. The 
enhancement of tenure security is thought would offer numerous advantages, including the following. 
First, the enhancement of tenure security is thought can increase the incentive or decrease the 
disincentive of smallholders to properly manage, undertake long-term investments on, and make 
improvements to their landholdings, which is believed would not only help achieve reduction in land 
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degradation and lead to sustainable land use, but also enable to raise smallholder productivity.240 In 
other words, the lesser the smallholder’s likelihood or fear of losing the physical possession and the 
enjoyment of the rights to, and the fruits and the value of improvements of their landholdings, the 
greater the incentive it is thought they would have to properly manage, undertake long-term 
investments on, and make improvements to their landholdings with their labour or asset. For instance, 
the land management, investment, and improvement activities that smallholders may carry out with 
their labour using materials freely or cheaply available include the addition of such physical features as 
irrigation, terracing, and drainage, planting of trees, construction of boundary demarcation structures, 
and establishment of product storage facilities; and the activities that they may conduct with their asset 
include acquisition and application of more modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services.241 
Moreover, the enhancement of tenure security is thought would offer numerous other benefits, 
including the promotion of gender equality, the reduction of land conflicts, and the improvement of 
governance. For example, in their assessment of the early impacts of land registration and certification 
on women in southern Ethiopia, Holden and Tewodros have found that the land registration and 
certification process, in which women were given equal treatment in terms of the documentation and 
enjoyment of land rights, has significantly strengthened the property rights and bargaining power of 
women and promoted gender equality.242 On their part, in their analysis of the incidence and impact of 
land conflicts in Uganda, Deininger and Castagnini, who identified tenure insecurity as one of the main 
reasons for the increasing incidence of land-related conflicts, which they concluded undermines land-
based investment and agricultural productivity, have emphasised that clearer and stricter definition, 
protection, and enforcement of land rights would contribute towards the prevention and resolution of 
land disputes.243 On the other hand, Lobo and Balakrishnan and Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse have 
noted that enhancement of tenure security can lead to improvement of governance, as it would help 
equip the state with information about landholders and landholdings, provide the basis for a system of 
property taxes, reduce the incidence of corruption, and streamline the operation of local institutions.244 
Furthermore, the enhancement of tenure security is thought would offer advantages with respect to the 
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promotion of the other two bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, namely the 
facilitation of the transfer of rights over land and the authorisation of the collateralisation of land 
rights. For instance, according to Feder and Nishio, the enhancement of tenure security can contribute 
towards the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land by helping reduce information asymmetry, 
decrease transaction costs, and increase the certainty of the performance and enforcement of 
contracts.245 As for the promotion of the collateralisation of land rights, besides helping boost credit 
use by providing greater incentive for investment, as Lemel and de Soto observed, the enhancement of 
tenure security can increase the collateral value of land and the creditworthiness of smallholders.246 
However, it should be emphasised that the causal relationship between the degree of tenure security 
and the tendency to engage in land management, investment, and improvement practices can be 
bidirectional, as the lack of tenure security may stimulate engagement in land management, 
investment, and improvement practices. For example, as Bledsoe noted, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, squatters or landholders who feel tenure insecurity often engage in such practices as the 
addition of physical features like terracing and drainage, the planting of trees, and the construction of 
boundary demarcation structures to assert claims, denote permanent occupation, project the image of a 
rightful landholder, make eviction more costly, and thereby enhance their tenure security.247 Similarly, 
Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau have observed that “In sub-Saharan Africa as well as in other countries 
with a recent history of land abundance, some land improvements, particularly the planting of trees, is 
a well-recognised method of enhancing tenure security for holders of temporary or fragile claims.”248 
Thus, since in such contexts causality may run the other way, as land management, investment, and 
improvement practices are viewed as a means towards the enhancement of tenure security, as Sjaastad 
and Bromley succinctly put it, “tenure security is a result, as well as a cause of land use decisions”.249 
So far, the three components of breadth, duration, and assurance that constitute the concept of tenure 
security and the benefits that the enhancement of tenure security is believed can provide have been 
discussed. The role that land law reform is generally thought would play in this regard has also been 
mentioned. At this juncture, it is thus necessary to examine closely how a land law reform is thought 
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should operate to change the land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system in order to 
lead to improvement in the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights that increase the 
breadth, duration, and assurance components, thereby bring about the enhancement of tenure security, 
and help reap the benefits that are believed can flow from the enhancement of tenure security. 
The issue concerning the choice of land policy that land law reform should introduce to the land tenure 
system in order to bring about the enhancement of tenure security and thereby help raise smallholder 
productivity in developing sub-Saharan African countries like Ethiopia has long been a subject of 
debate amongst law and development analysts, practitioners, and funders. Based on neo-classical 
economic theories pertaining to property rights250, and the abovementioned advantages that the policy 
of private ownership of land is believed would offer over the policy of state ownership in terms of the 
breadth, duration, and assurance components of tenure security, the view widely held had been that 
land law reform should introduce private land ownership policy to bring about the enhancement of 
tenure security, and promote the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land and the authorisation of 
collateralisation of land rights. Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau have succinctly captured the arguments 
for the policy of private land ownership. They stated that “There are several forces making for positive 
impact of individualistic property rights. First, when farmers feel more secure in their right to maintain 
long-term use over their land, they have greater incentive to undertake investments. Second, when land 
can be easily converted to liquid assets, improvements made through investment can be better realised, 
thereby increasing its expected return. On the other hand, farmers are more able to invest because, 
when freehold titles are established, land acquires collateral value and access to credit is easier. This is 
especially important regarding formal lending sources which often have imperfect information on the 
borrower.”251 Giovarelli has also stressed that “Privatization of land is generally undertaken to increase 
investment in and productivity of land, to encourage efficient use and allocation of land, and to 
empower recipients by providing them with a valuable asset.”252 Therefore, as Cotula, Toulmin, and 
Hesse noted, “These arguments prompted many post-independence governments in sub-Saharan Africa 
to adopt programmes to register land rights and to convert customary rights into private ownership”.253 
On the other hand, several recent studies have shown that private ownership of land appears to have 
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had little or no immediate effect in increasing tenure security, land management, investment, and 
improvement practices, and smallholder productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. Examples include those 
carried out by Jacoby and Minten in Madagascar254; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau in Burkina 
Faso255; Place and Migot-Adholla256, and Carter, Weibe, and Blarel in Kenya257; Moor in 
Zimbabwe258; and Besley in Ghana.259 In contrast, other studies suggest that even in countries where 
the policy of state ownership of land is enforced, land law reform can help increase tenure security, 
land management, investment, and improvement practices, and smallholder productivity in sub-
Saharan Africa. For instance, in Ethiopia, where the policy of state land ownership is enforced, several 
studies conducted by Deininger et al have demonstrated that the land law reform programme involving 
the registration and certification of landholdings that the government introduced within the framework 
of the policy of state ownership of land it enforces had a significant positive effect in increasing tenure 
security, land management, investment, and improvement practices, and smallholder productivity.260  
Therefore, the findings of those studies suggest that a land law reform may not necessarily bring about 
the enhancement of tenure security and the land management, investment, and improvement and 
smallholder productivity benefits that are believed can flow from it by introducing the policy of private 
or state ownership of land. In other words, the policy of private or state ownership of land by itself is 
not necessarily a stimulant or a constraint towards the enhancement of tenure security and the benefits 
that are associated with it. Instead, what is critical for a land law reform to be effective in helping 
increase tenure security, land management, investment, and improvement practices, and smallholder 
productivity is the adequacy of the breadth, duration, and assurance components of tenure security that 
it would bring about. For example, although the breadth of the land rights brought about by a land law 
reform programme that introduces the policy of private ownership of land, which would confer the 
rights to occupy, use, and alienate the land, might be better than, for instance, another land law reform 
programme that introduces the policy of state ownership of land, which would entitle the rights to 
occupy and use, but not alienate the land, this may not eventually matter if the assurance component is 
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weak. Conversely, although the breadth of the land rights that it brings about might be narrower, a land 
law reform programme that introduces the policy of state ownership of land can be effective in helping 
increase tenure security, land management, investment, and improvement practices, and smallholder 
productivity if the duration and assurance components are stronger. 
However, the findings of those studies should be viewed cautiously for several reasons. First, as 
Bledsoe suggested, land law reforms that introduced the policy of private ownership of land in other 
developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe have delivered positive outcomes.261 
Second, since the land law reforms that were undertaken in sub-Saharan African countries are 
relatively recent - most having been introduced only in the 1990s, it would be premature to conclude 
about their eventual outcomes, as the benefits they might deliver can take decades to materialise and 
become clear. Third, most of the land law reforms that were carried out in sub-Saharan African 
countries are incomplete. As Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse noted, “in most of sub-Saharan Africa very 
little land has actually been registered as private property.”262 Similarly, Deininger et al. have observed 
that “hardly any of the countries that introduced legal reforms with much fanfare have succeeded in 
developing, let alone rolling out, a low-cost system for land administration at a scale that is sufficiently 
large. This made it difficult for many of the expected benefits from such legislation to materialize. 
More generally, failure to implement land legislation has raised doubts regarding the technical, 
institutional, and political feasibility of such reform.”263 Fourth, it is difficult and costly to benchmark 
baseline situations, as well as to monitor, gauge, and demonstrate land law reform’s effect on tenure 
security, land management, investment, and improvement practices, and smallholder productivity, not 
least in sub-Saharan African countries, where the necessary capacity in terms of human, financial, and 
infrastructural resources is mostly lacking. Fifth, the effectiveness of land law reform in bringing about 
the enhancement of tenure security and the benefits associated with it can be limited by other factors 
such as legal pluralism in the land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of 
smallholder land rights. In other words, as will be discussed in the coming parts of this Chapter, since 
legal pluralism is a prominent feature of the land tenure system in most sub-Saharan African countries, 
which comprises the pre-existing non-formal customary arrangements that continue to exist, operate, 
and be widely used by society to govern the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights, 
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the effect land law reform might have on tenure security through the formal state land policies, laws, 
and institutions it puts into force can be significantly reduced or rendered irrelevant. As McAuslan 
precisely described it, “Customary tenure is - and always has been - one of the foundational elements 
of the land laws of all states in Africa.”264 Fifth, the effect that land law reform might have on tenure 
security may not be accurately evaluated not only because of the absence of a working method for 
measuring tenure security, but also because, due to the nature of tenure security, as Brasselle, Gaspart, 
and Platteau emphasised, assessments of tenure security do not always distinguish between levels of 
security as they actually exist.265 As will be elaborated in the coming parts of this Chapter, tenure 
security has an objective element, which pertains to the tenure security that land law reform might 
bring about through the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions it puts into force266, and a 
subjective element, which relates to the confidence or expectation of smallholders to do with their own 
perception of their tenure security.267 Sixth, as mentioned earlier, the tendency of engagement in land 
management, investment, and improvement practices depends not only on the degree of tenure security 
that land law reform might bring about, but also the availability of the necessary labour, financial 
means, and other resources. Seventh, the effectiveness of land law reform in helping raise smallholder 
productivity in sub-Saharan African countries hinges not only on the enhancement of tenure security it 
might bring about, but also other factors that are not to do with the land tenure system, including the 
technical problems of the smallholder sector. As Bugri and Pretty, Morison, and Hine suggested, a land 
law reform that brings about the enhancement of tenure security in such countries may not be effective 
in helping raise smallholder productivity, unless it is accompanied by measures aimed at addressing 
other factors that constrain productivity, particularly technical problems of the smallholder sector.268  
2. 2. 2. The Facilitation of the Transfer of Rights over Land 
The second way in which land law reform is thought can help raise smallholder productivity is by 
putting into effect land laws that improve the provision of smallholder land rights entailing facilitation 
of the transfer of rights over land temporarily or permanently through different means, including sale, 
lease, exchange, barter, donation, and succession, within the framework of the possible forms of 
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property rights in land specified in the land policy in force, such as ownership or usufruct, as well as 
land institutions, administrative and judicial, with substantive and procedural powers that undertake the 
provision’s implementation. The term “transfer of rights over land”, defined broadly here, relates to the 
process in which smallholders pass their land rights and the concomitant benefits over to other persons, 
either with consideration through sale, lease, exchange, barter, or in the form of security or payment of 
debt as in the case of mortgage, or without consideration through donation or succession.269 For 
example, a land law reform may be considered to have led to the facilitation of the transfer of rights 
over land if it puts into effect land laws and institutions that would improve the provision and 
implementation of the rights of smallholders to transfer their land rights and the concomitant benefits 
for consideration in a market setting permanently through sale, where the policy of private ownership 
of land is in force, or temporarily through lease, where the policy of state ownership of land is in force. 
A land law reform that brings about the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land is thought can 
help raise smallholder productivity mainly because it is believed would give rise to a dynamic rural 
land market, which is in turn believed would lead to increase in the value of smallholder land rights, 
more efficient and sustainable land use, and ultimately growth in smallholder productivity. It is thought 
that the existence of such a land market would enable those smallholders that are more successful and 
entrepreneurial to acquire more land, and those that are not, or that have marginal or economically 
unviable landholdings to transfer part or all of their landholdings temporarily or permanently, which 
would allow them to gain access to the means they need to diversify or switch their livelihoods, seek 
salaried employment, join other economic sectors, or migrate to urban areas. This is expected would 
lead to more efficient and sustainable land use and growth in smallholder productivity, as it would 
entail the reduction of land degradation and the consolidation of fragmented landholdings into larger, 
economically profitable units in the hands of more successful and entrepreneurial smallholders.270 
Moreover, the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land is thought can offer other benefits. For 
example, it is believed can lead to increase in state revenue through the generation of more land rights 
transfer taxes and administrative fees.271 Particularly in the context of Ethiopia, analysts such as 
Yigremew and Dessalegn have also argued that the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land would 
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realise the human right of Ethiopian smallholders to enjoy, like any farmer should, “unrestricted” land 
rights and economic benefits over their landholdings, which is their fair share of the country’s natural 
resources, and would bestow upon smallholders freedom and empowerment, as it provides them with 
the right and responsibility to decide on the fate of their landholdings and choose their livelihoods.272 
Furthermore, the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land is believed can help with respect to the 
promotion of the other two bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, namely the 
enhancement of tenure security and the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights. 
Specifically, the more the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, it is thought the more the 
enhancement of tenure security would be, as smallholders would feel more confident and can choose to 
keep or transfer their land rights. Similarly, the more the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, 
it is believed the more likely the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights would be.273 
However, just like in the case of the enhancement of tenure security discussed above, the issue 
concerning whether it is the policy of private or state ownership of land that land law reform should 
introduce in order to bring about the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land and thereby help 
raise smallholder productivity in developing countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa has long 
been a subject of debate amongst law and development analysts, practitioners, and funders. Although 
the long-held view had been that the policy of private ownership of land is more advantageous in 
facilitating the transfer of rights over land, the available empirical evidence is not conclusive.274 For 
example, several empirical studies conducted in Kenya and Uganda have found that the introduction of 
the policy of private ownership of land did not lead to the facilitation of the transfer of rights over 
land.275 In contrast, other empirical studies suggest that land law reform can be used to bring about the 
facilitation of the transfer of rights over land even in countries where the policy of state ownership of 
land is enforced. For instance, studies carried out by Deininger et al in Ethiopia have demonstrated that 
despite the enforcement of the policy of state ownership of land, the land law reform that allowed the 
transfer of land rights through lease had significantly facilitated the transfer of rights over land.276 
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It is, though, necessary to enter the caveat that the findings of those studies should be viewed 
cautiously. And the reasons discussed above that provided the grounds for caution as regards studies 
concerning the enhancement of tenure security would also apply here mutatis mutandis. To illustrate, 
for example, in Uganda, despite the enactment of a land law reform introducing the policy of private 
land ownership that allowed the sale of land, smallholders were found to be reluctant to transfer their 
land through sale for fear of jeopardising their livelihood.277 An equally important reason may be the 
lack of means to engage in land transactions, which Carter argued has “a major depressing effect on 
the ability of poor households to use even liberalized land markets to improve their access to land.”278 
It is, however, safe to conclude based on the findings of those studies that the policy of private or state 
ownership of land by itself is not necessarily a stimulant or a constraint towards the facilitation of the 
transfer of rights over land. In other words, a land law reform may bring about the facilitation of the 
transfer of rights over land despite the enforcement of the policy of private or state ownership of land. 
This issue can be best explained using as an example the right to transfer land rights through lease, 
which is often allowed both in countries where the policies of private and state ownership of land are 
enforced, as compared to sale, which is allowed only in countries where the policy of private 
ownership of land is enforced. The authorisation of the right to transfer land rights through lease is 
more important for most smallholders than sale for several reasons. Specifically, from the perspective 
of smallholders who would like to acquire land, entering into transaction of lease does not require 
possessing or making significant advance payment in the form of cash, asset, or other means of 
payment, whilst sale often does. And from the point of view of smallholders who would like to transfer 
their land, entering into transaction of lease does not entail the possibility of losing one’s land and thus 
livelihood altogether, whilst sale often does. Above all, research and experience generally suggest that 
the authorisation of the right to transfer land rights through lease would more significantly facilitate the 
transfer of rights over land, thereby enable poor smallholders to gain access to land, and help raise 
smallholder productivity in developing countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa like Ethiopia.279 
In their analysis of “The Evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy”, Deininger and Binswanger have 
succinctly captured how, for instance, the World Bank, which in its 1975 “Land Reform Policy Paper” 
discussing the role of land law reform in helping raise smallholder productivity, tackle poverty, and 
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foster overall economic growth in developing countries had emphasised the transfer of land through 
sale to be more important than lease in this regard280, has since changed its prescription from the sale 
to the lease of land in the face of increasing evidence from research and experience. They noted that 
“the earlier sceptical view of land rental markets has given way to recognition of their critical role as a 
means for providing the poor with access to land. The removal of remaining restrictions on land rental 
is therefore a top policy priority. In contrast, however, removing the restrictions on markets for land 
sales may not be the most urgent requirement for increasing efficiency and may have a negative impact 
on equity. Measures thus should be sequenced properly, emphasising rentals rather than sales”.281 
2. 2. 3. The Authorisation of the Collateralisation of Land Rights 
The third way in which land law reform is thought can help raise smallholder productivity is by 
putting into effect land laws that improve the provision of smallholder land rights entailing the 
authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights, including those that recognise the smallholders’ 
right to use their landholdings as collateral for credit, and land institutions, administrative and judicial, 
with substantive and procedural powers that undertake the provision’s implementation. The term 
“collateralisation of land rights”, defined broadly here, refers to the use by smallholders of their land 
rights as surety to obtain credit.282 A land law reform that brings about the authorisation of the 
collateralisation of land rights is thought can help raise smallholder productivity, achieve more 
efficient and sustainable land use, and even tackle land scarcity and poverty, because it is believed 
would enable smallholders to obtain the means they need to acquire more land, undertake better land 
management and improvement practices, invest in modern agricultural inputs, implements, and 
services, diversify or switch their livelihoods, and get insurance for the loss of land or sustenance.283  
A land law reform that brings about the authorisation of the use of land rights as collateral is 
particularly important for smallholders in developing countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
including Ethiopia. That is because the only valuable asset worthy of furnishing as surety that these 
smallholders usually have is their landholding.284 In addition, since land is immobile and virtually 
indestructible, land rights, especially those that are clearly defined, secure, and easily transferable, 
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often constitute a widely acceptable collateral to guarantee the repayment of credit.285 
In short, the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights is believed would offer a number of 
direct and indirect benefits. Directly, as mentioned above, it is thought can help improve the 
availability and terms of credit for smallholders and thereby reap the benefits expected to flow from it. 
Indirectly, it is believed would help give rise to a dynamic land credit market, reduce transaction costs 
in land markets, prevent costly development of collateral substitutes, spur growth of the private sector, 
create employment opportunities, free smallholders from discretionary interference by state officials, 
landlords, or other entities, and provide foundation for economic growth and good governance.286 
The view that emphasises the importance of the use of land rights as collateral particularly for 
smallholders in developing countries like Ethiopia started to gain currency after the World Bank 
published its “Land Reform Policy Paper” in 1975. This Policy Paper, which assessed that smallholder 
agriculture in the developing world, particularly in Africa, is “undercapitalised”, technologically 
lacking, underproductive, and “insufficiently competitive” largely because land rights are based on 
non-formal customary “communal” land tenure systems and considered these perceived shortcomings 
as a cause of low smallholder productivity and pervasive poverty, recommended that land law reform 
introducing the policy of private land ownership be enacted to replace communal land tenure systems 
by “freehold” through titling and registration. As per the Policy Paper, formally privatised, registered, 
and certified land ownership would not only lead to the authorisation of the collateralisation of land 
rights and the benefits claimed would flow from that, but also bring about the enhancement tenure 
security and the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land.287 The view acquired momentum after 
the publication of de Soto’s “dead capital” thesis in 2000.288 de Soto posits that most of the poor in 
developing countries continue to practise subsistence smallholder agriculture and be poor because they 
have “informal” land rights based on custom or occupation and are isolated from the “formal” land 
law framework backed by the state, which does not recognise and enforce their land rights, and vice 
versa, as the poor do not follow the formal land law of the state that does not effectively address their 
economic and social needs.289 Therefore, for de Soto, land is a “dead capital” that cannot readily be 
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turned into capital, traded outside of narrow local circles, serve as collateral for loan, and be used as a 
share against investment.290 de Soto thus recommends the enactment of land law reform involving the 
“discovery” and analysis of informal “social contracts” regulating most man-land relations in poor 
regions, followed by the designing of ways to connect, harmonise, and integrate those rules with the 
formal legal system; and argues that the benefit of such formal recognition and enforcement of 
informal land rights goes beyond the micro impacts on poor smallholders to the creation of capital for 
national development.291 According to de Soto, a land law reform that so grants to poor smallholders 
formally recognised, registered, and enforced land rights would enhance their tenure security, increase 
the value of land, and create new opportunities for them by making land, once a “dead capital”, alive, 
which would give them greater access to credit and legal protection for large-scale investment.292 
Nonetheless, the postulates set forth in the World Bank’s Land Reform Policy Paper and de Soto’s 
“dead capital” thesis on how a land law reform may be used to bring about the authorisation of the 
collateralisation of land rights and the benefits that are thought would flow from it have been later 
refuted on at least the following three grounds.293 First, they took for granted the adversity of the role 
of non-formal customary land tenure systems, and the possibility of their replacement by formally 
privatised, registered, and certified “freehold” through land law reform. However, law and 
development research and experience suggest that particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the non-formal 
customary land tenure systems provide a platform for the collateralisation of land rights where the 
formal state ones are not available or amenable to such transaction, and offer a more accessible and 
affordable alternative even where they have been theoretically repealed, delegitimised, and replaced 
by the formal state ones. Numerous studies have found that credit transactions involving the use of 
land as collateral are carried out extensively through non-formal customary land tenure systems across 
sub-Saharan Africa both in countries such as Kenya and Uganda, where the policy of private 
ownership of land is enforced, and in countries like Ethiopia, where the policy of state ownership of 
land is enforced and the collateralisation of land rights is prohibited for smallholders, notwithstanding 
that neither the land rights provided by, nor the credit transactions conducted through the non-formal 
                                                 
290
  de Soto, 2002:6. 
291
  de Soto, 2000:156-157, 166-167, and 171-173. 
292
  de Soto, 2002:6 and 39-46. 
293
  See, for instance, Deininger and Binswanger, 1999:248-249. 
69 
 
systems are recognised, exercised, and enforced under the formal systems backed by the state.294 
Second, despite the lack of direct evidence to support it, the World Bank’s Policy Paper and de Soto’s 
“dead capital” thesis assumed that the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights will make 
credit available for smallholders, motivate smallholders to take the credit using their landholdings as 
collateral, and guarantee smallholders will use the credit they take to advance, diversify, or switch 
their agricultural livelihoods. However, research and experience show that particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights through land law reform may not 
necessarily translate into the availability of credit and increased borrowing by smallholders. Even 
where the use of land rights as collateral for credit has been authorised, existing financial institutions, 
such as banks, are often reluctant to accept smallholder landholdings as collateral and provide 
smallholders with credit in sub-Saharan African countries, where land is owned by the state or subject 
to competing claims, banking tradition is yet to develop, the size and value of the landholding of 
smallholder is limited, smallholders can be unwilling or unable to repay the credit they might take, and 
the collateralised landholding may not be repossessed or taken over to satisfy the debt in the event of 
non-payment for cultural, political, or legal reasons. As Deininger and Binswanger noted, the 
authorisation of the collateralisation land rights alone “is unlikely to increase the banks’ willingness to 
lend to the rural sector where, for cultural or economic reasons, land cannot be repossessed or where 
land sales and mortgages are restricted.”295 Moreover, even where the credit is available, smallholders 
may be reluctant to collateralise their landholdings to obtain and use the credit due the risk of 
foreclosure, as failure to repay the debt as per the terms of the contract can mean losing the 
collateralised landholding, which is the only source of livelihood for most smallholders.296 In short, 
studies suggest that particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the introduction of land law reform with land 
policies and laws that authorise the collateralisation of land rights may not necessarily translate into 
the collateralisation of land rights and the benefits that are thought would flow from it, unless it is 
accompanied by measures that make credit available, encourage smallholders to take the credit, and 
ensure that smallholders use the credit they take to advance, diversify, or switch their agricultural 
livelihoods. Those measures may include encouraging the involvement of individuals and private, 
cooperative, and state-owned rural land credit institutions that will take smallholder landholdings as 
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collateral to provide credit in cash or in kind in the form of modern agricultural inputs, implements, 
and services; and accept repayment in cash or in kind in the form of agricultural products, labour, or 
taking over and using or leasing the collateralised landholding to satisfy the debt in the event of non-
payment before restoring it to the defaulting smallholder. On the other hand, the conditions that 
smallholders are required to fulfil should only include proof that the credit to be obtained using one’s 
landholding as collateral will be utilised to advance, diversify, or switch one’s agricultural livelihood, 
commitment to repay the debt as per the terms of the contract, and demonstration of having a possible 
means of living comparable with the current for oneself and family dependants for the period during 
which the collateralised landholding may be taken over to satisfy the debt in the event of default.297 
Third, although the World Bank’s Policy Paper and de Soto’s “dead capital” thesis recommend the 
policy of private ownership of land, the evidence to be drawn from the available research and 
experience on the issue concerning whether it is the policy of private or state land ownership that land 
law reform should introduce to bring about the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights and 
the benefits that are thought would flow from it is not conclusive. Though it was conducted in a 
context that is quite different from Ethiopia, the evidence on which the argument for the policy of 
private land ownership is based is the oft-cited study that Feder et al carried out in Thailand.298 The 
result of this study, which involved a series of surveys taken over several years, was published in a 
comprehensive manner in 1988.299 The study analysed patterns of borrowing and non-borrowing from 
institutional sources (formal credit-providing financial institutions) and non-institutional (non-formal) 
sources by farmers with formally registered and titled privately-owned landholdings on the one hand, 
and, on the other, farmers with landholdings that had not been formally privatised, registered, and 
titled. The descriptive study found that credit benefits accrue to titled farmers, who obtained more 
medium and long-term loans from institutional lenders, got lower interest rates from non-institutional 
lenders, and were provided with higher amount of loan per unit of land. In view of the fact that credit 
and borrowing are affected by many factors related to title, the authors of the study also applied 
econometric multivariate or switching regression analysis to the descriptive data. Their overall 
conclusion was that credit benefits accrued to titled farmers more than untitled farmers not necessarily 
because they had privately-owned land, but because titled land was more advantageous when used as 
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collateral, as the rights over such land were recognised and registered by the state and hence 
considered more secure, clearly defined, and easily transferable, exercisable, and enforceable.300  
In contrast, similar studies conducted in sub-Saharan African countries where the policy of private 
land ownership had been introduced found little evidence demonstrating that the privatisation, 
registration, and titling of land rights has made a significant difference as regards making credit 
available for smallholders, increasing the incidence of borrowing by smallholders collateralising their 
landholdings, and leading to the benefits thought would flow from the authorisation of collateralisation 
of land rights.301 For example, in Kenya, it has been noted that many smallholders avoided applying 
for loans using their land as collateral because they were afraid of foreclosure.302 By the same token, 
in Uganda, the majority of smallholders who participated in a 2001 national survey responded that 
they would not use their land as collateral to obtain credit because they are fearful of foreclosure.303 
On the other hand, research and experience suggest that it is possible to use land law reform to bring 
about the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights and the benefits thought would flow from 
it even in countries where the policy of state land ownership is enforced like Ethiopia. The upshot of 
this is that what matters most is not the enforcement of the policy of private or state land ownership, 
but the existence of land rights that are clearly defined, easily transferable, and formally enforceable, 
as well as the availability of credit for smallholders, the motivation of smallholders to take the credit 
by collateralising their landholdings, and the tendency of smallholders to use the credit they might take 
to advance, diversify, or switch their agricultural livelihoods.304 For example, thanks largely to the 
measures taken to make credit available, encourage smallholders to take the credit, and ensure that 
smallholders use the credit they take to advance, diversify, or switch their agricultural livelihoods, 
both the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights and the benefits thought would flow from it 
have been achieved in Israel, where most land is state-owned and leased to farmers for terms of 49 or 
99 years.305 Moreover, studies suggest that similar results have been achieved in China and Vietnam, 
where the policy of state land ownership is enforced. The effects of the adoption of individual land use 
rights under the household responsibility system in the early 1980s in China, and the enactment of the 
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1998 Law on Land in Vietnam, which provided automatically renewable leases of 20 years for annual 
crops and 50 years for perennials and authorised the collateralisation of land rights is considered to 
have been similar with the introduction of the policy of private ownership of land in this regard.306 
However, in Ethiopia, the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights has never been provided 
for smallholders under the land law reform programmes enacted by successive governments, 
particularly since the policy of state ownership of land was introduced by the Derg, which was later 
continued by the incumbent EPRDF. Nevertheless, the concept is not unknown as it has been provided 
for “investors” engaged in commercial agriculture under the post-Derg land law reform programme.307 
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence and consensus associated with the issue under discussion, 
however, it is possible to infer the following three conclusions based on the evidence to be drawn from 
the available law and development research and experience. First, land law reform can be used to 
bring about the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights despite the enforcement of the 
policy of private or state ownership of land. Second, a land law reform that brings about the 
authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights can help raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty by enabling smallholders to obtain the means they need to acquire more land, undertake better 
land management and improvement practices, invest in modern agricultural inputs, implements, and 
services, diversify or switch their livelihoods, and get insurance for the loss of land or sustenance. 
Third, in order to improve its success, a land law reform intended to bring about the authorisation of 
the collateralisation of land rights and the benefits that flow from it should be accompanied by 
measures aimed at making credit available, encouraging smallholders to take the credit, and ensuring 
that smallholders use the credit they take to advance, diversify, or switch their agricultural livelihoods. 
Those measures may, for example, include encouraging the involvement of individuals and private, 
cooperative, and state-owned rural land credit institutions that will take smallholder landholdings as 
collateral to provide credit in cash or in kind in the form of modern agricultural inputs, implements, 
and services; and accept repayment in cash or in kind in the form of agricultural products, labour, or 
taking over and using or leasing the collateralised landholding to satisfy the debt in the event of non-
payment before restoring it to the defaulting smallholder. On the other hand, the conditions that 
smallholders are required to fulfil should only include proof that the credit to be obtained using one’s 
landholding as collateral will be utilised to advance, diversify, or switch one’s agricultural livelihood, 
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commitment to repay the debt as per the terms of the contract, and demonstration of having a possible 
means of living comparable with the current for oneself and family dependants for the period during 
which the collateralised landholding may be taken over to satisfy the debt in the event of default. 
2. 2. 4. Other Factors Critical for Success 
As mentioned earlier, though a necessary first step, the issuance of land policy and laws that improve 
provisions of productivity-raising smallholder land rights is not a sufficient condition to make land law 
reform effective. As FAO noted, “Good law is only one among a number of elements that need to be 
in place for meaningful change to occur”.308 Specifically, law and development analysts, practitioners, 
and funders unanimously acknowledge that land law reform must also establish land institutions that 
ensure implementation of provisions of the land policy and laws.309 USAID has, for example, stressed 
the importance of implementation of provisions of land policies and laws to make a land law reform 
effective in helping raise smallholder productivity.310 Similarly, IFAD has stated that key issues in the 
analysis of the effectiveness of land law reforms should include: “Are land policies and laws being 
implemented and enforced? What are the major challenges for implementation of land policies and 
laws?”311 Yet, as the World Bank and Deininger cautioned, “policymakers need to be aware that land 
reform is not a magic solution, a number of factors may affect successful implementation.”312 Bruce 
has also observed that “Stipulating the desired situation in law is not enough. All of us who work in 
this area know of elegant laws that have had little impact, some for want of implementation and others 
in spite of serious implementation efforts”.313 In short, though considered an important second step, it 
is thought that implementation may not by itself guarantee success. This Section briefly outlines other 
factors law and development analysts, practitioners, and funders have identified as critical for success. 
For instance, according to the World Bank, other preconditions for success include the presence of 
capital and credit mechanisms, possibility and efficacy of investments, potential for income increase, 
land valuation capacities, reasonable transaction costs, effective communication channels to reduce 
information asymmetry, a bar to rent seeking, adequate institutional framework, favourable public 
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perceptions, perpetuation of systems, fee, and revenue streams, and the inclusion of the poor.314 On its 
part, AusAID has underscored the necessity of augmenting land law reforms with “irrigation systems, 
electrification of rural areas, roads and telecommunication systems, pricing policies and fiscal support 
for agricultural inputs, R&D and support for new technologies, access to credit and markets for 
agricultural produce.”315 Similarly, Hazell et al have emphasised that “Agricultural development 
requires a process of sustainable intensification in which farmers combine land, labour, technical skills 
and information, purchased inputs, and fixed and working capital to produce outputs for sale. If one 
element of the set is missing, then investments in all the others will be lost or significantly reduced.”316 
DFID goes even further and argues that “For land reform to have significant impact on poverty it must 
be part of a broader process of political, social and economic change, rather than a narrow intervention 
to redistribute land.” DFID then explains that “The pace of land reform cannot reasonably run ahead 
of advances in other related functions, especially the provision of infrastructure (water, power and 
communications) and technical support services to small-scale farmers (credit, input supply, 
marketing, extension and adaptive research), [as well as] the capacity of governments to coordinate 
these functions in even-handed, transparent, and efficient manner. Greater democratisation is often 
closely linked to the reform of land rights.”317 Rolfes has also posited that improvements in the rule of 
law can bolster land law reform’s effectiveness in bringing about the provision and implementation of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and ultimately in helping raise smallholder productivity 
by enabling “recognition of property rights; effective conflict resolution systems; careful definition 
and limits on the state’s power to take private land; and effective documentation of land rights.” He 
has further argued that “Legal rules will not be effective if the legal system as a whole is not a reliable 
and effective instrument for acquiring and protecting rights. The rule of law can be defined as an 
approach to governance and the ordering of relationships between parties in which formal law (1) 
supplies the guiding rules for allocating resources, resolving conflicts, and rendering justice; and (2) is 
generally adhered to and can be relied upon by the population to produce predictable outcomes.”318 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the factor widely considered the major cause of low smallholder 
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productivity in countries like Ethiopia is not only the land tenure system’s structural problems, which 
is to be dealt with through land law reform. Technical problems of the smallholder sector’s modus 
operandi related to lack of access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services is also 
considered as an equally important factor.319 It follows that taking agrarian reform measures to address 
those technical problems is thus another critical factor necessary to make a land law reform effective. 
Furthermore, Borras has, for example, noted that particularly in transitional and developing countries 
like Ethiopia, providing smallholders with such transitory and strategic public support as those 
directed towards building the capacity and raising the awareness of smallholders both before and after 
the introduction of land law reform is important to boost effectiveness.320 Specifically, FAO has 
enumerated that it is crucial for land law reform to be accompanied by the provision to newly-inducted 
smallholders of funding, technical assistance, and infrastructure to transport inputs and outputs to and 
from the new plot to ensure higher productivity.321 On its part, DFID has concluded that to make land 
law reform effective in helping raise smallholder productivity, attention should be paid to building the 
capacity of smallholders through expanding their knowledge about the newly introduced land policies, 
laws, and institutions and opportunities they offer as regards acquiring and safeguarding land rights.322 
2. 3. Land Law Reform’s Contribution in Tackling Poverty 
There is evidence to be drawn from established law and development research and experience that 
land law reform can contribute towards tackling poverty in countries with smallholder-based economy 
in two ways. One way is by conferring upon the poor the control and enjoyment of land as an asset 
that constitutes the principal form of acquisition, accumulation, and transfer of wealth and the main 
source of social and political capital.323 It is thought that this would increase the net wealth of the 
poor324, bring them into the cash economy by providing capital that can be traded, serve as collateral 
for loan, and used as a share against investment325, and socially and politically empower them, as 
landlessness has been, for example in a World Bank study conducted in India, identified as the greatest 
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predictor of poverty as social and political exclusion, even more than scheduled castes or literacy.326 
The grand idea is that being entitled to control and enjoy land and the concomitant rights and benefits 
would ultimately translate into higher spending power and access to more and better food, shelter, 
health, and education, other basic services and infrastructure, increased life expectancy and living 
standards, and the fulfilment of other economic, social, and political needs, roles, and goals.327 The 
other way, central to this thesis, is by helping raise smallholder productivity. This Section will 
examine in greater detail how land law reform contributes towards tackling poverty in the latter way. 
Analysts estimate that growth in smallholder productivity achieved with the help of land law reform 
may be up to eleven times more effective in reducing poverty than growth in other economic sectors in 
countries with smallholder-based economy at early stage of development, particularly those in sub-
Saharan Africa, due to several reasons.328 First, smallholders constitute the majority of the population 
and the poor in sub-Saharan Africa, where smallholder agriculture provides livelihood for around 65% 
of the population and 70% of the poor.329 Second, as Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl suggested, 
smallholders often have difficulty in benefiting from growth in other sectors due to the possession of 
low skills and education by smallholders and the failure of markets and institutions in rural areas, 
leading to the exclusion of smallholders.330 Third, wealth generated from growth in other sectors is 
less likely to be redistributed to smallholders due to “urban bias” against agriculture and rural areas.331  
Generally, the contribution land law reform can make towards tackling poverty in those countries by 
helping raise smallholder productivity is thought to be not only significant, but also direct. That is 
because growth in smallholder productivity can enable smallholders to attain food security, earn 
higher incomes, and increase their consumption. And the attainment of food security by smallholders 
would improve their nutrition and health, which would in turn promote their productivity.332 Growth in 
smallholder productivity is also believed can lead to greater supply of food at lower prices, as 
smallholders mostly produce staple crops that are mainly consumed and traded locally and have 
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relatively lower elasticity of demand.333 This is an important contribution towards tackling poverty for 
several reasons. First, it can enable the rural and urban poor, who spend most of their incomes on food, 
to access more and better food and have larger disposable incomes for expenditure on other basic 
necessities.334 Second, it can enable poor labourers in other economic sectors to access more and better 
food, have larger disposable incomes, improve their nutrition and health, and enhance their 
productivity.335 Third, it can boost the ability of the countries in question to meet growing demand for 
food, which is essential not only to achieve successful overall economic, social, and political 
development, but also to maintain the status quo.336 Fourth, it can enable the countries to save the 
foreign exchange they spend to import food for investment on health, education, and other economic, 
social, and political provisions. As IFPRI and Asenso-Okyere and Samson noted, “Africa spends about
$30 billion to $50 billion a year to import food. This deprives the continent of funds for needed 
expenditures on infrastructure and social and economic amenities. It is estimated that if continental 
food supplies do not increase, Africa will spend about $150 billion on food imports by 2030.”337 Fifth, 
it can enable the countries to reduce their reliance on imported food. The 2007-2008 global food price 
crises and the economic turmoil, social unrest, and political instability it triggered in some sub-
Saharan African countries has demonstrated the volatility, unpredictability, and unreliability of 
international food markets, as well as the necessity of enhancing reliance on domestic production as a 
matter of national security of a first-order priority, particularly given the ever growing world 
population, increasing scarcity of land, water, and other resources, the challenges of climate change, 
and the expanding demand for food from emerging economies.338 Barrett has succinctly captured the 
far-reaching contribution that greater supply of cheaper and better food achieved through growth in 
smallholder productivity can make towards tackling poverty as follows: “agricultural productivity 
growth facilitates escape from poverty [through] the impact of expanded supply on food prices, 
nutrient intake and human health. For most of human history, lives were short and unhealthy due to 
insufficient nutrient intake. Since the 18th century, countries escaped widespread hunger and 
premature death due to advances in food availability and associated income growth broadening access 
to satisfactory diet. The apparent reinforcing feedback between nutritional status and productivity has 
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led several scholars to hypothesize that escape from nutritional poverty trap helped to catalyze the 
unprecedentedly rapid and widespread advance of living standards over the past 300 years.”339 
Moreover, growth in smallholder productivity is generally thought can help increase the incomes of 
smallholders, as they can be able to sell more products in the market and save assets they would have 
spent to buy food, which would help them have larger disposable incomes that can in turn enable them 
to increase their consumption. For example, from a survey of rice-producing smallholders in 
Cambodia, Acharya and Sophal have reported that a 10% increase in yields had resulted in an 8.8% 
increase in household incomes in dry season cultivation.340 de Janvry and Sadoulet have produced 
similar evidence from Latin America.341 It should also be emphasised that as reported by DFID from a 
survey of smallholder rice farmers in Bangladesh, smallholder incomes generally continued to rise 
despite declining market prices resulting from major output expansion, as smallholders had already 
acquired the means to progressively reduce their costs of production by adopting new technologies and 
expanding irrigation, thereby effectively offsetting the impact of falling prices on their incomes.342 
The significance of the contribution that growth in smallholder productivity can make in helping 
tackle poverty in countries with smallholder-based economy can be further explained by drawing 
comparison with the contribution that agricultural growth achieved through large-scale commercial 
farms can make. As de Schutter and DFID noted, greater supply of cheaper food is better achieved 
through growth in the productivity of smallholders, who mostly produce staple food crops that are 
mainly consumed and traded locally and have relatively lower elasticity of demand; than large-scale 
commercial farms, which mostly produce cash crops or bio-fuels destined for export.343 Moreover, as 
Mellor and Hårsmar observed, besides being broad-based, the increase in income that growth in 
smallholder productivity would help achieve has stronger multiplier effects on growth in agriculture 
and other sectors of the local economy because smallholders are believed would spend about 80% of 
the increase in their incomes on local products and services.344 In contrast, it is generally thought that a 
fraction of the wealth generated from agricultural growth achieved through large-scale commercial 
farms would trickle down to the local economy, as large-scale commercial farmers are mostly 
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absentee landlords and thus do not demand local products and services, often spend a far lower 
proportion of their incomes, and spend it largely on importing inputs and machinery.345 Specifically, 
Li has shown that due to the way large-scale commercial agriculture combines capital, land, and 
labour, growth in this sector yields diminishing marginal return as regards employment opportunities 
and labour productivity.346 In fact, studies conducted in countries like Bolivia and Brazil have found 
that agricultural growth achieved through large-scale commercial farms had benefitted only a few, did 
not significantly reduce poverty, and had even worsened rural-urban wealth disparity and cleavage.347 
To conclude, the poverty alleviation that can be achieved through growth in smallholder productivity 
in countries like Ethiopia would be more meaningful than that can be possible through growth in 
large-scale commercial agriculture and the other economic sectors, or even under such ideal scenarios 
of boom as the discovery of huge oil or mining reserves. That is because since smallholder agriculture 
is the primary source of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy in those countries, growth in 
smallholder productivity would have a direct, broad-based impact, including greater supply of cheaper 
and better food and increase in incomes for smallholders, who constitute the majority of the population 
and the poor, reduction in staple food prices and hence growth in real and disposable incomes for both 
the rural and urban poor, who often spend the bulk of their incomes on food, and generation of 
powerful growth linkages to the rest of the economy. It would also be more orderly because, it is less 
susceptible to evils associated with other boom scenarios, such as inflation, corruption, inequality, 
exclusion, and vulnerability. Moreover, it would be more sustainable, not just in the environmental 
protection sense of the term. It would also equip the people with the bottom-up economic, social, and 
political empowerment necessary to sustain the poverty alleviation process.348 
2. 4. Land Law Reform’s Relationship to Legal Pluralism 
As mentioned earlier, land law reform introduced in countries like Ethiopia operates to bring the 
change in the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights it needs to bring to deliver the 
smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes it is thought would help achieve not only through 
formal state land policies, laws, and institutions established under the current and previous land law 
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reforms, but in the context of a land tenure system characterised by legal pluralism, which also 
comprises non-formal customary ones. It is thus imperative to examine land law reform’s relationship 
to legal pluralism in the light of evidence drawn from established law and development research and 
experience about the role it plays in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in such 
countries. This Section briefly explores the definition and the origin of legal pluralism in general, and 
in the context of the challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty in particular. 
2. 4. 1. Defining the Concept of “Legal Pluralism” 
The term “legal pluralism” first began to be used in legal anthropology in the 1970s in the study of law 
in colonial and post-colonial contexts to refer to the incorporation or recognition of customary norms 
and institutions under state laws and institutions, or to the independent coexistence of the pre-existing 
indigenous customary norms and institutions alongside the laws and institutions subsequently 
introduced by the state.349 It is probably in consideration of this fact that there is a widespread 
perception that tends to associate legal pluralism with sub-Saharan Africa. However, although, as 
Adelman noted, “African societies are amongst the most pluralist in the world, comprising as they do a 
diversity of tribal, ethnic, cultural and religious groups, different traditions, and people divided along 
urban and rural lines”350, legal pluralism is peculiar neither to sub-Saharan Africa, nor to land tenure 
systems governing land relations in the countries in the region - colonial, post-colonial, or otherwise. 
In fact, as Tamanaha succinctly put it, “Legal pluralism is everywhere. There is, in every social arena 
one examines, a seeming multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest local level to the most expansive 
global level.”351 Similarly, Griffiths has argued that “‘Law’ is present in every ‘semi-autonomous 
social field’, and since every society contains many such fields, legal pluralism is a feature of social 
organisation in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but have 
their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all the multifarious social fields present, which may 
support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another.” Griffiths concluded that legal pluralism is “a 
concomitant of social pluralism; the legal organisation of society is congruent with its social 
organisation”.352 And according to Connolly, “No state in the world contains an entirely homogeneous 
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population subscribing to a precisely defined set of norms. In many states, often entire communities 
hold norms quite distinct from those of the remainder of the population, and in many cases those 
groups have developed mechanisms to manage disputes arising out of those norms.”353 As Spector 
observed, legal pluralism assumes “there is a plurality of conflicting and incommensurable universal 
values”.354 In short, as Benda-Beckmann noted, the term “legal pluralism” is employed to refer to “the 
possibility of more than one legal order or mechanism within one socio-political space, based on 
different sources of ultimate validity and maintained by forms of organisation other than the state.”355 
At this juncture, a note on the problems associated with the concept of legal pluralism is in order. 
Since its inception, the notion of legal pluralism has been plagued by a fundamental conceptual 
problem and heated disagreement owing to the lack of definition of “law” and the resultant difficulty 
of distinguishing state from non-state normative orders so as to establish the concept of legal 
pluralism. The purpose here is not to attempt to construct a definition of “law”, or to draw a line that 
enables to make a distinction between state and non-state normative orders. The idea is to avoid the 
risk that Tamanaha has warned against, stating that “Scholars who invoke legal pluralism without an 
awareness of this conceptual problem and its implications will risk building upon an incoherent and 
unstable foundation.”356 After all, the question “What is law?” has never been answered in legal 
philosophy, and, consequently, as Woodman stressed, despite decades of hard work, legal pluralists 
have been unable to identify a clear line separating the state and the non-state normative orders.357  
Two approaches have been used in attempts to define law for the purpose under discussion, although 
each approach has both adherents and critics. The first approach, found in the works of Weber, 
Hoebel, and Hart, defines law in terms of public institutionalised enforcement of norms. Despite the 
fact that this approach, which views law as tied directly to political organisation, is not explicitly tied 
to state law, as this political organisation need not necessarily have the character of a state, it was 
derived from the core elements of the state law model.358 There are two problems with the approach. 
First, many institutions enforce norms, and there is no uncontroversial way to distinguish those that 
are “public” from those that are not, which entails the risk of subsuming all forms of institutionalised 
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norm enforcement under the term “law”. Second, although all societies have law, some lack 
institutionalised norm enforcement, which, as per this approach, would lead to the conclusion that 
such societies do not have law, just like Hart’s assertion about what he called “primitive societies”.359 
The second approach was developed by Malinowski building on Durkheim’s conception of law as a 
social phenomenon that reflects all the essential varieties of social solidarity, and Mauss’ idea of the 
possible existence of many legal systems interacting with each other. According to this approach, 
which defines law in terms of the maintenance of normative order within a social group, since every 
social group has normative regulation, every social group has “law”, regardless of the presence or 
absence of state institutions. For Malinowski, “law” is not to be found in “central authority, codes, 
courts, and constables”, but in social relations.360 Moore, who criticised this approach stating that “the 
conception of law that Malinowski propounded was so broad that it was virtually indistinguishable 
from the study of the obligatory aspect of all social relationships”, instead put forward the notion of 
the “semi-autonomous social field (SASF)”, although she declined to apply the label “law” to her own 
concept.361 Griffiths, who adopted Moore’s concept of the SASF - social fields with capacity to 
produce and enforce rules, applied the label “law” to same, which Moore herself had declined to do, 
and described it as the best way to identify and delimit law for the purposes of legal pluralism in his 
1986 seminal article entitled “What is Legal Pluralism?”362 To set the scene for his analysis of the 
issue of legal pluralism vs. legal monism and state vs. non-state normative orders, Griffiths began by 
restating the gist of the argument of those in favour of “legal centralism” or “legal monism”, the 
antonym of “legal pluralism”, as being a view that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform 
for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions.”363 Yet, 
Griffiths, who called the norms of the SASF “law” despite Moore’s demurral, arrived at the same 
problematic conclusion owing to which she objected to Malinowski’s conception of law - failing to 
make a distinction between different normative orders or forms of social regulation. As a result, 
Griffiths came under criticism from numerous corners, including Moore herself. For instance, Merry, a 
critic of Griffiths who stressed that “calling all forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law 
confounds the analysis”, posed the question “Where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves 
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simply describing social life?”364 Finally, Griffiths made a dramatic U-turn in his 2005 article entitled 
“The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and to Sociology”, conceded it is impossible to 
conceptualise law for social scientific purposes, and agreed with his critics that what he previously 
identified as “legal pluralism” is better conceptualised as “normative pluralism”. In his own words, 
Griffiths stated that “In the intervening years, further reflection on the concept of law has led me to the 
conclusion that the word ‘law’ can better be abandoned altogether for purposes of theory formation in 
sociology of law. It also follows from the above considerations that the expression ‘legal pluralism’ 
can and should be reconceptualised as ‘normative pluralism’ or ‘pluralism in social control’.”365  
However, despite its conceptual problems, the notion of legal pluralism continues to spread and gain 
popularity across a wide range of academic disciplines. Moreover, after the first Law and 
Development Movement of the early 1960s, which sought to transplant templates of Western-styled 
legal systems, and the second of the late 1970s, which focused on institution building and rule of law 
promotion, to spur development in developing countries366 ended having been discredited for 
conceiving law ethnocentrically as Western law and yielded “little law and less development”367, the 
notion of legal pluralism and the role of non-state normative orders have received increasing attention 
during the third and the current one, which began in the 1990s and is described as the period of “new 
developmentalism”.368 Furthermore, with the emergence of globalisation, decentralisation, and 
community empowerment as top international development agenda, the role of legal pluralism and 
non-state normative orders have increasingly become the focus of the law and development literature. 
Yet, both legal pluralism and non-state normative orders have always been a fact of life almost 
everywhere. Therefore, what gave rise to the notion of legal pluralism and the seemingly irrevocable 
conceptual problems associated with it is the way those at the helm of state power characterise 
different normative orders. As Tamanaha succinctly described it, “State law is currently the paradigm 
example of law”.369 Conversely, the non-state normative orders are excluded from being considered as 
law because those in state power do not want them to be considered so. After all, despite often being 
enacted and enforced in a different way, state law mostly derives its material contents from non-state 
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normative orders, although (state) law being the will of the sovereign, it gets its binding force from the 
endorsement and enforcement capacity of those in state power. However, despite being theoretically 
repealed by the state either explicitly or tacitly with the coming into effect of state law, practically the 
pre-existing non-state normative orders would often continue to exist, operate, and be used by society, 
as centuries of legal tradition could not be erased or wished away as instantly as the enactment of state 
law. Moreover, as Brietzke observed, “Traditional law is best understood as a residual category of 
social control, as ‘a class of rules too practical to be backed up by religious sanctions, too burdensome 
to be left to mere goodwill, too personally vital to individuals to be enforced by any abstract agency’. 
Law leaves older social controls - religion, custom, habit and rules of practical prudence and art - 
intact where intervention would be hazardous to the power of political authorities. Many differences in 
legal systems can thus be explained by the degree of centralised political authority.”370 
In short, the issue of legal pluralism vs. legal monism and state vs. non-state normative orders boils 
down to the issue of state power. As McAuslan put it, “the issue of pluralism v. monism is and always 
has been an issue of power; a question of who has political power, and over whom that political power 
is exercised”.371 Thus, what the attention legal pluralism and non-state normative orders have received 
recently reflects is not their discovery, but the change in the way those in power characterise and use 
different normative orders that already exist and operate in society. Other than that there is no ground 
whereby state law may be considered as “law”, whilst other normative orders are not. After all, no 
working definition of the term “law” that would enable to identify what constitutes “state law” itself 
and distinguish it from other normative orders has been formulated. Moreover, notwithstanding that 
state law is the current paradigm example of law, as Tamanaha observed, “at various times and places, 
including today, people have considered as law: international law; customary law; religious law; the 
lex mercatoria; the ius commune; natural law and more. These various manifestations of law do not all 
share the same basic characteristics - beyond the claim to represent legitimate normative authority - 
which means they cannot be reduced to a single set of elements for social scientific purposes.”372  
And in a world where non-state actors exercise normative power as significant as the state, it would 
not be necessary, if at all tenable, to construct a clear distinction between state and non-state normative 
orders. As Berman remarked, “Law operates based on a fiction that nation-states exist in territorially 
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distinct spheres and activities fall under the jurisdiction of one regime: a state could exercise complete 
authority within its territorial borders and no authority beyond it. In a world where non-state actors 
exert significant normative pull, can we build a sufficiently capacious understanding of the very idea 
of jurisdiction to address the incredible array of overlapping authorities that are our daily reality? 
Thus, a simple model that looks to territorial delineations is now untenable (if it was ever useful).”373  
To conclude, as Tamanaha noted, it is possible to avoid the conceptual problems and conduct analysis 
of legal pluralism “by accepting as ‘legal’ whatever was identified as legal by the social actors”, and 
understanding that “Legal pluralism exists whenever social actors identify more than one source of 
‘law’ within a social arena.”374 Thus, the term “legal pluralism” will be broadly used here to refer to 
the largely independent existence of formal land policies, laws, and institutions the state establishes 
through land law reform, alongside the pre-existing non-formal customary land policies, laws, and 
institutions, whether or not consistent with, or recognised under formal state ones, in the land tenure 
system governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights in developing countries 
such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. After all, since “land rights” are “property rights” concerning 
relations amongst people pertaining to rights and duties recognised by society involving issues of 
control, use, and transfer land375, non-formal customary land tenure systems recognised as “legal” by 
society in sub-Saharan African countries should be accepted as “legal”, at least as much as formal 
state ones recognised as “legal” by the state in those countries, or by society in the “developed world” 
are accepted as such. As Lund succinctly put it, “Property can be seen as a social convention that 
defines the relationship between people vis-à-vis things backed up by the sanctions and administrative 
structures of society. Thus, while African tenure forms may seem obscure and irrational from a 
distance, [they] make sense to those for whom they matter: the immediate stakeholders.”376 
2. 4. 2. The Origin of Legal Pluralism 
As mentioned earlier, the origin of legal pluralism in the land tenure system governing the provision 
and implementation of smallholder land rights in sub-Saharan African countries such as Ethiopia is 
attributable to land law reform.377 The modern state in most of sub-Saharan Africa was formed as a 
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result of European colonisation, whilst the modern state of Ethiopia, which has never been fully 
colonised, was formed during the reign of Menelik II parallel to the colonial scramble for Africa at the 
end of the 19th century.378 In most of sub-Saharan Africa, including Ethiopia, before the modern state 
was formed and started to enact land law reform, the land tenure system governing the provision and 
implementation of smallholder land rights comprised only the indigenous African traditional land 
policies, laws, and institutions. As van Asperen observed in relation to sub-Sahara African countries 
that had experienced direct colonial rule, “In general, before colonisation, the legal system, including 
land law, was based on customary, unwritten, law.”379 Similarly, in Ethiopia, the legal system, 
including the land tenure system, consisted of indigenous customary laws although they themselves 
were the product of a long process of “legal stratification” involving the experiences, norms, and 
practices of various cultural groups and the principles of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other local 
religions.380 Yet, in both cases, even after the state started to enact land law reform and thereby 
introduce new formal land policies, laws, and institutions to the land tenure system, the pre-existing 
indigenous ones, which have since come to be known as “non-formal customary land tenure 
arrangements”, have continued to exist, operate, and be used by society alongside the formal ones 
introduced by the state, which have since come to be referred to as “formal state land tenure 
arrangements”, thereby giving rise to the phenomenon known as “legal pluralism”.381 As Cotula noted, 
despite the existence and operation of formal land policies, laws, and institutions the state has 
introduced to the land tenure system through land law reform, in most of sub-Saharan Africa, “local 
resource users tend to continue to gain access to natural resources through local systems of property 
rights, particularly with regard to land and surface resources. These local tenure systems are based on 
(usually unwritten) rules founding their legitimacy on ‘tradition’, as shaped both by practices over 
time and by systems of belief. Because of this, they are usually described as ‘customary’”.382  
Therefore, it is due to land law reform that the legal pluralism in the land tenure system governing the 
provision and implementation of smallholder land rights in sub-Saharan African countries, including 
Ethiopia, came into being. In most sub-Saharan African countries that had experienced direct colonial 
rule, the legal pluralism is a legacy of European colonisation, as colonial rulers imported and 
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transplanted their own countries’ formal land policies, laws, and institutions on top of the pre-existing 
indigenous African customary land tenure arrangements. As McAuslan conveniently summarised it, 
despite much variation, the colonial legal order tended to build on the legal system of the colonial 
power. For instance, in much of Anglophone Africa, the “reception clause” adopted by colonial 
legislators provided for the application of the legislation, common law, and doctrines of equity in force 
in England at a specified date. Similarly, in much of Francophone Africa, the basic principles, laws, 
and institutions in force in France were put in place.383 But in the case of Ethiopia, the legal pluralism 
is the result of the land law reform that the country’s own native rulers introduced, particularly since 
Menelik II enacted the first land law reform programme of the modern state of Ethiopian in 1908.384 
However, legal pluralism emerged as a prominent feature of the land tenure system in most of sub-
Saharan Africa, including Ethiopia, due to two similar reasons. One reason is because in most sub-
Saharan African countries that had experienced direct colonial rule, non-formal customary land tenure 
systems were simply ignored or tolerated to govern land relations amongst locals particularly in rural 
areas, though in different degrees and often subject to “repugnancy clauses” that subjected their 
operation to consistency with their formal counterparts, the broader public order, and other colonial 
standards. As van Asperen noted, “Colonisation introduced state law, based on law of the colonial 
powers, which concerns the entire country. Concerning property, statutory land law was often only 
applicable in urban areas and rural areas with high agricultural potential. In the remaining areas 
customary land law was still applicable. Geographically speaking, land is legally subdivided into state 
land and customary land.”385 In Ethiopia’s case, particularly during the decades after the 1908 land 
law reform, as Connolly emphasised, “Until the 1950s, the law in Ethiopia was an amalgamation of 
codes, legislation, and a variety of customary rules. [T]he central government did nothing to prevent 
the traditional systems of law from operating [as] an interference with that operation can have meant a 
complete disruption of the institution most closely valued by members of traditional society.”386 
The other reason is because non-formal customary land tenure arrangements have continued to exist, 
operate, and be used by society notwithstanding attempts the state has made to replace them with 
formal state land policies, laws, and institutions through land law reform, and despite not being 
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consistent with, or recognised under the formal state ones. In other words, the non-formal customary 
land tenure arrangements continued to exist and operate because of the formal state arrangements’ lack 
of “legal penetration”, or failure to take hold in terms of both the number of actors and spheres of 
action influenced. As Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse noted, “For long, the policy response to this 
situation [of legal pluralism] has been an attempt to eradicate customary systems and replace them 
with a ‘modern’ system of land tenure.”387 And as Crewett, Ayalneh, and Korf briefly summarised it, 
“Scholars writing on African land tenure systems have often emphasised this struggle between 
customary forms of tenure and ‘modern’ legal forms of individual private property imposed by the 
state and have argued that a top down interference into customary institutions have largely failed.”388 
In any case, despite the existence of formal land tenure arrangements that the state has introduced 
through land law reform, as Menski stressed, non-formal customary arrangements have continued to 
operate de facto in much of rural Africa.389 Cotula has also argued that “On the ground, local resource 
users tend to continue to apply local tenure systems based on usually unwritten rules and founding 
their legitimacy on ‘tradition’.”390 Specifically in Ethiopia, Brietzke has observed that “traditional 
tenures remained largely unaffected by the laws enacted, with great fanfare, from 1944 to 1974.”391  
Numerous factors are considered responsible for the failure of formal state land tenure arrangements to 
take hold in most of sub-Saharan Africa, which can be broadly subsumed into two: those that are 
imputable to the state itself, and those that are to do with society, particularly smallholders themselves. 
For example, de Soto has highlighted that most of the poor in developing countries continue to 
practise subsistence smallholder agriculture and be poor because they have “informal” land rights 
based on custom and are isolated from the “formal” land law of the state, which does not recognise 
and enforce their land rights, and vice versa, as the poor do not follow the formal land law that does 
not address their economic and social needs.392 Moreover, as Cotula observed, “In much of rural 
Africa, lack of financial resources and of institutional capacity in government agencies, lack of legal 
awareness, socio-political deals between government and customary chiefs and, often, lack of 
perceived legitimacy of official rules and institutions all contribute to limit the outreach of state 
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legislation.”393 And as Brietzke noted, in Ethiopia’s case, “Government investments in land reform, in 
terms of monetary and legal resources, were minimal, and legal manoeuvres, far from promoting rural 
change, seemed to solidify peasant suspicions of the Government’s intentions. As a result, rural people 
continued to rely on traditional land laws.”394 Furthermore, since as Friedman concisely put it, “legal 
penetration is fostered by participation”, where the process of formulation and implementation of land 
law reform does not take into account the values and needs of smallholders, or if formal channels of 
participation in the process are unavailable or ineffective, participation would take the form of 
resisting, subverting, or ignoring the newly introduced formal land policies, laws, and institutions.395 
2. 5. The Implications of Legal Pluralism 
As mentioned in the preceding sub-section, due to the legal pluralism land law reform has brought 
about, the land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights 
in most sub-Saharan African countries such as Ethiopia consists in not only formal state land policies, 
laws, and institutions, but also non-formal customary ones.396  It is therefore imperative to examine the 
implication this legal pluralism might have to the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights and thus the conditions of smallholder productivity and poverty in such 
countries. This Section briefly explores the implication the legal pluralism might have in that regard. 
To begin with, as discussed in the preceding Section, tenure security is about not only the assurance, 
but also the confidence or expectation of the smallholders themselves that they will not be arbitrarily 
deprived of the control and enjoyment their land rights and the concomitant benefits. As such, tenure 
security has both objective and subjective elements. The objective element, which is otherwise called 
“de jure tenure security”, pertains to the assurance the state provides through the land tenure system’s 
formal land policies, laws, and institutions that it introduces using land law reform.397 In contrast, the 
subjective element, which is otherwise known as “de facto tenure security”, relates to the confidence 
or expectation of smallholders to do with the smallholders’ own perception of their tenure security.398  
The distinction between the objective, de jure tenure security that the state provides through the land 
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tenure system’s formal land policies, laws, and institutions, and the subjective, de facto tenure security 
that the pre-existing non-formal customary land tenure arrangements provide is particularly important 
for the purposes of this thesis for the following two reasons. First, the distinction would enable to 
better understand the implication that the legal pluralism in the land tenure system might have to the 
provision and implementation of the bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights to do with 
the enhancement of tenure security, as the objective element corresponds to the de jure tenure security 
that the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions provide, whilst the subjective element is 
associated with the de facto tenure security that the non-formal customary arrangements provide. 
Second, the subjective, de facto tenure security that the non-formal customary arrangements provide is 
more important for smallholders in most sub-Saharan African countries such as Ethiopia because the 
objective, de jure tenure security the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions provide is largely 
irrelevant. As the influence of the state and the formal land tenure system it introduces through land 
law reform is mostly limited in rural areas, most smallholders are unaware of the formal state land 
policies, laws, and institutions, or the objective, de jure tenure security they provide due to the lack of 
education, access, and often interest. The involvement of the state through land law reform in the land 
relations of those countries usually meant eviction or the disruption of the pre-existing non-formal 
customary arrangements without putting in place a viable formal alternative. Generally, non-formal 
customary systems are often more accessible and affordable, provide service in the absence of the 
formal state ones, and their non-state nature engenders trust in society, particularly where the state is 
seen as a remote or suspicious establishment as is the case in most of the rural sub-Saharan Africa.399  
In short, since non-formal customary land tenure systems are not only operational in most countries, 
but are also more important in governing land relations than the formal state ones put in place through 
land law reform, it is imperative for any discussion of land law reform in sub-Saharan Africa to 
account for the implication of legal pluralism.400 The issue of tenure security is no exception. Analysts 
note that in sub-Saharan Africa, non-formal customary systems provide stronger tenure security to 
smallholders than the formal ones.401 Even the World Bank, which prescribed the replacement of non-
formal customary systems by formal private land ownership policy in its 1975 Land Reform Policy 
Paper, has since changed its view. As Deininger and Binswanger noted, “the 1975 World Bank land 
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reform policy recommended communal tenure systems be abandoned in favor of freehold titles. Today 
it is recognized that some communal tenure arrangements can increase tenure security and provide a 
(limited) basis for land transactions in ways that are more cost-effective than freehold titles.”402 
As for the role non-formal customary land tenure systems play in facilitating the transfer of rights over 
land, a recent market study involving titled and untitled land in Uganda has indicated that markets in 
untitled land were more vibrant despite the absence of formal registration and recognition. The main 
reasons for lack of dynamism in the titled land market were the expensiveness of transaction charges 
paid to the state in administrative fees and the complicatedness of the registration procedure, as well as 
the lack of accessibility, transparency, and corruption of registration officials.403 Similarly, in Ethiopia, 
despite formal restrictions and prohibitions, thanks to non-formal land tenure systems, smallholders 
freely engaged in land transactions, including selling, leasing, donating, and bequeathing.404 
By the same token, the role that non-formal customary land tenure systems play as regards the 
collateralisation of land rights in sub-Saharan Africa in general, and in Ethiopia in particular must not 
be overlooked. Studies show that credit transactions involving the use of land as collateral are 
conducted extensively through the non-formal systems throughout Africa.405 This is despite the fact 
that neither the land rights provided by the non-formal systems, nor the credit transactions carried out 
through them are recognised, exercised, and enforced under the formal systems backed by the state.406 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, although the collateralisation of land rights for smallholders has long been 
formally prohibited and remains illegal, there has always been a vibrant credit market provided by the 
non-formal systems, in which smallholders freely use their land rights as collateral to obtain credit.407 
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Chapter 3 
The Political Economy of Land Law Reform, 
Smallholder Productivity, Poverty, and Legal Pluralism 
in Ethiopia 
Chapter 2 has briefly reviewed the relevant law and development research and experience and 
explained both from theoretical and practical perspectives in general why land law reform can help 
raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty in countries in roughly comparable position 
with Ethiopia if it is designed to change the land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure 
system in a way that improves the provision and implementation of bundles of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights. It has also outlined the definition and origin of legal pluralism, and 
demonstrated why, how, and to what extent legal pluralism in the land tenure system that involves both 
formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions affects the change land law 
reform brings to the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights and thus the conditions of 
smallholder productivity and poverty in such countries. This Chapter discusses the political economy 
of land law reform, smallholder productivity, poverty, and legal pluralism in Ethiopia in particular. 
3. 1. General Background and Context  
In order to fully grasp the land law reform, smallholder productivity, poverty, and legal pluralism 
experience of Ethiopia, it is essential to understand the general background and context of this 
experience. It is particularly imperative to understand the salient geographical, demographical, 
topographical, and historical features of the country, as well as the economic, social, and political 
settings, ideological, policy, and constitutional frameworks, national development conditions, needs, 
and priorities, and influential internal and external contexts that potentially help explain the critical 
importance of land and smallholder agriculture both as source of poverty and development potential, 
influence the formulation and implementation of land law reform, dictate the origin and implication of 
legal pluralism, and determine the concomitant fate of smallholder productivity and poverty in the past, 
present, and future. This Section will briefly outline the general background and context in question. 
Ethiopia is an independent nation located in northeast Africa, in the region otherwise known as “the 
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Horn of Africa”. The country had been a unitary state since the formation of the modern Ethiopian 
state at the end of the 19th century408, until it was restructured as a federal state under the rule of the 
incumbent EPRDF, which has been in power since May 1991. As of this period, during which Eritrea 
was allowed to secede and Ethiopia made to surrender its Red Sea coastline and be landlocked, the 
country has a land area of around 1.1 million square kilometres. It is situated between 3 and 15 degrees 
north latitude and 33 and 48 degrees east longitude. Since South Sudan became an independent state, 
Ethiopia is bordered by Eritrea to the north, Djibouti to the east, Somalia to the southeast, Kenya to the 
south, South Sudan to the southwest, and Sudan to the west.409 
Ethiopia’s capital is Addis Ababa.410 Nationally, Addis Ababa is the seat of government, the largest 
city, and the principal political, commercial, educational, and cultural centre. Internationally, it is host 
to foreign diplomatic missions and bilateral and multilateral organisations, including the headquarters 
of the AU (African Union) and the UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa).411 
Demographically, Ethiopia is characterised by a large religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity; as well 
as a big, rapidly growing population. Around 50% of Ethiopians are Orthodox Christians, whilst about 
18% are Protestants and Catholics. Islam is the second largest religion. Various estimates put the 
Muslim community between one-quarter to one-third of the population. Ethiopia also has a sizable 
Jewish community, although many have made aliyah to Israel in recent years. The country is also 
known to be the origin of Rastafarianism and other smaller indigenous, localised religions, which 
together account for the religious makeup of the rest of the population.412 Ethiopia is home to over 80 
ethnic groups, with population sizes ranging from more than 26 million to fewer than 100.413 The 
people of the country together speak over 80 different languages, including 12 Semitic, 22 Cushitic, 18 
Omotic, and 18 Nilo-Saharan languages.414 The current population of Ethiopia is estimated at more 
than 90 million, the second largest in Africa next to Nigeria.415 Ethiopia’s population is estimated to 
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grow at the rate of close to 3% per annum, one of the fastest growing in the world.416 Close to 85% of 
the country’s population lives in rural areas, where the rate of population growth is higher.417 
Topographically, the terrain of Ethiopia, which is described as “a land of contrasts”, consists of the 
central plateau and the surrounding lowland plains that produce three distinct climatic and agro-
ecological zones: tropical in the south and southwest, cold to temperate in the highlands, and arid to 
semi-arid in the north-eastern and south-eastern lowlands.418 Ethiopia’s topography is dominated by 
the central plateau composed of a chain of mountains formed by volcanic activity, where almost 90% 
of the population lives.419 Although it lies within the tropics, the mountainous topography means that 
many parts of the country have moderate tropical climate. The highlands provide fertile soil and fairly 
adequate rainfall as compared to other countries close to the Sahara.420 They are also the source of 
numerous rivers, lakes, and streams. The country has twelve river basins, eleven fresh, nine saline, and 
four crater lakes, more than twelve major swamps and wetlands, and enormous underground water.421 
Economically, as in many other developing countries, smallholder-based agriculture has historically 
been the primary source of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy in Ethiopia. Smallholder 
agriculture contributes close to 95% of Ethiopia’s aggregate output in agriculture (Appendix 3, Table 
3422), which generates about 88% of the country’s export earnings, supplies more than 73% of raw 
materials for the predominantly agro-based domestic manufacturing and service industries, and 
accounts for around 50% of GDP.423 The smallholder agriculture practised in Ethiopia is land-centred 
even by the standards of developing countries, as smallholders mostly rely on the utilisation of land to 
practise labour-intensive, rain-fed, low-input mixed farming focused predominantly on crop 
production.424 As discussed earlier, the country’s smallholder productivity is generally low due to 
structural problems of the land tenure system pertaining to the land policies, laws, and institutions that 
constrain the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and 
technical problems of the smallholder sector’s modus operandi related to the lack of access to modern 
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agricultural inputs, implements, and services. Consequently, smallholder agriculture is considered as 
the primary source of poverty in Ethiopia425, which had an annual per capita income of $170 and 
ranked 174th out of 187 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index in 2011.426 Yet, 
smallholder agriculture is thought to provide the principal development potential, as it is the primary 
source of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy, and the country has little other resources under 
commercial exploitation than land, labour, water, and climatic conditions suitable for agriculture.427 
Historically, Ethiopia is widely regarded as the cradle of mankind, as evidenced by the discovery of the 
3.5 million-years-old “Dinknesh” or “Lucy”, the famous human ancestor considered crucial in the 
chain of human evolution, in the Afar region in 1974, and many other subsequent archaeological 
discoveries of the remains of the earliest ancestors of the human species in the country.428 However, 
like many other issues pertaining to Ethiopia, the country’s history is subject to contestation. Some 
trace Ethiopia’s history back to millions of years, mainly citing the abovementioned archaeological 
discoveries, others to thousands of years, invoking the mentioning of its name in the Old Testament 
and the well-documented records of Ethiopian civilisation dating back to the Axumite Kingdom that 
existed from the 1st century AD to 1150, and a few others to hundreds of years, referring to the time of 
the formation of the modern Ethiopian state under Menelik II at the end of the 19th century.429 
The present-day Ethiopia is an outcome of centuries of expansion, contraction, disintegration, and 
reunification. As Marcus succinctly put it, “Ethiopia’s history contains an analytic truth. From time to 
time, the nation disintegrated into component parts, but it never disappeared as an idea and always 
reappeared in fact.”430 Analysts characterise the pre-modern Ethiopian state as something close to a 
federal polity in terms of duality of authorities and decentralisation of power. For example, according 
to Bahru, at least since the 13th century, the imperial throne, which often claimed legitimacy based on 
descent from the Solomonic line, or being the descendant of the dynasty of Menelik I, the legendary 
son of King Solomon of Jerusalem and Queen of Sheba of Ethiopia, and had the title of “Nigusa 
Nagast” (King of Kings), represented the centre; whilst a number of strong provincial nobilities, who 
often held the title of “Nigus” (King), effectively exercised power in the territories falling under their 
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respective sphere of influence.431 Clapham has also noted that “historic Ethiopia approximated a 
federal system”.432 Assefa Fiseha has made a similar observation, noting that “Except for the twentieth 
century, Ethiopia has for the most part been under a decentralised rather than a centralised system of 
governance.” He also explained that “the balance often swayed, albeit slightly to the Niguse Negast 
(King of Kings). Defined in broad terms, the regional nobility submitted to the throne, contributed a 
fighting force in time of crisis or rebellion and collected and paid tributes to the monarchy: the 
collection of tribute and maintenance of national security being the function of the emperor. In return 
for this administrative and military function, the nobility were granted autonomy and the right to retain 
some amount from the tributes they collected for the centre. They had their own army.”433 Even after 
he completed the formation of the modern Ethiopian state, Menelik II did not dismantle this long-
standing tradition of unity and autonomy. As Levine noted, Menelik II did not decisively undercut the 
authority of provincial nobilities, who even became largely independent around the end of his reign.434 
Ethiopia, which under the leadership of Menelik II defeated the Italian colonial forces at the battle of 
Adwa in 1896 in what has been registered in history as the first victory of a black nation over a 
European colonial power and subsequently managed to have its sovereignty recognised by the then 
world powers, has never been fully colonised.435 It does not this have the colonial legacy experienced 
by most other sub-Saharan African countries, whereby colonial rulers imported and transplanted their 
own countries’ formal land policies, laws, and institutions on top of the indigenous African customary 
arrangements, thereby giving rise to legal pluralism.436 In Ethiopia, that was carried out by the 
country’s own native rulers through land law reforms they enacted.437 In most other sub-Saharan 
countries, the pre-existing non-formal customary arrangements were either replaced or simply ignored 
to govern land relations amongst locals, though in different degrees and often subject to “repugnancy 
clauses” that conditioned their operation on consistency with formal ones and other colonial standards. 
In any case, non-formal customary arrangements have continued to operate in much of rural Africa.438  
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It is against this backdrop that Menelik II introduced the 1908 land law reform programme. This land 
law reform was motivated by the vision of Menelik II internally, to make Ethiopia a modern, 
prosperous, and strong country by attracting foreign trade, investment, and technology, and externally, 
to secure Ethiopia’s recognition as a sovereign state, acceptance as an equal “civilised” member of the 
community of nations, and integration into the global economy from the then world powers.439 
Notably, the land law reform was more rigorously implemented in and around the national capital, 
Addis Ababa, which Menelik II founded, where foreigners were deemed would most likely reside.440 
Moreover, the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions introduced through the land law reforms 
enacted in 1908 and during subsequent decades were largely meant to supplement, but not to substitute 
pre-existing non-formal customary arrangements. Connolly has conveniently summarised the overall 
environment in which land law reform operated during this period, emphasising that “Until the 1950s, 
the law in Ethiopia was an amalgamation of codes, legislation, and a variety of customary rules. More 
than sixty non-state justice systems existed, based variously in the Christian Fetha Nagast, Muslim 
Shari'a law, or general customary law.” Connolly has also suggested the possible reasons why, the 
ways how, and to what extent the state at the centre allowed the operation of the non-formal customary 
arrangement, noting that “Each king administered justice in the area under his control, and the law to 
be applied in each case depended upon facilitation of community cohesion, rather than a consistent set 
of legal principles. Despite the declining power of chiefs, the central government did nothing to 
prevent traditional systems of law from operating [as] an interference with that operation could have 
meant complete disruption of the institution most closely valued by members of traditional society.”441  
However, the coming to power of Haile Sellassie I in 1930 opened a new chapter in the history of 
Ethiopia in a number of aspects. Haile Sellassie I promulgated the 1931 Constitution, the first written 
constitution in the history of the country, which was designed to push his ambitious policy of 
centralisation and marked the end of the long-standing tradition of unity and autonomy. Although 
Haile Sellassie I retained for himself the title of “Nigusa Nagast” (King of Kings) and assumed 
absolute power, he abolished the autonomous kingdoms and provincial administrations - completely 
subjugating them to central rule under himself, and made sure that all potential contenders for power 
were members of the two houses established under the 1931 Constitution, which in effect had only an 
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advisory roles.442 The Derg, which deposed and took over power from Haile Sellassie I in the 1974 
Revolution, continued the push for the centralisation of power in earnest, as other than the replacement 
of the Solomonic genealogy by a Marxist ideology, the centralisation of power and the marginalisation 
of the people was conducted at a scale that was unprecedented even during the imperial era.443 
The reign of Haile Sellassie I had also opened a new chapter as regards the treatment of the non-formal 
customary land policies, laws, and institutions in Ethiopia. Attempts to comprehensively replace the 
non-formal customary land tenure arrangements with formal state ones started to be made after Haile 
Sellassie I enacted what was then the country’s most comprehensive and systematised land law reform 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, those attempts do not seem to have succeeded. For example, as 
Gopal observed, “after 1960, customary laws were invalid, but for the most part communities 
continued to apply the same customs and traditions.”444 Numerous other studies suggest that regardless 
of formal land tenure arrangements the state has since been introducing through land law reforms, non-
formal ones have continued to exist, operate, and be used by society to govern more than 85% of land 
relations in the country.445 Beckstrom has, for instance, published a research in 1973 on the reception 
or penetration of codified laws in Ethiopia. He noted that the degree to which the Civil Code and other 
codes embodying the formal land tenure arrangements introduced by the land law reform programme 
of Haile Sellassie I had taken hold was slight both in terms of the number of actors and spheres of 
action influenced. By 1973 even urban residents lacked substantive familiarity with the codes, and 
were resorting to traditional courts eight times more frequently than formal courts.446 Beckstrom 
concluded that “The new laws have had little effect to date on the social fabric of even the urban areas 
of the highland plateau. [There has been] no deeper, lasting effect on general social patterns.”447  
In order to fully grasp the current constituents of the formal land policies, laws, and institutions of that 
make up the land tenure system in force in Ethiopia, it is necessary to explore the background of the 
overall legal tradition, state structure and power relation, and hierarchy of laws of the country. Ethiopia 
traditionally follows the continental or civil law legal system, although there is evidence of use of 
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precedents in the adjudication of cases before the second half of the last century.448 As such, the formal 
state laws, including those that promulgate and put into effect the formal land policies, laws, and 
institutions established through land law reform, are made by way of legislation in the form of codes or 
statutes enacted by the legislature or other organs of the state entrusted with lawmaking power.449 In 
Ethiopia, the term “hierarchy of laws” describes a chain of subordination between laws, whereby laws 
are put at various levels of importance depending on the rank of authority that the maker of each law 
possesses within the state structure and power relation in force. Each law should be consistent with the 
one above it in the hierarchy ladder. Otherwise, if challenged, it may be declared null and void.450  
Accordingly, the formal land policies, laws, and institutions promulgated and put into effect through 
legislation issued as part of a land law reform programme will remain effective, unless and until 
repealed by other legislation of equivalent position in the hierarchy of laws of the country issued by an 
organ of the same or different government that has been entrusted with a lawmaking power equivalent 
to the organ that had issued the earlier legislation within the state structure and power relation in force. 
However, amongst those formal land policies, laws, and institutions that are put into effect through 
legislation issued as part of an earlier land law reform programme, what subsequent governments 
usually change significantly through the legislation they promulgate as part of the land law reform 
programmes they enact are mostly those that they perceive are to do with their own distinct ideologies 
and national development strategy objectives and goals, which they often espouse depending on the 
prevalent influential internal and external contexts. To that extent, there are significant continuities and 
discontinuities in the formal land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system of Ethiopia. 
For example, the forms and contents of the formal laws and institutions of the country dealing with 
transactions over land, registration of those transactions, and modes of proof of transfer and possession 
of land rights that were put into effect through the 1960 Civil Code promulgated as part of the land law 
reform programme introduced by Haile Sellassie I have not been significantly changed through the 
legislation that either the Derg or the EPRDF subsequently issued as part of their own land law reform 
programmes. Many important formal laws and institutions embodied in different titles and parts of the 
Civil Code that was promulgated during the imperial era still remain effective and constitute the land 
tenure system currently governing smallholder land relations in Ethiopia, without their forms and 
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contents having been significantly changed. They specifically include the definition of immovable 
property in Title VI; rights in rem or real property, such as usufruct and servitude in Title VIII; public 
domain, expropriation, and association of land rights holders in Title IX, register of immovable 
property in Title X, and contracts relating to immovable properties, such as lease in Title XVIII. 
Therefore, the EPRDF has since it took power framed virtually all aspects of life in the country along 
ethnic lines as per its commitment to what it called “the national question”, including the land law 
reform it enacted. It restructured Ethiopia into a federal polity composed of constituents formed mainly 
along ethnic lines under the FDRE Constitution. This Constitution instituted a parliamentary system of 
government.451 As such, parliaments constituting the legislative organs are entrusted with the highest 
state power both at the federal and regional levels. According to Article 50 of the Constitution, “The 
House of Peoples’ Representatives is the highest authority of the Federal Government. The House is 
responsible to the People. The State Council is the highest organ of State authority. It is responsible to 
the People of the State.”452 The Constitution has also established a federal executive body called the 
Council of Ministers, which is headed by the Prime Minister and composed of various Ministries.453 It 
has also authorised the formation of regional executive bodies at state, sub-state, and local 
administrative levels, which are known as, from top downwards, Region, Zone/Special Woreda, 
Woreda, and Kebele.454 The Executive Council, which is headed by the regional president and 
composed of various Bureaux, constitutes the highest executive organ at the regional level.455 
Furthermore, the Constitution provides for a three-tiered, parallel federal and state judiciary, including 
first instance, high, and supreme courts.456 The Constitution has also authorised the regions “to enact 
and execute” their own constitutions to be drafted, adopted, and amended by the State Council.457 
Accordingly, the regional states and the city administrations have issued their own constitutions and 
charters, which were adopted in 1995 and revised in 2001 and henceforth.458 Since the FDRE 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the position of the regional constitutions and city 
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administration charters in the hierarchy of laws of Ethiopia is subordinate to the FDRE Constitution.459  
As in most other countries following the civil law tradition, legislation in Ethiopia is broadly 
categorised as being primary or subordinate. Primary legislation is a law made by the legislative body, 
which is known in the context of Ethiopia as “proclamation”. Within the current state structure and 
power relation in the country, a proclamation is enacted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives and 
the State Council at the federal and regional levels, respectively. However, the legislative body may, in 
the proclamation it enacts, delegate its lawmaking power to the pertinent executive organ in order to 
allow room for more localised expertise and detailed provisions for implementation. By the same 
token, the executive may further delegate its power to an organ subordinate to it. A law based on a 
legislative power obtained through delegation is therefore called a subordinate legislation. For 
example, the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the State Council often delegate to the Council of 
Ministers and the Executive Council, respectively, such lawmaking power in the proclamations they 
issue. Laws issued by the Council of Ministers and the Executive Council in this way are known as 
“regulations”. Laws issued by a federal Ministry or a regional Bureau based on the power further sub-
delegated to it by the Council of Ministers or the Executive Council are called “directives”.460 
For example, the FDRE Constitution, which established the current federal state structure461, proclaims 
to have been adopted by “the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”462, declares that “All 
sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”463, and that “This 
Constitution is an expression of their sovereignty.”464 Thus, since the FDRE Constitution is thought to 
have been made by the people, the possessors of sovereign power, it occupies the uppermost position 
in the hierarchy of laws of the country.465 However, the Constitution qualifies the sovereign power that 
it proclaims to reside in the people, stating that “Their sovereignty shall be expressed through their 
representatives elected in accordance with this Constitution and through their direct democratic 
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participation.”466 And as per the federal state structure and parliamentary system of government, the 
elected representatives through whom the people express their sovereignty are members of the House 
of Peoples’ Representatives at the federal level, and of the State Council at the regional level, which 
are the highest authority and legislative body next to the people in as much as their respective 
jurisdictions are concerned.467 As such, the laws that these organs enact are primary legislation called 
proclamation, which occupy the second highest position in the hierarchy of laws below the FDRE 
Constitution. Laws made by the federal Council of Ministers or the regional Executive Council based 
on the lawmaking power delegated to them by the House of Peoples’ Representatives or the State 
Council are subordinate legislation called regulations, which thus occupy the third position in the 
hierarchy of laws below proclamation. And laws made by a federal Ministry or a regional Bureau 
based on the lawmaking power further sub-delegated to it by the Council of Ministers or the Executive 
Council are called directives, which occupy the lowest position in the hierarchy of laws. It should, 
however, be emphasised that since the regional constitutions are directly made by the State Council of 
the region concerned, although they are the supreme law within their respective territories, their 
position in the hierarchy of laws of Ethiopia is subordinate to the FDRE Constitution. It should also be 
noted that since most of the codes issued during the imperial era that still partially or fully remain in 
force, including the Civil Code, were issued as primary legislation in the form of proclamation, their 
position in the current hierarchy of laws is the same as other proclamations more recently promulgated. 
State Structure and the Hierarchy of State Powers and Laws 
Rank Name and Rank of the Law Name and Rank of the Lawmaker 
At National Level At Regional Level At National Level At Regional Level 
1st. The FDRE Constitution The FDRE Constitution People People 
2nd. - Regional Constitution - State Council 
3rd. Proclamation Proclamation House of Peoples’ 
Representatives 
State Council 
4th. Regulations Regulations Council of Executive Council 
5th. Directives Directives Ministries Bureaux 
The FDRE Constitution may arguably be considered as one of the constituents of the current formal 
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land tenure system of Ethiopia for several reasons. As the supreme law of the land and an embodiment 
of the formal land policy involving the EPRDF’s state land ownership policy now in force in the 
country, it provides the framework for the current land law reform, directs the establishment, 
substantive contents, and procedural rules of the formal land laws and land institutions, and shapes the 
composition and operation of the overall formal land tenure system. In addition, although it may not be 
directly invoked and relied upon, the Constitution sets out provisions concerning smallholder land 
rights, and guides the manner of interpretation, explanation, and application of smallholder land rights 
provisions set out in specific formal land laws in the course of implementation by executive land 
institutions, exercise by smallholders, and enforcement by dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Specifically, as the supreme law of the land, the Constitution entrusted power to formulate the 
country’s land policy to the federal government under Article 51, which enumerates the “Powers and 
Functions of the Federal Government” and states that the federal government “shall formulate and 
implement the country’s policies, strategies and plans in respect of overall economic, social and 
development matters.”468 The Constitution also embodies under Article 40 the current formal land 
policy of the country that the EPRDF has formulated accordingly. Although the regional constitutions 
and city administration charters contain provisions concerning smallholder land rights in particular, 
like most of their other provisions, they are either verbatim copies of, or closely similar with those of 
the FDRE Constitution. As Tsegaye Regassa observed, “The major material or substantive source of 
the norms of the state constitutions is apparently the federal constitution. A cursory glance at the 
provisions of the state constitutions confirms this observation. There is a striking similarity.”469 
Nonetheless, for the same reasons discussed above in relation to the FDRE Constitution, the regional 
constitutions and city administration charters may be considered as constituents of the current formal 
land tenure system of Ethiopia, particularly in as much as their respective territories are concerned. 
Land is one of the matters on which the division of federal and regional powers has been made under 
the FDRE Constitution.470 This Constitution designated land as a “federal matter”. According to 
Article 51, the federal government “shall enact laws for the utilisation and conservation of land and 
other natural resources”.471 In contrast, the Constitution under Article 52 enumerates the “Powers and 
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Functions of States”, and declares that “All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government 
alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States.”472 As 
regards land matters, the Constitution, which further states under the same Article 52 that “Consistent 
with sub-Article 1 of this Article, States shall have the following powers and functions”, specifically 
authorises the regional states “To administer land and other natural resources in accordance with 
Federal laws”.473 Accordingly, the federal government enacted its first land law entitled “Federal Rural 
Land Administration Proclamation No. 89/1997” on 7th July 1997.474 However, it has since replaced 
this law by “The FDRE Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No. 456/2005”.475 
Nonetheless, the federal government has in land laws it issued as per the lawmaking power conferred 
upon it in the Constitution given regional states power to “enact rural land administration law, which 
consists of detailed provisions necessary to implement this [federal] Proclamation.”476 The federal 
government has also conferred upon regional states power to “establish institutions at all levels that 
shall implement rural land administration and land use systems.”477 Accordingly, by the time this thesis 
was written, the regional states of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPRS have put into effect their 
own formal land laws setting out provisions of smallholder land rights and land institutions dealing 
with implementation of smallholder land rights provisions, which thus form part of the current formal 
land tenure system of Ethiopia, though the remaining five regions, namely Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, 
Gambella, Somali, and Harari, have yet to put into effect their own formal land laws and institutions.478 
Finally, it is necessary to emphasise that the formal federal and regional land policies, laws, and 
institutions that constitute the current formal land tenure system of Ethiopia have not been promulgated 
in the form of a “land code”, unlike, for example, the Commercial and Criminal Codes of the country. 
As a result, provisions concerning those policies, laws, and institutions are found scattered in various 
federal and regional legislation pertaining to land. For instance, the allocation of land for investment in 
commercial agriculture is governed by the FDRE Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002. Whereas, 
urban land, the acquisition of which is subject to a lease contract concluded with the government, is 
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governed by the FDRE Land Lease Holding Proclamation No. 272/2002. It is also necessary to stress 
that, though they do not exist in a consolidated, systematised manner due to the absence of a land code, 
the federal government and the regional states of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPRS, which put 
into effect their own land laws and land institutions, have also enacted land regulations and directives 
and other legislation concerning land, which thus form part of the country’s formal land tenure system. 
3. 2. Ethiopia’s Land Law Reform Experience under 
Three Previous Governments 
In order to fully grasp the present challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty 
in Ethiopia, it is necessary to understand the historical antecedents and precedents of the subject 
matter. That will also help identify strengths and weaknesses and garner useful experiences that will 
enable to devise strategies to effectively deal with those challenges in the future. This Section provides 
a brief historical overview of the chronologies, policy contexts, development objectives, and 
continuities and discontinuities pertaining to land law reform under the three major previous 
governments of modern Ethiopia led by Emperor Menelik II, Emperor Haile Sellassie I, and the Derg. 
3. 2. 1. Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913)  
Emperor Menelik II, whom many Ethiopians affectionately call “emiye’, which loosely translates into 
“darling”, is one of the most popular leaders in the history of Ethiopia credited with a number of 
landmark achievements that shaped the country’s modern history. He is also a luminary in the history 
of black people around the world. It was under the leadership of Menelik II that Ethiopians defeated 
the Italian colonial forces at the battle of Adwa in 1896 in what has been registered in history as the 
first victory of a black nation over an invading white colonial power.479 
Menelik II is particularly known for his effort to unify, modernise, and end the centuries-old isolation 
of Ethiopia from the global community and economy. He completed the formation of the modern 
Ethiopian state parallel to the scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th century two years after the 
defeat of the Italian colonial forces.480 Menelik II, who was the ruler of Abyssinia, which encompassed 
the northern and central parts of what is now Ethiopia, also oversaw the formation of the modern 
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Ethiopian state by reintegrating the territories that now form the southern parts of the country.481  
However, as this was a period when the scramble for Africa was at its heyday, the then world powers 
were reluctant to recognise Ethiopia as a sovereign state. Ethiopia itself was such a poor country 
characterised by backward feudalistic economic, social, and political relations. It was a country in full-
blown crisis, having undergone relentless resource and identity-based international and civil wars, a 
long-drawn isolation from the rest of the world for centuries, and an exceptionally severe rinderpest 
epidemic and famine that affected the northern province of Tigray.482 
Therefore, Menelik II had to undertake multifaceted, rigorous reform programmes aimed at 
modernising the economic, social, and political relations, the land tenure system, and the agriculture 
sector of the country with the following two major objectives. One, to realise his vision of making 
Ethiopia a modern, prosperous, and strong country by attracting foreign aid, trade, investment, and 
technology. Two, to secure Ethiopia’s recognition as a sovereign state, acceptance as an equal 
“civilised” member of the community of nations, and integration into the global economy from the 
then world powers, which had conditioned that upon the enactment of the reforms.483 
Accordingly, Menelik II introduced Ethiopia’s first land law reform comprising Western-modelled 
formal land tenure legal and institutional arrangements in 1908.484 He also established the first 
Western-styled government cabinet of the country.485 The reward Menelik II achieved from his reform 
enterprises was immediate, particularly in relation to the second objective. In that same year, Menelik 
II secured Ethiopia’s recognition as a sovereign state from the colonial powers that had taken over the 
entire region, including territories that used to be part of the country. International agreements, 
whereby boundaries were delimited, if not always demarcated, were signed: With French Somaliland 
(Djibouti) in March 1897; British Somaliland (June 1897); Italian Eritrea (1900); Anglo Sudan (1902); 
British East Africa (Kenya) 1907; and Italian Somaliland (1908).486 
                                                 
481
  Bahru, 1991:111; Gebru Mersha and Githinji, 2005:2. 
482
  Bahru, 1991:71; Vaughan, 2003:108 and 114-115. 
483
  Scholler, 2006:9 and 2008:100. 
484
  Aberra, 1998:98-100. 
485
  Selamu and Vanderlinden, 1967:411-415.  
486
  Vaughan, 2003:104. 
107 
 
Menelik II established the country’s first Western-styled government cabinet in 1908.487 He also in the 
same year achieved his objective of securing Ethiopia’s recognition as a sovereign state from the 
colonial powers that had taken over the entire region, including territories that were part of the country. 
International agreements whereby boundaries were delimited, if not demarcated, were then signed: 
with French Somaliland (Djibouti) in March 1897; British Somaliland (June 1897); Italian Eritrea 
(1900); Anglo Sudan (1902); British East Africa (Kenya) 1907; and Italian Somaliland (1908).488 
As regards the first objective, however, the achievement of Menelik II was not as immediate and 
straightforward as the second one. The Western-modelled liberal and capitalist agenda and 
formalisation and individualisation of land rights that were superimposed upon the pre-existing land-
based feudalistic social relations, political economy, and indigenous land tenure arrangements, which 
were considered as “primitive”, did not work as well as expected. According to analysts of law and 
development such as Chua and Adelman and Paliwala, that is largely due to the lack of 
accommodation of the local wisdom and context and the divergence of interests and values. 489 
In general, despite being meant to bring agricultural land, growth, and development to smallholders, 
the land law reforms undertaken by Menelik II led to the control of Ethiopia’s land and agrarian 
relations by members of the royal family, the nobility, and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church; top civil 
service, army, security, and local government officials; and foreign government agencies and business 
enterprises.490 The absence of a full-blown colonisation that could have allowed the establishment of a 
Western-modelled formal land tenure system throughout the country, coupled with the dictation by the 
colonial powers of the reform agenda of Menelik II, appears to have led to the establishment of a 
dysfunctional land tenure system characterised by legal pluralism. That is because Ethiopia neither 
wholeheartedly transformed the transplanted formal arrangements into a complete, functional formal 
land tenure system, nor maintained and built on the pre-existing indigenous land tenure arrangements.  
The land law reform introduced by Menelik II affected more the national capital, Addis Ababa, and the 
ethnically more diverse southern parts of the country reintegrated upon the formation of the modern 
Ethiopian state, where the formalisation and individualisation of land rights was implemented 
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relatively rigorously. Yet, the northern and central parts of Ethiopia, including the provinces of Tigray, 
Gondar, Gojjam, Wello, and Shewa were largely left to keep on with their indigenous land tenure 
systems, which were as diverse as their ethno-linguistic groups.491 This is believed to have injected 
ethnic element and strengthened the social and political aspects in the country’s land law reform 
enterprises meant to raise smallholder agricultural productivity and tackle poverty. Smallholder 
eviction, landlessness, and tenancy and absentee landlordism occurred far more widely in the southern 
parts of the country where the privatisation of land was carried out rigorously, as a result of which the 
indigenous ethnic groups’ land rights based on their customary land tenure systems was jeopardised.492 
3. 2. 2. Emperor Haile Sellassie I (1930-1974)  
Emperor Haile Sellassie I, who assumed power after a period of internal power struggle following the 
end of the reign of Menelik II in 1913, launched an agriculture-centred national development strategy 
as of the early 1950s. He is credited with that because it was for the first time in the history of Ethiopia 
that the country had formally adopted such a development strategy. The strategy involved the 
enactment of land law and agrarian reforms in a systematised, comprehensive, and integrated manner. 
Haile Sellassie I enacted the land law reform embodied in the Civil Code and other codes issued during 
the “Era of Codification” as part of the “Law and Development Movement I”. This Movement traces 
its origin to the emergence of a new conception of development and development economics after the 
end of World War II. The Movement stipulated law - the liberal, positive, Western notion of law – a 
central role in bringing about “the modernisation of Africa, Latin America, and Asia”.493 Ethiopia is 
one of the countries where this conception was first tested.494 The conception views the indigenous 
socio-economic politico-legal order, including the land tenure system, as anathema to development; 
and law itself both as a part and a tool of development.495 In short, as per this conception, as 
development entails the transformation of the “traditional” to the “modern”, the indigenous socio-
economic and politico-legal order should have to be transformed into a Western-modelled liberal and 
capitalist order that prioritises the individual and the market through the transplantation of Western 
templates of formal law akin to the prescriptions of Max Weber with a view to “supplanting Third 
                                                 
491
  Aberra, 1998:98-100 and 123-124. 
492
  Markakis, 1974:125-127; Markakis and Ayele, 1976:56-59. 
493
  Chua, 1998:12-13; Chibundu, 1997. 
494
  Paul, 1977:1. 
495
  Benda-Beckmann, 2000:3; Chibundu, 1997. 
109 
 
World ‘localism’” with the “unity, uniformity and universality of [the] modern Western State”.496  
Accordingly, Haile Sellassie I enacted the land law reform embodied in the 1960 Civil Code in pursuit 
of the promised modernisation of the country’s indigenous socio-economic and politico-legal order and 
land tenure system, as well as agricultural and overall economic growth. In the words of Haile 
Sellassie I, the 1960 Civil Code, including the land law reform it embodied, was enacted because 
“Ethiopia requires the modernisation of the legal framework”, and that “In order to consolidate the 
progress already achieved and to facilitate yet further growth and development, precise and detailed 
rules must be laid down regarding those problems which do not only face the individual citizen but the 
nation as a whole.”497 Moreover, to produce local professionals who would ensure the implementation 
and implantation of the newly-enacted codes of law, the present-day Law Faculty of Addis Ababa 
University, the first of its kind in the country’s history, was founded in 1963 and staffed by American 
and European instructors with the support of the Staffing of African Institutions of Legal Education 
and Research (SAILER) Project initiated under the auspices of the Ford Foundation of the USA.498  
In addition, Haile Sellassie I enacted an agrarian reform that started in 1953 with the establishment, 
using the land grant system of the USA as a model, of the then Imperial Ethiopian College of 
Agriculture and Mechanical Arts (IECAMA), later renamed “Alemaya Agriculture University” and 
now called “Haromaya University”, which was assigned teaching, research and extension 
responsibilities, and tasked with transferring local research outputs and technologies to farmers, and 
importing technologies and improved practices from abroad and introducing them to farmers in the 
country.499 Haile Sellassie I further expanded his reform programmes in a way that heavily favoured 
large-scale commercial farms to augment agricultural production for export in line with the 
modernisation drive that gained currency among the underwriters of the programmes at the time. 
Increase in production was expected to be achieved through accelerated foreign and domestic 
investment in large-scale farms as per the dominant line of thinking of the time, which was somehow 
akin to what Williamson later in 1989 named the “Washington Consensus” to describe the set of 
prescriptions constituting the “standard” reform package promoted for developing countries such as 
Ethiopia by Washington DC-based funding institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
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US Treasury Department.500 Accordingly, the imperial government introduced the First (1957-1961) 
and Second (1962-1967) Five Year Development Plans, which were mainly designed to expand large-
scale commercial agriculture and produce “high-value” cash crops for export.501 Yet, in recognition of 
the perils of neglecting smallholder subsistence agriculture, the government made a policy shift toward 
the modernisation of the smallholder sector through the dissemination of modern technologies, 
promotion of improved seed varieties, provision of credit and extension services, development of 
transport infrastructure, and formation of marketing cooperative societies under the Third Five Year 
Development Plan (1968-1973).502 This Plan introduced the package project approach composed of the 
Comprehensive Integrated Package Projects (CIPPs), which were implemented with SIDA financing 
under the management of the AIDB and MoA.503 The objective was to raise smallholder productivity 
throughout Ethiopia by first focusing on pilot projects, including selected smallholder farms of 
individual households and organised groups in “high-potential” areas, through the provision of access 
to modern inputs such as improved seed and fertiliser, whilst simultaneously reducing the level and 
cost of services provided to smallholders.504 The geographic coverage of the pilot projects was to be 
expanded through the First Minimum Package Program (1971–1979), which was interrupted due to the 
eruption of the 1974 Revolution, in which Haile Sellassie I, Ethiopia’s last monarch, was deposed.505 
Overall, the land law reform of Haile Sellassie I is praised for being Ethiopia’s first comprehensive and 
systematised reform. It is also credited for economically, bringing about “enclaves of agrarian 
progress” and modest overall growth; socially, leading to the creation of a small, largely urban-based 
elite loyal to him; and politically, consolidating his power externally and internally by pleasing his 
Western allies and benefitting his predominantly elite domestic powerbase.506 However, the feudalistic 
nature of the government means that, the land law reform did not address the concentration of land in 
the hands of absentee landlords, including loyal members of the upper echelons of the royal family, the 
nobility, the army, the police, the civil service, the business community, and the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church, as well as the rampant landlessness, arbitrary eviction, and tenancy of peasants that prevailed 
during the imperial era. The agrarian reform programmes of Haile Sellassie I are believed to have been 
                                                 
500
  Williamson, 1989; Kydd and Dorward, 2001:467; Williamson, 1994. 
501
  Rashid, Meron, and Gezahegn, 2007:3. 
502
  Spielman, Dawit, and Dawit, 2011:6. 
503
  Berhanu, Hoekstra, and Azage, 2006:9-10. 
504
  Dejene, 1990:50. 
505
  Spielman, Dawit, and Dawit, 2011:6. 
506
  See, for instance, Brietzke, 1975:46. 
111 
 
effective in expanding access to improved technologies and modern agricultural inputs, implements, 
and services, although their success was restricted due to limited coverage, lack of financial and 
technological resources, shortage of skilled human power, unfavourable land tenure system, and poor 
infrastructural and market development, as well as initial bias in favour of export-oriented large-scale 
commercial agriculture.507 In short, despite their modest success, the land law reform and agrarian 
reform programmes of Haile Sellassie I did not address the widespread grievances related to the 
distribution of land rights and agricultural products that fuelled the 1974 Revolution, which rallied 
around the slogan “Land to the Tiller”.508 Nor did they help avert the 1973 famine that ravaged 
northern Ethiopia, which, though kept secret to the rest of the country and the world, was exposed by a 
documentary film Jonathan Dimbleby produced, and served as an immediate cause for the culmination 
of the Revolution in the deposition of Haile Sellassie I and the last imperial government of Ethiopia.509 
3. 2. 3. The Derg Military Junta (1974-1991)  
The Derg, which was made up of a group of junior military officers who carried out a “creeping coup”, 
assumed power in the 1974 Revolution that deposed Haile Sellassie I, and officially named themselves 
the PMAC, then enacted the 1975 land law reform considered as the most “radical” in the country’s 
history510 in the form of PMAC Proclamation No. 31/1975.511 The Derg proclaimed to have espoused 
socialist economic programmes, ethnic-based social agenda, and Marxist political worldview. Analysts 
note that this is due to the Derg’s new-found alliance with the former Soviet Union and communist 
bloc, which promised to provide military and economic support by substituting for the aid the Western 
bloc had cut due to its alliance with the imperial government, as well as the necessity of meeting the 
“land to the tiller” demand, which was the Revolution’s rallying cry in consideration particularly of the 
land and agriculture-related grievances that were more pronounced in the ethnically more diverse 
southern Ethiopia, breaking the imperial-era landed aristocracy, and consolidating its grip on power.512  
The national development goals of the Derg were to: (i) ensure that social justice and equity are 
promoted; (ii) generate more resources required to accelerate economic development for improving the 
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living standards of the people; and (iii) expedite the construction and management of the economy via 
planning and in a resource allocation system that would ensure a steady progress in economic and 
social development.513 In order to achieve these broad national development goals, the Derg took a 
number of measures, including the nationalisation of all banks, insurance companies, industrial and 
commercial firms, and the introduction of the land law reform programme that made all land the 
property of the state.514 In the programme of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) it later established, 
the Derg expanded its development goals to include: (i) accelerating the growth of the productive 
forces so as to build a strong and internally self-sustaining national economy free from the influences 
of the capitalist market; (ii) expanding, strengthening and ensuring the dominance of the socialist 
production relations with a view to creating a conducive environment for the growth of the productive 
forces, and expanding socialist economic organisations and management; and (iii) accelerating 
sustained growth of the standard of living and cultural well-being of the working people.515 
However, in line with its ideological orientation, the Derg left no room for the participation of the 
private sector in the effort to accomplish its national development goals.516 The Derg made this clear in 
its declaration of 1974, emphasising that “resources that are crucial for economic development or are 
of such a character that they provide indispensable service to the community will have to be brought 
under government control or ownership.”517 Moreover, the Derg set a maximum ceiling on the value 
private investment at Birr 250,000 for a domestic investor and US$500,000 for a foreign investor.518 
The main strategy the Derg sought to use to accomplish its development goals was the 1975 land law 
reform, the objective of which was to “provide work”, means of living, and increased incomes “for all 
rural people”, as well as to “increase agricultural production and, by liquidating the feudal system, [to] 
narrow the gap in rural wealth and income.”519 Thus, the Derg’s land law reform abolished imperial-
era land tenure systems, nationalised all land without compensation, and introduced the policy of state 
land ownership. The Derg’s land policy declared that “All rural lands shall be the collective property 
of the Ethiopian people”, that “No person or business organization or any other organization shall hold 
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rural land in private ownership”, and that “No compensation shall be paid in respect to rural lands.” 520 
Specifically, the Derg’s land law reform every adult citizen was guaranteed equal rights of access to a 
maximum of 10 hectares of land per household free of charge with usufruct rights excluding rights to 
transfer through sale, lease, collateralisation, and succession, except to primary family members.521  
The Derg’s land law reform was liked to its agriculture-led national development strategy known as 
“agrarian socialism”, which sought to achieve Soviet-style “socialist transformation of agriculture” and 
was marked by the centralisation of the supply of modern agricultural inputs, implements, and 
services; formation of peasant associations and service cooperatives; establishment of state and 
cooperative farms, and implementation of forced villagisation and resettlement programmes intended 
to create “large-scale Soviet-style mechanised farms.”522 The Derg, which started by continuing the 
implementation of the First Minimum Package Program launched under Haile Sellassie I, then 
augmented its land law reform with agrarian reform aimed at alleviating the lack of access to modern 
agricultural inputs, implements, and services.523 According to Mulat, Fantu, and Tadele, the Derg’s 
resettlement and villagisation programmes, which involved planned, compulsory relocation of 
smallholders, were also intended to make way for the establishment of large-scale state-owned 
commercial farms and assemble smallholders in villages so as to make it easier for political control.524 
Overall, the Derg’s land law reform is widely considered to have succeeded in dealing with the land 
and smallholder agriculture-related deprivations and exploitations prevalent during the imperial era.525 
The policy of state ownership of land was enforced throughout all parts of Ethiopia and land was 
provided to the previously landless and land-constrained smallholders free of charge, thereby 
addressing the ethnic and social aspects of the land question.526 Its agrarian reform is also praised for 
expanding modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services throughout the entire country.527 
However, the land law reform and agrarian reform programmes of the Derg are generally considered to 
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have failed with respect to helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. The land rights 
given to smallholders under the Derg’s land law reform were so attenuated with restrictions and 
prohibitions that analysts such as Yigremew, Dessalegn, and Teketel have argued that the Derg freed 
the country’s smallholders from being tenants of the imperial-era absentee landlords and only to make 
them “tenants of the state”.528 In short, the land tenure system the Derg’s land law reform established 
was unfavourable to the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, 
and, as Clapham observed, through time, access to land became a mechanism to reward supporters and 
punish opponents, and arbitrary administration led to corruption and favouritism at the local level.529  
The success of the Derg’s agrarian reform programmes is thought to have been limited due to the 
persistence of the imperial-era problems related to the lack of capacity, the use of the programmes as 
political tool, and the continuation of the extraction of the smallholders’ meagre surplus, although this 
time around the state itself was perpetrator.530 Overall, the land law reform and agrarian reform 
programmes of the Derg are considered to have favoured large-scale state-owned and collective farms 
at the expense of smallholders in the supply of land and modern agricultural inputs, implements, and 
services.531 In any case, despite its land law reform and agrarian reform programmes, the Derg, which 
grabbed power by capitalising on the famine of 1973, ended up presiding over the 1984 famine that is 
believed to be the worst in the country’s history532, and was eventually removed in May 1991 in the 
same way as its rose to, and stayed in power during the 17 years of its existence - through force.533  
3. 3. The Current Land Law Reform Experience under 
the Post-1991 EPRDF Rule   
The EPRDF, which has been in power since it helped fight, overthrow, and succeeded the Derg in May 
1991534, then enacted its own land law reform programme that is currently in effect in Ethiopia. As 
Atakilte and Hussein suggested, the EPRDF had the same socialist economic programmes, ethnic-
based social agenda, and Marxist political worldview as the Derg.535 And as Crewett and Korf, Merera, 
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and Abbink observed, the EPRDF is originally a Marxist ethnic liberation movement and the successor 
of the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) that still constitutes the backbone of the political 
organisation and the current government it leads in the country, which had fought an armed struggle 
against the Derg claiming ethnic-based oppression and seeking ethnic-based solution for the settlement 
of Ethiopia’s longstanding problems, including those pertaining to land law reform, smallholder 
agricultural productivity, and poverty.536 However, the fall of the Derg and the coming to power of the 
EPRDF in May 1991 was accompanied by major internal and external events, which appear to have 
considerably shaped the ideological orientation of the EPRDF, the national development strategy 
objectives and goals it designed, as well as the formulation and implementation of the land law reform 
it enacted to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty to attain those objectives and goals. 
Internally, Ethiopia was a country almost in full-blown crisis, with protracted war, extreme poverty, 
widespread dislocation and emigration, maladministration, corruption, and a state, though inept and 
illegitimate, that controlled virtually every aspect of life, leaving little space for grassroots activity, 
civil society or the private sector.537 Moreover, the period was marked by the existence of numerous 
political organisations with various national and ethnical platforms, the dire situation of smallholder 
productivity and poverty, and the prominence of a view that blames the Derg’s legacy, especially the 
policy of state ownership of land, for this situation.538 Externally, the period was characterised by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union its communist bloc, the advent of the “New World Order” marked by the 
dominance of Western bilateral and multilateral funding agencies, particularly the World Bank and the 
IMF, the emergence a school of thought viewing the Western economic, social, and political principles 
of capitalism, individualism, and liberalism as the only viable path for transitional countries like 
Ethiopia539, and the commencement of “structural adjustment” as a condition for Western aid under the 
auspices of bilateral and multilateral funding agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF.540  
Therefore, despite its socialist economic programmes, ethnic-based social agenda, and Marxist-
oriented political worldview, the EPRDF had no alternative but to also accommodate the Western 
principles of capitalism, individualism, and liberalism, which has thus by the EPRDF’s own admission 
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forced it to adopt the governing ideology that it claims to be a pragmatic mixture of Marxism-
liberalism and later gave it the name “Revolutionary Democracy”.541 The EPRDF framed virtually all 
aspects of life in Ethiopia along ethnic lines as per its commitment to what it called “the national 
question”. Accordingly, it restructured the country into a federal polity composed of a central 
government and regional administrations that were formed mainly along ethnic lines under the TPCE 
(Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia), which was the supreme law of the land from its adoption at 
the TNC (Transitional National Conference) in July 1991542 until it was replaced as such by the FDRE 
Constitution, which was put into effect on 21 August 1995543, proclaims to have been adopted by “the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”544, and to be “the supreme law of the land”.545 The 
TPCE and the Constitution emphasise ethnic-based group rights and contain provisions such as a 
“secession clause”, which authorises the federating units formed mainly along ethnic lines units to seek 
“unconditional” secession546, which turned out to be controversial, as, for its proponents, it provides 
the only formula to achieve ethnic harmony and maintain Ethiopia as a political unit formed by the 
voluntary unification of ethnic groups547, whilst, for its opponents, it invites ethnic conflict and risks 
the eventual disintegration of the country.548 However, the Constitution also contains provisions setting 
out fundamental human rights and individual freedoms and creating a series of liberal institutions, 
including elected, representative legislature549, accountable executive550, and independent judiciary.551 
On the other hand, since the EPRDF had the same socialist economic programmes, ethnic-based social 
agenda, and Marxist political ideology as the Derg, it continued the Derg’s policy of state ownership of 
land under its land law reform programme.552 The major objective of the EPRDF’s land law reform is 
to “put in place legal conditions conducive for sustainable rural land use, whereby rural land is 
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conserved and sustainably used in a manner that gives a better output”.553 The FDRE Constitution, 
which embodies the current land policy of the country, validates the policy of state ownership of land, 
declaring that “Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”.554 
The land law reform programme of the EPRDF is linked to its agriculture-led national development 
strategy called ADLI, which has been the flagship of the EPRDF government since it unveiled it 
immediately after assuming power declaring it to be an effective instrument for attaining food security 
and pro-poor economic growth in Ethiopia.555 ADLI, which the EPRDF adopted arguing that Ethiopia 
is a smallholder-based economy, and that the country has little capital and other resources necessary 
for outright industrial development except abundant agricultural land, labour, and water, was tasked 
with its objective of helping attain food security and foster overall economic growth mainly by raising 
smallholder productivity in staple crops.556 In short, in the words of the EPRDF government, “ADLI is 
a strategy in which agriculture and industry are brought into a single framework, wherein the 
development of agriculture is viewed as an important vehicle for industrialisation by providing raw 
material, a market base, surplus labour, and capital accumulation.”557 ADLI is hoped to ultimately help 
accomplish the four national development policy goals the EPRDF has been pursuing, which are to (i) 
bring about rapid economic growth; (ii) benefit the majority of the population therefrom; (iii) move the 
country from aid-dependency to self-sufficiency; and (iv) establish a well-developed market 
economy.558 In view of that, although the EPRDF’s land law reform has made significant continuities 
from the Derg’s, including the enforcement of the policy of state ownership of land, the provision of 
usufructuary land access, the restriction of succession to family members, the prohibition of sale, and 
disallowance of collateralisation, it has also recognised the right to compensation for investment made 
on land upon expropriation, lifted the 10-hectare restriction on maximum plot size, abolished the 
prohibition of tenancy and hired labour, allowed the leasing of land, expanded the succession of land 
rights from spouse and children to all family dependents, and decentralised the governance of land.559 
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The EPRDF’s land law reform was also accompanied by several agrarian reform programmes 
undertaken within the framework of the ADLI strategy. One is the agricultural extension programme 
known as the Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES), which was 
launched in 1994/95 to merge the training and visit system with the technology diffusion experience of 
the Sasakawa Global 2000, and thereby demonstrate to smallholders the benefits of a package of 
inputs, notably balanced and higher rates of fertiliser, improved seeds, pesticides, and management 
practices.560 The other is the Sustainable Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation Program 
(SAERP), which was intended to expand small-scale irrigation and watershed management schemes to 
reverse environmental degradation and boost agricultural productivity.561 Yet, the EPRDF has made 
continuities in its agrarian reform from the Derg’s, particularly as regards the state’s dominant position 
in the supply of modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services, arguing that “the private sector 
will play a leading role in these activities, but given the early stages of transition to market agriculture, 
a range of public sector investments and services is needed to help jump-start the process”.562  
3. 4. Legal Pluralism and the Land Law Reform 
Experience of Ethiopia  
Legal pluralism that land law reform gave rise to in the land tenure system, which comprises both 
formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions that govern the provision 
and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, has been the most significant of the 
challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty throughout the history of modern 
Ethiopia. But what makes legal pluralism particularly a major challenge in Ethiopia is not just the fact 
that land law reform enacted in the country has to operate to bring the change in the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights that it needs to bring about in order to 
deliver the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes it is hoped would help achieve not only 
through the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions introduced under the current and previous 
land law reforms, but also in the context of a land tenure system that comprises the pre-existing non-
formal customary ones. After all, as McAuslan observed, “Customary tenure is - and always has been - 
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one of the foundational elements of the land laws of all states in Africa.”563 It is not even the fact that 
despite the existence of the formal land policies, laws, and institutions that the state has been 
establishing and operating through land law reform, the pre-existing non-formal customary ones have 
continued to exist, operate, and be used by society to govern more than 85% land relations in Ethiopia. 
Instead, what makes legal pluralism particularly a major challenge in the country is the fact that the 
non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions have remained more popular, influential, 
and legitimate in the eyes of society despite having been delegitimised, abolished, and replaced by the 
formal state land policies, laws, and institutions, which, though are backed and considered legitimate 
by the state, appear to be illegitimate in the eyes of society and have thus largely remained irrelevant, 
unimplemented, and unused. As a result, the non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions 
have continued to exist, operate, and be used by society in Ethiopia despite often being not consistent 
with, and recognised under the formal state ones. Moreover, there is no clear hierarchy or other form of 
coordination between the formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions. 
This can create confusion and adversely affect the provision and implementation of smallholder land 
rights, and, through that, the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes that land law reform is 
hoped would help achieve in the country. For example, parties to a dispute concerning such 
smallholder land rights may invoke different land laws to support competing claims, or may choose 
different land institutions that they feel would likely be favourable to their cause.564 With that in mind, 
this Section will highlight the treatment that successive governments of Ethiopia have given to the 
legal pluralism in the land tenure system, particularly the non-formal customary land policies, laws, 
and institutions, and examine the implication that this treatment might have to the provision and 
implementation of smallholder land rights and the conditions of smallholder productivity and poverty. 
As legal pluralism in the land tenure system, which comprises not only formal state land policies, laws, 
and institutions introduced through land law reforms, but also the pre-existing non-formal customary 
ones, affects the manner of provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights, it thus seems to have affected the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes of land law 
reform. As Brietzke argued, state law, including land law enacted through land law reform, “has failed 
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to promote development in Ethiopia.”565 That, according to Brietzke, who stressed that “Development 
and rural development are virtually synonymous in Ethiopia”566, is because “the impact of state-
sanctioned law on rural Ethiopia has been slight. In many areas, defined, perhaps, as lying beyond a 
day’s walk from the nearest all-weather road, government law has had no effect upon daily life.”567 
It should, however, be emphasised that what matters is not the existence of legal pluralism per se, but 
the way in which this legal pluralism is formally treated. Research and experience suggest that if 
treated appropriately, legal pluralism can enhance rather than hinder land law reform’s effectiveness. 
For example, McAuslan has argued that land law reform and the resultant legal pluralism can be used 
as a tool to make effective use of land as an engine of wealth creation in Africa if the indigenous 
customary land tenure arrangements are taken as a foundation and the formal land laws and institutions 
that are imported and transplanted are treated as an add-on. To use the words of McAuslan, 
“Customary tenure is not an add-on to received law; indeed, received or imposed law is the add-on. 
Received law thus needs to be adapted and adjusted to indigenous law, not vice versa, and proponents 
of received law should be advancing the case for legal pluralism”.568 Ethiopia provides an interesting 
litmus test for McAuslan’s argument. The country has experimented with several land law reforms that 
treated legal pluralism in different ways. And the way in which the land law reforms treated legal 
pluralism appears to have shaped their smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes they delivered. 
Specifically, under the land law reform Menelik II introduced in 1908, the pre-existing customary land 
tenure systems were taken as a foundation, whilst the formal state systems that were transplanted were 
treated as an add-on. As a result, a land tenure system composed of both formal state and non-formal 
customary systems governed land relations until the enactment of the country’s most comprehensive 
and systematised reform in the 1960s. As Connolly noted, “Until the 1950s, the law in Ethiopia was an 
amalgamation of codes, legislation, and a variety of customary rules.”569 During this period, the 
condition of smallholder productivity and poverty was such that Ethiopia was able to ensure national 
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food self-sufficiency and even export to countries in East Africa and the Middle East.570 
Nevertheless, under land law reforms that have since been enacted, the indigenous customary land 
tenure arrangements of Ethiopia were not taken as a foundation. Nor were they modified, reinforced, 
and complemented by the foreign formal land laws and institutions that were imported and 
transplanted. In fact, they were not even treated as an add-on to the newly introduced formal land laws 
and institutions. Instead, they were delegitimised, abolished, and replaced by the formal ones. 
Exceptionally, few instances of incorporation and recognition of certain aspects of the customary 
arrangements have been made in the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia, which embodied most elements of 
the reform programme enacted under Haile Sellassie I, although this has been progressively avoided 
under the subsequent reform programmes. Yet, even those few customary elements that were retained 
in the Code were neither adequate nor effective. Besides being reflective of the customs of only the 
then politically more important ethno-cultural groups and hence as foreign as the formal ones to the 
many others, those customary elements were never communicated and put into effect sufficiently. As 
Vanderlinden observed, “for many inhabitants of the Empire, the few traditional norms kept in the 
Codes are utterly foreign, as they reflect the traditions of other politically more important groups.”571 
Commenting on the treatment accorded to customary land tenure arrangements, David, the Civil Code 
draftsman, has stated that “The Ethiopians have sorted out their customs, keeping only the necessary 
ones which either correspond to their profound sentiment of justice, or else appear too generally and 
too profoundly rooted for one to hope to take them away from Ethiopians in the foreseeable future.”572 
Several things are unclear in David’s comment. It is not clear what is meant by, by whom, and on what 
basis the customs of Ethiopians that correspond to their “pro-found sentiment” and that are “too 
profoundly rooted” were decided; or if, by whom, and how the customs will be taken away from them. 
One thing is clear, though. The customary land tenure arrangements were neither taken as a 
foundation, nor treated as an add-on to the formal land laws and institutions that were imported and 
transplanted. The incorporation and recognition of certain aspects of them has been made, but only 
exceptionally and rarely. In short, the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia made it clear under Article 3347(1) 
that “Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written or customary previously in force 
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concerning matters provided for in this Code shall be replaced by this Code and are hereby repealed.” 
The Derg and the EPRDF were even less generous in their treatment of the customary land tenure 
arrangements under the reform programmes they enacted. The main objective that the Derg assigned to 
its reform was “by liquidating the feudal system, to lay the basis upon which the Ethiopian peasant 
masses may be liberated from age-old feudal oppression, injustice, poverty and disease, and all 
Ethiopians may henceforth live in equality, freedom, and fraternity.”573 For the Derg, in order to 
liquidate the feudal system, customary arrangements “concerning land tenure [that] strongly reinforce 
the feudal framework of Ethiopian rural life” had to be abolished.574 Accordingly, Article 32 of the 
PMAC Proclamation delegitimised and abolished all non-formal customary land tenure arrangements.  
On its part, the EPRDF pursued ethnic-based agenda. Accordingly, it declared under Article 40(3) of 
the FDRE Constitution that “The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural 
resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property 
of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means 
of exchange.” The land laws the EPRDF issued as part of its reform programme also declared that the 
reform is intended to promote the ethnic-based agenda and realise the policy of state ownership of land 
“confirmed in the Constitution of the FDRE as a result of the bitter struggle waged by the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.”575 Furthermore, the Constitution stipulated under Article 9(1) 
that “The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any law, customary practice or a decision of an 
organ of state or a public official which contravenes this Constitution shall be of no effect.” Similarly, 
contravening provisions and operations of the customary land tenure systems have been rendered null 
and void under Article 17(2) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, 
Article 30(2) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Article 32(2) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. 
However, notwithstanding those radical abolition provisions and despite often being in conflict with 
the provisions of the formal ones, the non-formal customary land tenure arrangements continue to exist 
and operate. Notably, they remain far more popular and important than the formal ones in governing 
smallholder land relations. This fact epitomises the failure of land law reform and the challenge of 
legal pluralism. In other words, the outcome of land law reform has been a dual, dysfunctional land 
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tenure system characterised by legal pluralism. On the one hand, land law reform has given rise to a 
formal land tenure system, which, despite being legitimate in the eyes of the state, is apparently 
illegitimate in the eyes of the people. It is such laws of the country that resulted from this failed 
attempt to abruptly erase numerous centuries of legal history, turn it into a tabula rasa, and fill it with 
alien laws that Schiller has characterised as “fantasy law.”576 And, on the other, land law reform has 
neither recognised nor neutralised pre-existing non-formal customary land tenure systems, which, 
despite having been formally abolished, are apparently considered legitimate in the eyes of the people 
and remain far more popular and important in governing smallholder land relations. In fact, application 
of the five parameters that Friedman developed to measure the legitimacy of a legal system suggests 
that the non-formal land tenure systems are more legitimate than the formal ones.577 In short, land law 
reforms enacted in modern Ethiopia have produced neither the functional formal land tenure system 
nor the agricultural growth successive governments anticipated. The legal pluralism it brought about 
means that, instead of clarity and predictability, land law reform has entailed confusion and uncertainty 
in the land tenure system governing the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the fact that Ethiopia has been in structural food deficit since the enactment 
of the country’s first comprehensive land law reform in the 1960s, which also marked the beginning of 
the wholesale abolition and replacement of customary land tenure arrangements by formal ones, and 
that the deficit has worsened with the increasing sidelining of the customary land tenure arrangements 
under the subsequent land law reforms suggests that the way legal pluralism was handled is the crucial 
factor behind the outcome land law reform delivered. Brietzke has succinctly summarised the situation, 
noting that “In Ethiopia, effective everyday social control is maintained under traditional laws. 
Recourse to ‘government law’ only occurs in extraordinary cases - penal problems, tax disputes, and 
cases in which traditional dispute settlement has failed. Even in these cases, the judge is often unaware 
of the existence of relevant state-sanctioned law, misunderstands it, or refuses to apply it”, and that 
“the laws currently applicable in rural Ethiopia are an often overlooked development constraint.” 578  
But why did not “penetration” of formal state land policies, laws, and institutions take place? That is 
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arguably because land law reforms undertaken throughout Ethiopia’s history have been designed 
primarily to serve the interests of those in state power. The state often did little to engage beyond 
ensuring that those interests are served; and lacked the motivation and means to consult or benefit 
smallholders or the public at large in the formulation and implementation of land law reforms.579 On 
their part, suspicious or unaware of the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions, smallholders 
tended to ignore them and stick to the pre-existing non-formal customary tenure systems. For example, 
as Dunning suggested, “There have been land reforms throughout Ethiopian history, but have been 
with highly political flavour designed to reward one group or to punish another, and always ultimately 
to consolidate the power of the ruler.”580 This political purpose of using land law reform to put land 
under state control has since continued. Crewett, Ayalneh, and Korf have observed that “Ethiopia has a 
long legacy of state intervention in land relations throughout different political regimes”, and that “It is 
evident that the quest for state control over rural land exhibits long continuity in Ethiopian history.”581 
Similarly, Crewett and Korf have argued that “it is very unlikely that the Ethiopian government departs 
from the dependence path in rural politics and the practices to govern the rural populace and gives up 
its most precious power resource in the rural realm - the power to distribute land.”582 
Land law reforms undertaken in the country have thus been not primarily based on economic 
considerations of raising agricultural productivity and tackling poverty, but taking into account social 
and political interests associated with land. Through their land law reforms, Haile Sellassie I sought to 
promote community cohesion and national unity; the Derg waged class struggle to bring land equality 
and classless society by “liquidating the feudal system” and laying “the basis on which Ethiopians may 
live in equality, freedom, and fraternity”; and the EPRDF pursued ethnic-based agenda and sought to 
realise the policy of state land ownership “confirmed in the Constitution of the FDRE as a result of the 
bitter struggle waged by the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.” Haile Sellassie I enacted 
his land law reform because “Ethiopia requires the modernisation of the legal framework of social 
structure” and “In order to facilitate growth and development.”583 The Derg’s reform was meant to 
“increase agricultural production and, by liquidating the feudal system, [to] provide work for all rural 
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people [and] narrow the gap in rural wealth and income.”584 The EPRDF enacted its reform to promote 
its ethnic-based agenda, as well as “put in place legal conditions conducive for sustainable rural land 
use, whereby rural land is conserved and sustainably used in a manner that gives a better output.”585 
However, apparently successive governments not only viewed the pre-existing non-formal customary 
land tenure arrangements as “illegal” superstructures and denied them the status of “law”, but also 
considered them anathema to the economic, social, and political goals they sought to pursue through 
their land law reforms. That is why each of them enacted their own land law reform and used it to 
emphatically declare the wholesale repeal and replacement of the indigenous non-formal customary 
arrangements by the foreign-modelled formal state land policies, laws, and institutions they imported 
and transplanted. For example, David, the draftsman of the Civil Code and the chief architect of the 
first comprehensive land law reform of Ethiopia, has explained the perception that underpinned the 
treatment accorded to the non-formal customary arrangements, noting that “The development and 
modernisation of Ethiopia necessitate the adoption of a ‘ready-made’ system; development and 
modernisation force the reception of a foreign system of law in such a manner as to assure as quickly 
as possible a minimal security in legal relations.”586 In fact, David did not recognise “customs” as 
“law”, and considered them responsible for the country’s underdevelopment. According to David, 
Ethiopia’s adoption of a ‘ready-made’, foreign system of law was justified because the country did not 
have, and “cannot wait 300 or 500 years to construct in an empirical fashion a system of law”. As 
regards the situation before codification, David remarked that “Only ten years ago there existed neither 
a collection of jurisprudence, nor a doctrinal work on the civil law; neither were there any laws except 
some very fragmentary dispositions. Under these conditions citizens were left without a guide to their 
rights and obligations. The door was open to arbitrariness and all security was lacking. With conditions 
in the modern world, where highly developed states exist, it is inconceivable that one might build in a 
country such as Ethiopia the road built in Western Europe in the course of centuries of groping.”587 
But could the governments have been able to pursue their economic, social, and political goals using 
the pre-existing non-formal customary land tenure arrangements rather than the foreign-modelled 
formal land policies, laws, and institutions they imported and transplanted through land law reform? 
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The decentralised, vague, and diverse nature of the customary arrangements, as well as the fact that the 
social pressures inducing compliance with them are too diffuse, makes them ill-adapted to pursue those 
goals. Different cultural groups have different rules, impairing the efficiency of centralised formulation 
and implementation of development interventions. The non-formal customary arrangements inherently 
reflect and reinforce the patriarchal, feudal, and subsistence framework Ethiopia’s smallholder-based 
rural life, emphasise traditional structures, values, and beliefs, focus on upholding past relationships 
and maintaining the relative status quo, and hinder the reduction of reliance on families, neighbours, 
and communities and the expansion of wide-scaled face-to-face relationships necessary to foster broad-
based economic, social, political development.588 Since unwritten custom is vague and depends on the 
knowledge of particular judges or jurors, people cannot predict the consequences of their actions with 
the degree of certainty required for development. Relations between persons with differing cultural 
groups are made more difficult by the diversity of rules.589 Codification of customary laws, such as was 
attempted in Kenya, could only result in a lowest common denominator type of law that would mean 
little to a person of a particular cultural group, and would be ill-adapted to advance development.590 
Nonetheless, the governments could have been able to better advance the economic, social, and 
political goals they sought to pursue through their land law reforms using the foreign-modelled formal 
state land policies, laws, and institutions they imported and transplanted as an add-on to, and a means 
to modify and complement rather than repeal and replace the pre-existing non-formal customary 
arrangements. Such land law reform would be more efficient and effective, and the land policies, laws, 
and institutions it establishes more legitimate and functional than would be otherwise. That is because 
it would allow concentration of the country’s scarce legal resources upon those elements of the pre-
existing land tenure system that most constrain smallholder land rights and productivity. It would also 
enable to avoid a situation whereby non-formal customary arrangements are repealed and replaced by 
foreign-modelled formal ones, which, despite being backed by the state, largely remain irrelevant, 
unimplemented, and ineffectual. As Brietzke observed, land law reform can be efficiently and 
effectively used to foster smallholder productivity and development in countries like Ethiopia if the 
new formal land laws and institutions are put into effect to the extent they can serve as a substitute for 
the traditional values and structures and are able to ensure that the legal rule and the associated reward 
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or punishment receive maximum spontaneous obedience. Otherwise, land law reform can disrupt the 
pre-existing land relations and entail more harm than good. For Brietzke, “The development potential 
inherent in law can best be realised by concentrating scarce legal resources upon those narrowly 
defined laws, values, and structures which most hinder development.” Brietzke has further argued that 
reform “programmes that exceed political and administrative capacities should not be attempted: the 
payoff from the utilisation of scarce resources is too small and disrespect for law and governmental 
policies will result.”591 More importantly, the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions that such 
land law reform establishes would be more legitimate and functional, thereby entailing better 
penetration. As Friedman noted, “penetration is fostered by participation.”592 The fact that it is the 
newly introduced formal land policies, laws, and institutions that are adapted to “their” indigenous 
customary arrangements would ensure the continuation of smallholders’ knowledge, consideration as 
legitimate, and willingness to use the land tenure system that would result from such land law reform. 
3. 5. Land Law Reform’s Smallholder Productivity and 
Poverty Effects in Ethiopia 
Any assessment of land law reform’s effect in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty in Ethiopia should include examination of cereals. That is because cereals, particularly teff, 
barley, wheat, maize, and sorghum are the most important crops in the country in terms of the number 
of producing smallholders and the amount of cultivated land, output, expenditure, and consumption.593 
For instance, cereals were grown by almost 11.2 million smallholder households accounting for close 
to 85% of the country’s smallholder households numbering around 13.25 million on 73.4% of the total 
of l13 million hectares cultivated during the 2004/05-2007/08 main “Meher” production season.594 
Together, those smallholder households produced a yearly average of 12 million ton of cereals, which 
is about 68% of the agricultural output of Ethiopia (Table 3, Appendix 3595). According to the 2004/05 
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Household Income, Consumption, and Expenditure Survey (HICE), the average share of food 
expenditure in total expenditure being 51%, cereals accounted for more than 46% of food expenditure 
and were the source of 62% of national average per capita daily calorie intake during that year.596  
The period around 1960 provides a suitable starting point to assess land law reform’s role in helping 
raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia. This period marks the enactment of the 
country’s most comprehensive land law reform linked to its first agriculture-led national development 
strategy. It was also around this period that national statistics about agriculture started to be collected. 
Data from FAO indicates a modest but steady growth of 1.9% per annum on average in overall 
agricultural output during the 1961/62-1969/70 – the first decade following immediately the start of 
implementation of land law reform along with agrarian reform as part of the agriculture-centred 
national development strategy formally adopted by Haile Sellassie I. However, it was the expansion of 
cultivated land area that contributed much of the growth, which was 1.1% per annum. In contrast, rise 
in smallholder agricultural productivity accounted only for 0.8% of the growth, which betrays the little 
or no positive impact of land law reform (Appendix 4, Table 4597). Overall, agricultural output plunged 
sharply during the next decade from 1970/71-1979/80, which was marked by the 1974 Revolution that 
led to the fall of Haile Sellassie I and the rise of the Derg. It was also characterised by the enactment of 
the Derg’s land law reform that introduced the policy of state ownership of land – the most radical and 
comprehensive in Ethiopia’s history, and its agrarian reform programme that expanded the provision of 
modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services, but put it under exclusive state control. The 
growth of agricultural output during this decade was -1.4% per annum (Appendix 4, Table 4598). 
The major cause of the decline was a -4.9% decrease in cultivated land area that analysts note was 
attributable to the economic, social, and political turmoil associated with the 1974 Revolution, as well 
as the subsequent implementation of the Derg’s land law reform and agrarian reform programmes that 
transferred the land tenure system and the smallholder sector’s modus operandi to state control, banned 
private enterprise, and introduced multifaceted restrictions, which reduced incentives for production, or 
encouraged under-reporting.599 Notably, the adverse effects of the land law reform and agrarian reform 
                                                 
596
  Alemayehu, 2008:3-4; CSA, May 2007. 
597
  Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, 2011:11. 
598
  Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, 2011:11. 
599
  Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, 2011:10. 
129 
 
programmes could have made the negative growth rates even worse, had it not been for the 3.7% rise 
in smallholder agricultural productivity due largely to the expansion of the provision of modern 
agricultural inputs, implements, and services throughout the country.600 Similarly, the average growth 
rate of agricultural output under the Derg during the 1979/80-1989/90 decade was -0.3% according to 
FAO data, whilst data from CSA indicates a growth rate of 0.6%601 (Appendix 4, Table 4602). 
During the decade from 1990/91-1999/00, which was marked by the fall of the Derg and the rise of the 
EPRDF to power, the average growth rate of overall agricultural output accelerated to about 5% 
according to both FAO and CSA data. Yet, the growth was entirely owing to the expansion of 
cultivated land area by almost 6%, whilst smallholder agricultural productivity continued to decline by 
0.7% and 0.5% according to FAO and CSA data, respectively. During the following decade from 
1999/2000 to 2008/09, growth in overall agricultural output accelerated further to 6.5% and 7.0% 
according to FAO and CSA data, respectively (Appendix 4, Table 4603). The growth achieved during 
these two decades is attributed mainly to the liberalisation, as compared to the Derg era, introduced by 
way of the land law reform and agrarian reform programmes enacted by the EPRDF604; and a 
combination of other factors, including the absence of war and political stability, increase in foreign 
aid and public investment, and to some extent good rainfall and climatic conditions.605 
When it comes to land law reform’s role in helping tackle poverty in Ethiopia, over the period from 
1960-2002, the national economy of Ethiopia grew at a rate of 2.60% per annum. Analysis of sectoral 
growth rates during this period suggests that the larger share of the growth of real GDP came from the 
industrial and services sectors than agriculture. Whilst agricultural GDP grew by 1.35% on average 
annually, industrial GDP and service GDP grew by 3.35% and 4.70% per annum, respectively 
(Appendix 8, Table 8606). Likewise, decomposing the growth trend into different sectors shows that 
agriculture contributed only 0.78% of the growth of the national economy, whilst industry and services 
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contributed 0.35% and 1.50%, respectively, during the same period.607 The rate of economic growth 
has been more impressive during the period since 2003. The country’s economy has been growing at a 
rate of more than 8% per annum according to the IMF, and by around 11% as per the government 
(Appendix 9, Table 9608). Though the actual rate of growth has been controversial and data provided by 
the government has been widely contested, which it routinely rejects as “politically motivated”, there is 
an overall consensus that the country has seen strong economic growth during this period.609 
Nevertheless, the economic growth registered during the period since 1960 was attributable largely to 
the services sector followed by manufacturing (Appendix 8, Table 8610; and Appendix 9, Table 9611). 
Nonetheless, even the growth in the services sector was due to public investment in the form of 
expansion in administration and defence expenditures. It had little to do with the expansion of such 
services as education and health, which are crucial for overall poverty alleviation and development.612 
In general, whilst the poor performance of the agricultural sector demonstrates the little positive impact 
that land law reform had, the fact that the sector remains to be the mainstay of the national economy 
suggests that structural transformation has not yet been achieved. In short, the economic growth 
achieved during the period since 1960 is not attributable mainly to agriculture, particularly the 
smallholder sector. Nor has it translated into broad-based poverty alleviation and economic 
development. In fact, the condition of poverty in Ethiopia seems to have been worsening during this 
period. For example, whilst overall agricultural output and the national economy grew at a rate of 
1.35% and 2.60% per annum, respectively, during the period from 1960-2002, the population grew by 
2.71% during the same period. This implies an annual decline of 1.36% and 0.11% in the growth of per 
capita food production and income, respectively (Appendix 5, Table 5613; and Appendix 8, Table 8614).  
It can be argued that government policies have influenced poverty alleviation. For instance, the period 
1960-1973 during the imperial era was characterised by a land tenure system that included private land 
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ownership and a more liberal economic policy under the traditional system of public administration.615 
During this period, though estimates vary, the annual average growth rate of agriculture was close to 
3%, thanks mainly to investment in commercial agriculture.616 Similarly, the economy grew 4% per 
annum, though it falls to around 1.5% per capita growth, given the high population growth rate617 
(Appendix 6, Table 6618; Appendix 7, Table 7619; and Appendix 8, Table 8620). 
During the rule of the Derg, the performance of the agriculture sector was the worst in the country’s 
history. Though estimates vary, agriculture grew by around 0.5% per annum (Appendix 6, Table 6621; 
Appendix 7, Table 7622; and Appendix 8, Table 8623). Overall economic growth decelerated to 2.3% 
per annum, which is equivalent to -0.4% per capita growth when population increase is factored in.624 
In contrast, the rule of the incumbent EPRDF is characterised by liberalisation in some aspects as 
compared to the Derg period. Though estimates vary, agriculture performed better than during the 
Derg period - growing at a rate of more than 2% per annum (Appendix 6, Table 6625; Appendix 7, 
Table 7626; and Appendix 8, Table 8627). The country’s economy has also seen strong growth – a rate of 
around 7% per annum for the entire post-1991 period combined.628 Yet, the remarkable economic 
growth rate registered during the period since 1991 has not reversed the poverty situation in Ethiopia. 
In particular, the performance of the agricultural sector has been poor both in absolute terms and as 
compared to the manufacturing and services sectors. The fact that despite its poor performance, 
agriculture remains the primary source of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy suggests that 
structural transformation has not yet been achieved. This demonstrates the little positive role land law 
reform has been playing in helping raise agricultural productivity and tackle poverty in the country.  
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Chapter 4 
Land Policies and the Choice of a Land Ownership Policy 
Promoting Smallholder Land Rights in Ethiopia 
4. 1.  Introduction  
As discussed earlier, land policy is one of the constituents of the land tenure system land law reform 
establishes and through which it operates to bring the change in the provision and implementation of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights it needs to bring to deliver the smallholder productivity 
and poverty outcomes it is hoped would help achieve. “Land policy”, defined broadly here, relates to a 
general statement the state promulgates using its legislative organ that specifies the possible forms of 
property rights in land as per the essential national interest concerning land, which thus broadly reflects 
the purpose, composition, and operation of the overall land tenure system, highlights the administration 
of land, guides the management of land relations, and directs the manner of provision and 
implementation of land rights.629 Land policy plays a critical role in making land law reform effective. 
As Wily noted, land law reform “is mainly first articulated in new national land policies”.630 As 
mentioned above, the articulation of land policy conducted during the formulation of land law reform 
intended to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in a given country involves 
specification, as per the essential national interest concerning land, of the possible forms of property 
rights in land to be applied, exercised, and enforced under the formal state land tenure system in the 
form of private, state, or customary land ownership or a variation or a combination of some or all of 
those, which therefore means stipulation of the breadth, duration, and assurance of smallholder land 
rights in broad terms. The upshot is that land policy will also broadly guide the composition, operation, 
and contribution of the other two constituents of the formal state land tenure system, namely land laws 
and institutions, that land law reform will subsequently put into effect and through which it will later 
operate to bring about the change in the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights that it needs to bring about in order to deliver the smallholder productivity and 
poverty outcomes it is hoped can help achieve. Specifically, land policy will shape the forms and 
contents of provisions of productivity-raising smallholder land rights set out in the land laws that will 
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be subsequently issued to clarify, give binding force to, and translate into action the land policy; and 
direct the composition and operation of land institutions that will be established to carry out the 
implementation of provisions of the land laws through application in the course of administering land, 
managing land relations, and enabling exercise by smallholders, as well as through interpretation, 
explanation, and enforcement in the course of dispute resolution. Moreover, although land policy may 
not be directly binding and relied upon, it guides the manner of interpretation, explanation, and 
application of smallholder land rights provisions land laws set out during implementation by executive 
land institutions, exercise by smallholders, and enforcement by dispute resolution mechanisms.631 
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, land has historically been a resource of vital economic, social, 
and political importance in Ethiopia.632 In view of this and the critical role that land policy plays, it 
would not therefore be surprising to see that the choice of a land ownership policy which land law 
reform should introduce in order to be effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty in the country has been a subject of a longstanding, passionate debate. This debate, which 
revolves around the issue of whether the policy of state or private ownership of land is preferable for 
the country, first arose during the heyday of the 1974 Revolution that deposed Haile Sellassie I, which 
was fuelled by grievances related to the distribution of land rights and agricultural products. As Bahru 
noted, although all agreed on the need for a radical land law reform and rallied around the slogan “land 
to the tiller”, the issue emerged as a bone of contention amongst the discrete groups of students, 
teachers, political organizations, trade unions, and military officers that were the driving force behind 
the Revolution.633 Amidst the turmoil that prevailed during the Revolution, junior military officers 
calling themselves “the Derg” took over power and enacted the 1975 radical land law reform in the 
form of the PMAC Proclamation No. 31/1975, which abolished the numerous land tenure systems that 
were in force during the imperial era and introduced the policy of state ownership of land throughout 
Ethiopia.634 The Derg grabbed power and enacted its land law reform in the name of peasants, although 
as Brietzke stressed, it never consulted or involved them in the process.635 According to Gebru Mersha 
and Githinji, the Derg did so realizing the necessity of such a radical land law reform programme to 
uproot the landed aristocracy from rural areas, appease the left opposition, and win over the support of 
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peasants - thereby consolidating its power.636 The Derg subsequently claimed that its land law reform 
would implement the “land to the tiller” rallying cry of the Revolution and put the debate to rest.637 
Nonetheless, the debate was rekindled in earnest in the period of uncertainty that followed the fall of 
the Derg and the coming to power of the EPRDF in May 1991. Considering that the existing policy of 
state ownership had detrimental effect on smallholder productivity and poverty during the Derg era, 
and that the country was undergoing a “post-socialist transition”, many local and international 
development analysts, practitioners, and funders expected a move towards privatisation.638 Moreover, 
during the period of uncertainty that accompanied the transfer of power, both the options of continuing 
the policy of state ownership and of replacing it with a private ownership policy were discussed.639 A 
case in point is a Symposium on “Rehabilitating the Ethiopian Economy” organised in January 1992 in 
Addis Ababa by Inter-Africa Group, which was attended by a multitude of participants, such as local 
and international development analysts, as well as representatives of bilateral and multilateral funding 
agencies, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, and of political organisations, including the ruling 
and opposition parties. In the Symposium’s Final Report, it was noted that “There was a consensus that 
the current system, because it does not guarantee security of tenure and undermines incentives, has 
detrimental effects on agricultural productivity and natural resource conservation.”640 However, the 
EPRDF persisted with its decision to continue the state ownership policy it had already declared in the 
NEP the TGE issued in November 1991, although a referendum was promised to decide the issue.641  
Yet, during the deliberation conducted in the constituent assembly to decisively formulate and institute 
the country’s land policy in the new FDRE Constitution that was being drafted under the auspices of 
the EPRDF, the issue was so contentious that the continuation of the state land ownership policy was 
approved narrowly only by four votes – with 499 votes in favour, whilst 495 members of the assembly 
voted against the continuation and for the introduction of the policy of private land ownership.642 The 
policy of state land ownership was thus validated under the FDRE Constitution. Specifically, the 
Constitution provides that “The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural 
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resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property 
of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means 
of exchange.”643 All federal land laws issued subsequently validate the state land ownership policy 
provided under the Constitution. For example, Article 4 of the FDRE Proclamation No. 89/1997 and 
the Preamble and Article 5(3) of the FDRE Proclamation No. 456/2005 set out the same provisions as 
the Constitution. Likewise, the constitutions and land laws issued by all regions confirm this policy. 
For instance, Article 40(3) of the SNNPRS Constitution contains a restatement of the provisions of the 
FDRE Constitution. Similarly, the Preamble and Article 5(14) of the SNNPRS Rural Land 
Proclamation No. 110/2007 are restatements of provisions of the FDRE Proclamation No. 456/2005. 
Meanwhile, the referendum that was promised to decide the issue never took place.644 The government 
has also tried to suppress the debate thereafter publicly declaring that land ownership policy is a “dead 
issue” and that any policy change will be made only “over the grave of the EPRDF.”645 Despite that, 
the debate has continued in earnest between, on the one hand, the government and its supporters 
defending the policy of state land ownership the government has been enforcing646, and, on the other 
hand, critics arguing against it and in favour of the introduction of a private land ownership policy.647 
With that in mind, this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate by synthesising, analysing, and assessing 
the antagonistic arguments of the two poles in the light of the relevant law and development research 
and experience. Therefore, this Chapter will specifically examine what advantages the state land 
ownership policy that the government currently enforces, the private ownership policy that the critics 
mostly favour, and the non-formal customary land tenure systems that society frequently uses offer in 
promoting the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights. The 
Chapter will also explore if it is possible and preferable for Ethiopia to adopt a hybrid state-private-
customary policy combining the advantages both the formal state and private ownership policies and 
the non-formal customary land tenure systems offer, outline the form and content that this hybrid state-
private-customary land policy should have, and demonstrate the way how it may be put into effect. 
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4. 2.  Justifications of the Government for State Land 
Ownership Policy  
The justification the government and other proponents of its position offer for the enforcement of the 
current state land ownership policy is arguably shaped by the socialist economic programmes, ethnic-
based social agenda, and Marxist-oriented political outlook of the EPRDF - the political organisation 
in charge of the country’s post-Derg government and land law reform. This justification is underpinned 
by the premise that land is a resource of vital economic, social, and political importance, and that 
Ethiopia’s smallholders have historically endured widespread landlessness, arbitrary eviction, 
exploitative tenancy, and deprivation of their produces. Therefore, for the proponents, the most 
important national interest that a land policy introduced in Ethiopia should serve ought to be ensuring 
fairness for smallholders in the control and enjoyment of land rights and the concomitant benefits.648 
According to McAuslan, “fairness” or “equity” may be defined as making available an equitable and 
reasonable proportion of resources, in this case land, to all members of society who need it, in this case 
smallholders. It also includes taking steps to ensure this is done and the position is maintained.649 
In short, the proponents justify the current state land ownership policy based on two strands of justice 
as fairness principle. The first is fairness as historical justice, which is redressing the injustices that 
smallholders historically suffered and preventing those injustices from coming into being again. The 
other is fairness as egalitarianism, which is enabling smallholders to have equal access to land without 
payment. The proponents further contend that the involvement of the state in the land relations of the 
country is necessary to guarantee that fairness is practically ensured and maintained.650 
Moreover, the proponents argue that those historical injustices had profound economic, social, and 
political implications. Economically, since land and land-based smallholder agriculture are the primary 
source of livelihood and the mainstay of the economy, the injustices related to the distribution of land 
rights and agricultural products had entailed the impoverishment of smallholders individually and the 
economy nationally.651 Socially, the proponents claim that those injustices had a devastating effect 
because Ethiopia is a country with diverse ethno-linguistic, religious, and cultural groups, where 
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ethnicity, religion, and culture are intimately tied to specific places, which were more pronounced as 
the alleged injustices occurred in the southern parts of the country that were reintegrated upon the 
formation of the modern Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th century.652 As Markakis observed, 
“While Abyssinia had been a relatively homogenous state with deep Christian roots, the newly 
acquired territories were inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups among whom Islam 
predominated.”653 Whereas, Gebru Tareke, a vocal supporter of the EPRDF, has described the situation 
as follows: “By alienating lands of the annexed societies and thereby reducing them to servitude, and 
by imposing on them Abyssinian culture, the conquerors planted the seeds for national and class 
antagonism.”654 Politically, the proponents invoke the view widely held among analysts of Ethiopia’s 
land and agrarian relations that those injustices emanate from the quest for state control over land 
throughout the history of the nation. According to Crewett, Ayalneh, and Korf, with a view to 
controlling power to distribute land – the most precious power resource in the country – and to thereby 
control and govern the rural smallholder masses and the populace at large, “The Ethiopian state has 
exerted considerable influence on local land tenure regimes throughout different political regimes.”655 
Yet, the proponents tend to place particular emphasis on the ethnic dimension of the issue.656 They are 
keen to emphasise that the practice has been instrumental in the exploitation and deprivation of ethno-
linguistic groups, particularly in the southern parts of the country. That is why, they explain, “the land 
question” in Ethiopia is intertwined with “the question of nationalities” in terms of both the source and 
the solution of the problem, and needs to be approached as such to prevent political instability.657 
The proponents further argue that the enforcement of the current state land ownership policy and the 
involvement of the state in the country’s land relations are necessary because even in contemporary 
Ethiopia, the introduction of the policy of private land ownership would lead to the resurgence of those 
historical injustices along with their economic, social, and political implications. That, they explain, is 
because smallholders would sell off their land through distress sales and become landless and 
impoverished, which would give rise to the imperial-era absentee landlordism and exploitative tenancy 
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institutions.658 Specifically, the government claims that the introduction of the policy of private 
ownership of land would “obstruct our development”, and “besides the huge economic harm it entails 
it will create a severe social crisis that endangers our peace, development, and even our survival.”659 It 
also contends that the privatisation of land ownership entails the acquisition and accumulation of land 
in the hands of a few individuals who are capable to buy, subsequent peasant eviction and poverty, and 
massive rural-urban migration of the then landless peasantry. It further explains that given the lack of 
industrial development and the high rate of unemployment in urban centres, large-scale rural-urban 
migration increases the potential for economic, social, and political unrest and ethnic conflict resulting 
from migration across ethnic boundaries.660 Similarly, Gebru Mersha, a forceful proponent of the state 
land ownership policy, has argued that “privatization of land will create a massive eviction of peasants 
and the displacement of pastoralists. Landless and poor peasants, who comprise the overwhelming 
majority of the rural population, will be the first victims of that policy. Moreover, the pre-reform 
landlords, who battened on the meagre ‘surplus’ produced by the peasants, will now be replaced by 
‘capitalist’ farmers who alienate peasants from their land.”661 Fantu Cheru, another proponent, has also 
warned that “the commoditization of land would turn the clock back to the situation before the 1974 
Revolution. It would bring back the former landlords, open up the possibility of large-scale peasant 
evictions and thus create a massive influx of pauperized and destitute migrants into the towns”.662 
The proponents also maintain that the current state land ownership policy is tailored to make the post-
Derg land law reform effective in improving the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights and helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty.663 They 
particularly claim that the state land ownership policy is meant to ensure the tenure security of 
smallholders by preventing them from selling or mortgaging their landholdings, thereby safeguarding 
them from the grabbing hands of an urban bourgeoisie and rural elites and protecting them from ending 
up landless.664 They further assert that it has been declared under the FDRE Constitution that 
smallholders may not be dispossessed of their landholdings except under certain conditions specified 
by law, which they argue strengthens their tenure security by providing them with protection against 
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arbitrary eviction. In addition, they point to Article 40(7), which stipulates that smallholders have full 
private ownership rights over immovable properties and permanent improvements they bring about on 
their landholdings with their own labour or capital. The proponents also reiterate the provisions of 
Article 40(8), which makes it clear that such property of smallholders may be expropriated only if it is 
needed “for public purposes”, and “subject to payment in advance of compensation commensurate to 
the value of the property.” Moreover, the proponents mention the land registration and certification 
programme envisaged under the federal and regional land laws, which they suggest is aimed at 
enhancing tenure security. Article 6 of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 
2007, Article 15 of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Article 5 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007 
provide for the registration and certification of smallholder landholdings that would grant lifelong 
usufruct rights, although the process has not yet been fully implemented in all parts of the country.665 
When it comes to the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, the proponents argue that although 
smallholders were prohibited from selling or mortgaging their landholdings so as to ensure their own 
tenure security, other transfer mechanisms have been provided by law. Indeed, despite the two 
principles of fairness, right to transfer landholdings through lease has been recognised under Article 
8(1)-(3) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 10 of the 
Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Article 6 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. Besides, any landholder 
has right to transfer his land use right through inheritance to members of his family under Article 8(5) 
of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 9 of the Oromia 
Proclamation 2007, and Article 5(1) [d] and (2) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. 
As for the authorisation of collateralisation of land rights, the proponents maintain that investors 
engaged in commercial agriculture are allowed to use their landholdings as collateral to obtain credit 
under Article 8(4) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 15 
(15) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Article 15(3) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. They also 
contend that smallholders were prohibited from using their landholdings as collateral to ensure their 
tenure security. Had collateralisation of land rights been authorised for smallholders, most would have 
been tempted to use their landholdings to obtain credit, default, and end up landless.666 
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Finally, it should be emphasised that the two core arguments set forth by the government in support of 
the policy of state ownership of land and against private land ownership are contradictory. On the one 
hand, it asserts that “the EPRDF strongly opposes”667 the introduction of the policy of private 
ownership of land in Ethiopia because this policy would allow the country’s private sector, which is 
“rent-seeking” and motivated by selfish interests and personal gains668, to buy land from smallholders, 
who would “sell off their landholdings due to destitution” - thereby leading “inevitably to the 
accumulation of land in the hands of a few.”669 On the other, the government maintains that the main 
reason it favours the enforcement of the policy of state ownership of land in Ethiopia is because, 
contrary to the main argument of the supporters of private land ownership that this policy would enable 
private entrepreneurs to acquire land and engage in agriculture in a more productive and competitive 
manner, “in view of the limited capital and managerial capacity that the private sector of the country 
has, it cannot be expected to buy land and use it extensively in that manner.”670 
It should also be noted that it was the Derg which succeeded the imperial government and that first 
used the land and agriculture-related injustices of the imperial era to justify the introduction of the 
policy of state ownership of land and the intervention of the state in smallholder land relations in 
Ethiopia.671 The Derg also had the same socialist economic programmes, ethnic-based social agenda, 
and Marxist political outlook as the EPRDF. As Hussein noted, however, the land law reform and 
agrarian reform measures that the Derg implemented to address the injustices were so interventionist 
that they undermined the initial gains and led to contradictions between the regime and smallholders, 
which opposition groups such as the EPRDF exploited effectively to overthrow it.672 There is one 
subtle difference, though. The EPRDF gives precedence to the ethnic-based social aspects of the land 
question over the economic and political aspects of the issue. According to Assefa Fiseha, the EPRDF 
“has for long advocated that it is the oppression of nationalities that is at the heart of the crisis and the 
political and economic marginalisation is a consequence rather than a cause. Thus it championed for 
long for the nationalities right as a decisive remedy.”673 Nevertheless, some analysts, such as 
                                                 
667
  EPRDF, 2005b:27. 
668
  EPRDF, 2000:175 and 178. 
669
  EPRDF, 2005b:27. 
670
  EPRDF, 2005b:28. 
671
  Crewett and Korf, 2008:215. 
672
  Hussein, 2004:12. 
673
  Assefa Fiseha, 2006:212. 
141 
 
Vaughan674 and Teshale675, question the EPRDF’s thesis of the oppression of nationalities by the 
Amhara elite and its commitment to bring about ethnic-based social justice in Ethiopia. They do so 
based on analyses of both the historical and contemporary situation of the political economy of 
ethnicity in Ethiopia under the rule of the EPRDF, which was founded and has since been led mainly 
by the TPLF. It should be remembered here that as Assefa Fiseha noted, like the Amhara, Tigrayans 
speak a Semitic language, adhere predominantly to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and belonged to 
Abyssinia – the predecessor to the present-day Ethiopia, although they were always a provincial 
contestant to the throne of Abyssinia and were by and large ruled by their own nobility.676 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the current state land ownership policy’s goal of ensuring fairness 
in allocation of land rights is incompatible with the post-Derg land law reform’s and ADLI strategy’s 
objective of raising smallholder productivity. For instance, Kassahun has noted “the anomaly” between 
the land policy’s purpose of putting land under state ownership on the one hand; and, on the other, the 
land law reform’s and the ADLI strategy’s objective of raising smallholder productivity, as well as the 
national development policy goals of bringing about rapid economic growth, benefiting the majority of 
the population therefrom, moving the country from aid-dependency to self-sufficiency, and 
establishing a well-developed market economy.677 Similarly, participants of the January 1992 Inter-
Africa Group Symposium who supported the privatisation of land ownership have argued that it is 
impossible to achieve the objective of raising smallholder productivity through a state land ownership 
policy intended primarily for ensuring fairness.678 However, the incompatibility appears to be a result 
of a conscious move. In the words of Crewett and Korf, it is a consequence of the government’s 
attempt to “provide a ‘dialectical’ solution to the efficiency-fairness dichotomy and thus please [the 
pro-efficiency] donor agencies, [as well as to allow] the local bureaucrats pick those aspects that 
promise to satisfy the fairness principle and ensure peasant support for the ruling regime.”679 The 
dominant narrative pertaining to fairness, which is to be secured by a benevolent, paternalistic state 
through the enforcement of the policy of state land ownership and the rigorous involvement of the state 
in land relations as an arbiter to ensure fairness practically, is designed to maintain state control on 
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land and retain its most formidable power resource. Yet, considerations of efficiency were apparently 
deemed to be too important to completely discard, even though that might entail incompatibility. This 
is because it is only by bringing about growth in smallholder productivity that one can expect to ensure 
the achievement of food security at the household level, if not the accomplishment of the ADLI 
strategy objectives and national development goals. That would also enable to accommodate the 
wishes of critical pro-efficiency internal and external development analysts, practitioners, and funders, 
and secure their support without having to compromise the fairness narratives substantially.680   
4. 3.  Arguments of Critics in Favour of a Private Land 
Ownership Policy 
The position of the critics of the policy of state ownership of land currently enforced in Ethiopia builds 
on neo-classical economic theories of property rights in land and emphasises the considerations of 
efficiency.681 That contrasts with the position of the proponents of the policy, which is buttressed by 
narratives of land and agriculture-related injustices in the country and emphasises the considerations of 
fairness. The central argument of the critics is that the policy of state land ownership inherently entails 
negative effects on the provision and implementation of the three bundles of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights. Therefore, they conclude, the policy naturally yields smallholder productivity 
lower than what would have been achievable if the policy of private land ownership were enforced.682 
The critics particularly emphasise that the design and implementation of the policy of state ownership 
of land currently enforced hinders the growth of smallholder productivity, and thus the achievement of 
the ADLI strategy objectives, and the development needs and priorities of Ethiopia. That, they argue, 
is due to the barriers the policy inherently entails to the enhancement of tenure security, the facilitation 
of the transfer of rights over land, and the authorisation of collateralisation of land rights for 
smallholders. They explain that whilst land - the most vital factor of production – is kept outside the 
operation of the market and the private sector in an agrarian economy, it is impossible to achieve the 
main objective of ADLI, which is raising smallholder agriculture productivity, and thereby accomplish 
the four the national development policy goals of bringing about rapid economic growth; benefiting the 
majority of the population therefrom; moving the country from aid-dependency to self-sufficiency and 
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integrating it into the global economy; and establishing a well-developed market economy.683 
Specifically, critics provide the following reasons to support their argument against the policy of state 
land ownership. First, it undermines tenure security and incentives for investment on land, and thereby 
adversely affects productivity and sustainable land use. Second, it prevents the emergence of a 
dynamic rural land market that allows entrepreneurial smallholders to access credit and land. Third, it 
discourages smallholders on marginal land from out-migrating and ties them to inefficient land use, 
which leads to fragmentation of landholdings, overpopulation in rural areas, and land degradation. 
Fourth, it perpetuates the legacy of the Derg’s land redistribution programmes that created tenure 
insecurity and discouraged smallholders from investing in sustainable land use.684 It is by highlighting 
the disadvantages of the policy of state land ownership and by refuting the arguments the proponents 
use to justify its enforcement that the critics mostly make their case for the introduction of the policy of 
private ownership. For example, Dessalegn has argued that “freehold is the best means of ensuring 
absolute tenure security. Security of holding and pride of possession will restore peasant confidence 
which has been shattered by fifteen years of state ownership and socialist agrarian policies under the 
Derg. Freehold will provide strong incentives to peasants to invest on land, and will make land 
transactions easier and more efficient.”685 Similarly, at the Symposium Inter-Africa Group organised, 
critics arguing for private land ownership have maintained that “only private ownership will ensure 
security of tenure and provide the peasant with the incentives necessary to make investments and 
improvements on land”; and that “one cannot move towards a market economy whilst keeping land - 
the most vital means of production in agricultural economy - outside the operation of the market.”686 
In short, the position of the critics has the same themes as the analysis provided by Barrows and Roth. 
That is, individualisation of land ownership “increases investment by increasing tenure security and 
reducing transaction costs. Higher tenure security increases expected investment returns, thereby 
increasing demand for capital (including credit) for investment. The supply price of credit decreases 
because the cost of lending is reduced by improved credit worthiness and higher collateral value. Both 
supply and demand effects increase investment. Individualisation will cause a land market to emerge. 
Land will be transferred to those able to extract a higher value of product from the land as users who 
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are more productive bid land away from less productive users. [And individualisation] increases tenure 
security of the landholder, thereby reducing economic costs of litigation over land disputes.”687 
The critics challenge the historical and contemporary narratives pertaining to land and smallholder 
agriculture-related injustices that the proponents use to justify the enforcement of the policy of state 
land ownership and the intervention of the state in the country’s land relations as an arbiter to ensure 
fairness. The critics do not dispute the fact that those injustices occurred during the imperial era. 
However, they assert that if those injustices could be addressed through the enforcement of the policy 
of state land ownership and the intervention of the state in land relations, then they had been addressed 
by the Derg and should no longer be an issue during the rule of the EPRDF. For the critics, ensuring 
fairness for smallholders requires allowing them to have the control and enjoyment of the rights to, and 
the fruits of their landholdings without interference from outside sources, including the state.688 
The critics maintain that since the Derg introduced the policy of state ownership, the state has replaced 
landlords and become the sole entity with power to own, administer, and distribute land, making 
smallholders “tenants of the state”.689 For example, Mesfin has noted the Derg has, by declaring itself 
the sole owner of land, transformed Ethiopia from a country where absentee landlordism and tenancy 
were practised mainly in the south during the imperial era, into a country of all tenants.690 Similarly, 
Dessalegn has emphasised that the Derg’s land law reform has “replaced the landlord with the state, 
providing the latter direct and unencumbered access to the peasantry.”691 Dessalegn has further 
observed that “This is what ‘state’ ownership of land has done in this country: government authorities 
can give away land to investors and others without consulting landholders or their communities, and 
irrespective of the damage this may have on peasants’ livelihoods and the natural environment.”692 
The critics also contend that the government’s explanation and implementation of its policy of state 
land ownership defeats the principle of fairness as egalitarianism, as well as the arguments of 
maintaining economic fairness, social equity, and political stability used to justify the enforcement of 
the policy. For instance, the government has explained that “One of the ways in which the ownership 
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of land by the state is expressed is the government controls land as an owner and ensures it is used for 
various purposes, including enabling private investors that want to engage in agriculture to get land 
through long-term lease.”693 The government has also explained that “investors have the opportunity to 
obtain large tracts of land smallholders do not cultivate through lease. This option is open. In addition, 
there is an opportunity for investors to lease land from smallholders without displacing them.”694 The 
critics specifically emphasise that large tracts of land are being provided in the name of investment to 
commercial agriculture enterprises that produce almost exclusively for export, which is reported to 
have resulted in massive eviction of smallholders belonging to indigenous ethnic groups, as well as in 
the much vilified absentee landlordism that the policy is supposed to prevent. The critics also cite the 
right of smallholders to transfer their landholdings through lease, which they assert entails the transfer 
of land from smallholders and accumulation in the hands of others, thereby defeating the equal land 
distribution to all citizens without payment argument of the proponents of the policy. Moreover, the 
critics stress that despite the policy’s enforcement, landlessness is still a serious problem in Ethiopia, 
as many rural residents are landless, or have landholdings less than the minimum size required to 
guarantee adequate food production let alone the growth of smallholder productivity in the country.695 
The critics further decry that even the offer to give “large tracts of land” for investment in commercial 
agriculture is intended for foreign investors that mostly produce for export to their home countries.696 
The government has declared that “the focus of attention should be on attracting foreign investors. 
Historically, efforts made to attract foreign investment are almost exclusively directed towards non-
agricultural sectors. This needs to change if Ethiopia is to achieve its agricultural objectives.”697 In a 
document posted on its website in 2008, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MoARD), which has been renamed Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) after it was re-established as such 
in 2010, stated that since out of the country’s total land area of 111.5 million hectares, more than 74 
million is suitable for annual and perennial crop production and only 18 million hectares is now under 
cultivation, some 54 million is available for investment in commercial agriculture, though the figure 
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has since been reduced to close to 5 million hectares, which is still enormous by any standards.698 
But why should all this land be allocated for investment in commercial agriculture in a country where 
numerous studies699 have identified the smallness and fragmentation of landholdings as one of the 
major factors contributing towards low smallholder productivity and pervasive poverty? According to 
the government, the future of agricultural growth and development in Ethiopia lies in the promotion 
investment in commercial agriculture, as “The key actors in the sector’s development will be relatively 
large-scale private investors and not the semi-subsistence small farmers.”700 This reflects the paradigm 
shift that has been made from the existing ADLI strategy centred on raising smallholder productivity in 
staple crops towards commercial agriculture.701 For the government, private investment in commercial 
agriculture provides an opportunity for agricultural transformation through technology transfer, 
employment creation, infrastructure expansion, generation of foreign exchange and tax revenue, and 
even ensuring national food security, though investors are known to grow mostly such crops as 
flowers, sesame, cotton, sugarcane, bio-fuels, and rice, which are not staple crops in Ethiopia.702 Why 
then are foreign investors given preference to domestic ones? In the government’s view, “While there 
is no entry barrier for domestic private investment, empirical evidences abound that capital resources 
of domestic private investment might not be adequate for the anticipated scale of development. 
Moreover, local knowledge of certain agricultural disciplines, especially marketing skills and 
experience, are limited. Therefore, the focus of attention should be on attracting foreign investors.”703 
Nonetheless, the critics are generally sceptical of the arguments set forth by the government to justify 
the enforcement of the policy of state ownership of land and its preference of foreign investors to 
domestic ones in the allocation of land for investment in commercial agriculture. For example, Lavers 
has commented that “By prioritising land equality, government effectively blocks powerful 
independent economic actors (that might be able to translate their economic power into political 
influence) from emerging.”704 According to Dessalegn and Merera, the real motive of the government 
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is the quest to control land and ensure the continued dependence of the rural smallholder masses on the 
state for accessing this vital resource.705 Dessalegn explains his argument by constructing two 
scenarios of land rights. These are “‘land sovereignty’, which is grounded in secure rights of holders 
that enable them effective control and use of the land as well as the natural resources in their 
community; and ‘land dependency’, which creates insecurity, “dis-empowers” individuals and 
communities, and enhances the hegemonic authority of the state.” Dessalegn contends that the whole 
purpose of the policy of state land ownership is creating land dependency. “Here the state assumes the 
role of sole active agent, and individuals and communities become passive recipients of decisions from 
above because of the underlying insecurity over their property and the fear of losing it at any time.”706 
Furthermore, the critics dismiss the proponents’ assertion that the policy of state ownership of land 
currently enforced in Ethiopia is tailored to enhance the tenure security of smallholders. The critics 
conceptualise tenure security in the same way as the term is often defined in the context at hand, which 
is the confidence or expectation of a smallholder to keep physical possession of his landholding and 
enjoy the rights to, and the fruits of the landholding, as well as the value of improvements made with 
his labour or asset either in the course of use or upon transfer continuously without interruption, 
imposition, or interference from outside sources, including the state, private individuals, and other 
entities.707 In the words of Dessalegn, for instance, “the only way peasant confidence will be restored, 
and insecurity of tenure abolished thus enabling peasants to take their land as their assets and to work it 
with great effort, is if peasants are assured that no one can take their land from them.”708 
The critics argue that it is impossible for the current policy of state ownership of land to enhance 
smallholders’ tenure security because of the following reasons. First, as it stands now, smallholders in 
Ethiopia do not have the right of ownership over their farm land, which is “exclusively vested in the 
state”.709 For the critics, the core argument put forward by the proponents of the current policy as 
regards tenure security is based on the questionable assumption that smallholders would immediately 
embark en masse on selling or mortgaging their land through distress transactions, whilst the predatory 
bourgeoisie and elites would, on their part, go on a buying spree as soon as the policy of private 
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ownership of land is introduced. There is no proof that the policy of state ownership of land would 
prevent smallholders from selling or mortgaging their land through distress transactions or otherwise. 
If anything, what the available empirical research demonstrates is that despite the enforcement of the 
policy of state ownership, (extra-legal) transfers of land have been taking place during the Derg period 
and thereafter on a scale comparable with, or even larger than the transfers that were undertaken during 
the imperial era, when such transactions were legal.710 According to Dejene, “The view that the state 
will prevent excessive concentration of land amongst the rich and prevent the dispossession of the poor 
by imposing restrictions on the ownership or transfer of land has been challenged. The equity concerns 
of governments could, if they are genuine, be met through appropriate policy instruments such as the 
specification of farm-size ceilings without inhibiting land market. Unnecessary restrictions may deny 
efficient farmer access to farmland and would contribute to underutilisation of available land.”711 
Second, even the access and usufruct rights to land to which smallholders are entitled are conditional 
upon the fulfilment of a number of requirements, including the residency requirement and several land 
use and management rules and obligations, which smallholders need to comply with in order to secure 
their land access and use rights.712 For example, according to Articles 5, 9, and 10 of the FDRE 
Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, only residents of the locality have the right 
to get land for agriculture, every smallholder shall be obliged to use and protect his land, and where a 
smallholder has left the locality on own wish and “stayed over a given period of time”, or “when the 
land gets damaged, the user of the land shall lose his use right.” However, details of what constitutes, 
or how or by whom determination of staying “over a given period of time” or “when the land gets 
damaged” is made have not been provided. Likewise, Article 6(16) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007 
“any rural land user shall be deprived of his land use right under the following conditions: leaving the 
land unused for two consecutive years, leaving the holding on his own reason, or neglect conserving 
the land. The detail shall be decided by Oromia Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau.” Articles 
12 and 14 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007 also contain similar provisions. Third, there is a likelihood 
of future state-sponsored large-scale redistribution of smallholder landholdings. For the critics, such 
redistribution is a real possibility as the practice has not been outlawed, and because the demand for 
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land is skyrocketing largely due to rapidly expanding large-scale commercial farming and the 
burgeoning population that requires its cut, whilst land is becoming ever scarcer.713 Fourth, the state 
still maintains power to expropriate smallholders’ landholding for “public purpose” at anytime when it 
is needed for such a purpose as defined and determined by the administrative officials of the woreda.714 
According to Yigremew, whilst the negative impact of smallholders’ lack of the right of ownership 
over their landholding and the likelihood of state-sponsored redistribution of land on the tenure 
security of smallholders is self-evident, the implication of the government’s power of expropriation is 
a cause of particular concern. He contends that besides being wide-open for abuse during 
implementation, this power of expropriation can lead to the mass eviction of smallholders in favour of 
private investors. He further argues that the government will most likely consider the large-scale 
commercial farming in which the investors are to be engaged as development projects falling within 
the scope of “public purpose” that warrant the expropriation of smallholders’ landholdings.715 This 
observation appears to have validity given the vagueness of the definition of the term “public purpose” 
under the laws governing the expropriation of smallholder landholdings for public purposes.716  
4. 4.  Revisiting the Debate on Land Ownership Policy 
Choice for Ethiopia 
As the discussion in the preceding Sections might suggest, there are several problems with the debate 
on the issue of whether the policy of state or private land ownership is preferable for Ethiopia, which 
has dominated the discourse concerning the challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, 
and poverty in the country over the past several decades. First, the debate is narrowly-framed, which 
does not accommodate non-formal customary land tenure systems that studies indicate continue to 
govern more than 85% of land relations in the country. Second, the justifications and arguments that 
                                                 
713
  Articles 9 of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 14 of the Oromia 
Proclamation 2007, and Articles 22 and 23 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007.  
714
  “Woreda” is, according to the hierarchy of the current official governmental structure in Ethiopia, an administrative 
division, which is like a district or county that usually has its own (ostensibly legislative) council, (executive) office, 
and (regional first instance) court. A woreda is situated below a “zone” and above a “kebele” in the hierarchy ladder. 
Typically, more than one (often contiguous) kebeles are brought together to form a woreda; and more than one 
(often contiguous) woredas are grouped together to form a zone, which is the second highest administrative 
hierarchy subordinate only to the state government at the regional level. Different names are used to refer to woredas 
in certain regional states of the country. For instance, a woreda is called “aanaa” in the Oromia regional state.  
715
  Yigremew, 2002:35-40. 
716
  See, for example, FDRE Proclamation, 2005b: Articles 3(1) cum 2(5); and FDRE Regulations 2007, Article 2(8).  
150 
 
each party uses to highlight the advantages of the policy it supports and emphasise the disadvantages 
of the policy it opposes are driven by preconceived ideological and doctrinal considerations and 
economic, social, and political interests, rather than being based on empirical data. Third, the debate is 
underpinned by a questionable assumption involving a false, binary choice of a land ownership policy. 
As discussed earlier, the enforcement of the policy of state or private ownership of land would not by 
itself necessarily make a land law reform effective or ineffective in helping raise smallholder 
productivity and thereby tackle poverty in developing countries like Ethiopia. Instead, evidence drawn 
from established law and development research and experience demonstrates that what is critical for 
the effectiveness of a land law reform is the establishment of a land tenure system comprising land 
policies, laws, and institutions that bring about improvement in the provision and implementation of 
bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights enhancing tenure security, facilitating the 
transfer of rights over land, and authorising the collateralisation of land rights. It also shows that 
despite the argument and counterargument of the two sides to the debate, both the policies of state and 
private land ownership can have advantages and disadvantages in this regard. 
In fact, research and experience suggest that the policies of state and private land ownership exist in 
their pure forms only in theory, but not in practice, as, despite variations, the land tenure systems in 
force in all countries around the world happen to combine some features of both policies. Nor does a 
formal state land tenure system exist in its pure form anywhere, as, despite variations, the land tenure 
systems in force in all countries around the world happen to contain some features of non-formal 
customary land tenure arrangements in one way or another. Moreover, research and experience 
demonstrate neither the possibility nor the desirability of the enforcement of each of the formal state 
and private land ownership policies and non-formal customary land tenure arrangements in their pure 
forms. Instead, what they counsel is the adoption of a land policy that, taking into account particularly 
such factors as the specific economic, social, and political background, historical, geographical, and 
demographical contexts, and the development needs, priorities, and potentials of the country 
concerned, combines the features of both the formal state and private land ownership policies and the 
non-formal customary land tenure arrangements in order to be able to reap advantages each of them 
can have as regards the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights. 
Specifically, the policy currently enforced in Ethiopia cannot be considered as a state land ownership 
policy in its pure form. Nor are the justifications and arguments set forth by the government and other 
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proponents of the current policy fully defensible. Those justifications and arguments, which were also 
used by the Derg, are questionable given the fact that any real and perceived injustices of the imperial 
era, ethnic-based or otherwise, and any possibility of their re-emergence have already been dealt with 
decisively by the Derg through its land law reform. Besides, the right of smallholders to transfer their 
landholdings through such means as lease, though encumbered by legal and practical limitations, has 
been recognised by law, which would entail land transfer from smallholders and accumulation in the 
hands of others, and undermine the equal land distribution and social equity narratives used to justify 
the policy of state land ownership. Moreover, large tracts of land are being provided to urbanites and 
foreigners engaged in commercial agricultural investment for almost exclusively export purposes, 
which is reported to have resulted in massive eviction of smallholders of indigenous ethnic groups, as 
well as in the vilified absentee landlordism that the policy is supposed to prevent. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence to substantiate the implicit assumption made concerning the clear and present danger the 
introduction of the policy of private ownership poses: that there exists a predatory army of urban and 
rural elite desirous and capable of buying large tracts of rural land from smallholders for agriculture 
waiting out there on standby. That is whilst any interested and capable person, irrespective of his 
background, is legally entitled, at least on paper, to easily acquire from the state itself a swath of land 
for a very cheap price through a lease contract lasting for numerous decades in the name of agricultural 
investment, without risking the trauma of dealing with the evacuating smallholders and the corruption 
and harassment of local authorities. However, the federal and regional state officials whom I 
interviewed have emphatically stated that it is not the landholdings of smallholders, but only land 
which is under state holding or which is “unutilised” that is being provided or set aside for such 
commercial farming investment purposes.717 Nonetheless, this statement of the officials was strongly 
disputed by the local smallholders with whom I had FGDs and conversations subsequently. I have also 
personally witnessed several instances of large-scale commercial agriculture investment projects, 
which indicate otherwise.718 Nor is there any evidence to support the assumption that smallholders are 
hell-bent on selling off their land and losing their livelihood en masse through distress sales; and 
would, therefore, need the defensive shield of the policy of state ownership of land and the protective 
hands of the state. What is more, the enforcement of the policy of state ownership of land has proven 
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ineffective in preventing the widespread practice of selling, collateralising, and otherwise transferring 
land carried out freely all over the country through non-formal means.719 As far as the issue of 
provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights is concerned, the land 
law reform programme led by the policy of state ownership of land upheld by the state and proponents 
of its position has brought about laws containing provisions that can contribute toward the 
enhancement of smallholders’ tenure security and the facilitation of the transfer of their rights over 
land. However, the authorisation of collateralisation of land rights has not been provided altogether for 
smallholders, although it has controversially been for investors engaged in commercial agriculture. 
Moreover, the implementation of the smallholder land rights set out in those provisions is encumbered 
by restrictions and limitations, as well as legal and practical impediments, which will be discussed in 
the coming sections. Overall, numerous empirical studies suggest that the policy of state ownership of 
land on which both the Derg and the post-Derg land law reform programmes are based has not been 
effective in raising smallholder agricultural productivity and tackling poverty in the country – a fact 
that has not been denied or refuted by the state and proponents of its position. 
On the other hand, research and experience demonstrate that it is possible to use land law reform to 
improve the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights even in such 
countries as Ethiopia, where the policy of state ownership of land is enforced. For example, empirical 
studies Deininger et al conducted have shown that the process of registration and certification of 
smallholder landholdings had a significant positive impact on tenure security and investment in 
China720 and, to an extent, in Ethiopia721, despite the enforcement of the policy of state land ownership. 
Similarly, empirical studies indicate that it is possible to facilitate the transfer of rights over land in 
such countries where the policy of state ownership of land is enforced and sale is prohibited. For 
instance, the authorisation of the right to transfer land rights through lease has been shown to have 
increased land use right transfer transactions and smallholder agricultural productivity in China722 and 
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Ethiopia.723 There have also been innovative practices involving the authorisation of the use of land 
rights as collateral without the risk of foreclosure whereby the landholding is surrendered altogether in 
the event of default in countries like Benin, where registered plots are given a “land certificate,” which 
can be furnished as collateral.724 Another case in point is Ethiopia, where, though its constitutionality 
and legitimacy is disputed, investors engaged in large-scale commercial agriculture, who have obtained 
land from the government through lease, are allowed to present their land rights as collateral.725 
Similarly, neither the policy of private ownership of land critics favour practically exists in its pure 
form anywhere in the world, nor are the arguments of the critics concerning the comparative 
advantages of the policy as regards the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights to make the case for the introduction of the policy in Ethiopia fully defensible. 
As Lund masterfully described it, “what is termed private land in Europe is more often than not subject 
to a range of restrictions (concerning the land’s development, its use, its division, zoning, construction 
on it, etc.). It is often forgotten that productivity and investment may actually be quite high under other 
tenure forms if other factors (such as market access, credit access, etc.) allow it.”726 Moreover, as 
discussed earlier, several studies conducted in sub-Saharan African countries have concluded that the 
privatisation of land had little or no immediate effect as regards the enhancement of tenure security, 
facilitation of the transfer of their rights over land, and increase in the collateralisation of land rights. 
However, the lack of proper implementation of the policy, as well as the overwhelming influence of 
non-formal land tenure systems in those countries, are important factors that need to be taken into 
consideration here. Therefore, unless measures that take into account the implementation capacity of 
the state and the perception and custom of smallholders are envisaged, the introduction of the policy of 
private land ownership alone is unlikely to bring a significant immediate effect on the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights in Ethiopia. Otherwise, far from 
working effectively, privatisation can have a harmful effect on smallholder productivity and poverty.727 
That is why even in countries where private ownership policy is enforced and land is subject to sale 
and other forms of transfer, targeted restrictions are placed on the marketability of land so as to protect 
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the poor without causing harm to land values and investment incentives.728 
4. 5.  The Possibility of a Hybrid State-Private-
Customary Land Policy   
This thesis argues that it is possible and preferable for Ethiopia to adopt a hybrid state-private-
customary land policy that would enable to combine the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of 
each of the formal state and private land ownership policies and non-formal customary land tenure 
systems through a process that involves an initial stage starting with enforcement of the current policy 
of state land ownership, passes through a transitional period during which land would be categorised, 
administered, and used as state, private, and communal landholdings, and culminates in the installation 
of the policy of private land ownership. This approach can enable to address the concerns and interests 
of the two parties to the debate, as well as to selectively accommodate the non-formal customary land 
tenure systems. It can also enable to effectively use land law reform to help raise smallholder 
productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia due to reasons briefly discussed in this Section. 
In other words, the thesis proposes the enactment of a land law reform that recognises the legal 
pluralism in the land tenure system in the short-run. That is because recognising legal pluralism in the 
short-run is the most effective way to make use of, and possibly end legal pluralism in the long-run. To 
paraphrase, the recognition of legal pluralism is proposed not as an end in itself, but as a means to use 
and then end legal pluralism itself. The recognition of legal pluralism is necessary for several reasons. 
First, established law and development research and experience demonstrates that past land law reform 
initiatives intended to help raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty that involved 
attempts to totally abolish and replace non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions with 
formal state ones in Ethiopia and other sub-Saharan African countries have brought about neither law 
nor development, as they resulted in pluralised, disorganised, and dysfunctional land tenure systems 
that constrained the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and 
adversely affected the conditions of smallholder productivity and poverty. Moreover, the recognition 
of legal pluralism can help make the land law reform proposed here effective in helping raise 
smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia, as it would enable to reap the advantages and 
avoid the disadvantages that the non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions have as 
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regards the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and allow the 
state to concentrate scarce resources needed for the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the 
proposed land law reform upon changing only the most constraining formal or non-formal land 
policies, laws, and institutions of the pre-existing land tenure system. Furthermore, the recognition of 
legal pluralism would enable the pre-existing non-formal customary land policies, laws, and 
institutions to continue to operate alongside the newly introduced formal state ones and contribute to a 
stable, predictable legal environment acutely needed during the period of transition, and provide room 
for the gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption of non-formal customary land tenure arrangements 
into the formal state land tenure system – thereby leading to the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. 
To begin with, the justifications set forth by the government and the other proponents of the policy of 
state land ownership currently enforced are not based on substantive empirical data does not mean that 
the concerns they have raised about what can follow if this policy is abruptly replaced by the policy of 
private land ownership have been disproved by empirical evidence. After all, Ethiopia is a country 
where land and land-based smallholder agriculture are so important that the prevalent economic, 
social, and political power and class positions, structures, and relations reflect the patterns of land 
distribution and smallholder agricultural production determined by the land tenure system in place. As 
such, land law reform, particularly of such magnitude that includes the changing of the overriding 
policy of land ownership abruptly, which has been superiorly governing land relations in the country 
for four decades now, cannot be expected to proceed along rational lines as planned theoretically, 
especially given the fact that it is not supported by conclusive empirical data. If anything, in view of 
the magnitude and multifariousness of the consequences such a land law reform entails, the events that 
can follow the reform exercise are unlikely to be predictable, and can involve the economic, social, and 
political instabilities that the proponents of the policy now in force claim would likely follow. 
Nor can the possible interests of the government and other proponents of the policy of state land 
ownership be dismissed. Given the position and the power these parties currently have, they can easily 
block any effort aimed at bringing change. As Crewett and Korf correctly noted, “Agricultural 
economists may continue conducting studies to demonstrate the investment incentives of privatizing 
land. Their ambition to change Ethiopian government policy, however, is likely to fail. The 
government may respond to such pressures from international donors by implementing some kind of 
land certification as is currently part of the land policy documents. But it is very unlikely that the 
Ethiopian government departs from the dependence path in rural politics and the practices to govern 
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the rural populace and gives up its most precious power resource in the rural realm – the power to 
distribute land.”729 Though not so pessimistic, it is therefore important to be less optimistic and more 
realistic. On the other hand, the government should realise that the current approach whereby the state 
uses a sizable proportion of its limited resources to ensure allocation of the ever dwindling land to 
every adult citizen in need free of charge, oversee the provision and implementation of land rights, and 
control and administer land relations is neither sustainable nor favourable to effectively use land law 
reform to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the country in the long-run. 
By the same token, the critics’ arguments are not fully based on substantive empirical data does not 
mean that the advantages of the policy of private land ownership has with respect to helping improve 
the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, thereby raise 
smallholder productivity, and tackle poverty have been fully refuted empirically. In fact, the bulk of 
evidence from research and experience demonstrates that the policy of private ownership of land offers 
clear advantages, provided that its implementation is backed by an adequate legal framework, 
functional institutional arrangement, and developed market system, and is executed through a gradual, 
controlled process that adequately takes account of the objective situation and the specific 
development background, context, needs, and potential of the country and the people concerned. In 
short, although its implementation may be costly and entail difficulty particularly at the initial stage, 
the policy of private land ownership has a proven record of superior performance as regards promoting 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights and thereby helping raise smallholder productivity, tackle 
poverty, and even foster overall economic development. This has been practically demonstrated in the 
“more developed” Western countries, where the policy has long been enforced, as compared to the 
“less developed” countries in parts of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, where it has been recently put 
into effect or not at all. Privatisation may be evil given the problems that it can entail, such as 
inequality, unemployment, inflation, corruption, and social exclusion, as well as the periodic global 
crisis like the one currently going on in the capitalist world. Nonetheless, it is a lesser evil as compared 
to living without it in what seems to be a perpetual state of low smallholder productivity, pervasive 
poverty, and lack of overall economic development, as has been the case in Ethiopia for close to half a 
century now since the introduction of the policy of state ownership of land.730 
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Moreover, it is necessary to accommodate non-formal customary land tenure systems, which govern 
more than 85% of land relations in the country. Though earlier approaches emphasised their perceived 
disadvantages and called for their abandonment, notable law and development analysts, practitioners, 
and funders now agree that non-formal customary systems have advantages as regards the provision 
and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights. For example, as Deininger and 
Binswanger noted, “the 1975 World Bank land reform policy recommended communal tenure systems 
be abandoned in favor of freehold titles. Today it is recognized that some communal tenure 
arrangements can increase tenure security and provide (limited) basis for land transactions in ways that 
are more cost-effective than freehold titles. Where that is the case, governments may find it useful to 
reduce the cost of cooperation, improve accountability, and facilitate a gradual evolution of communal 
systems to meet emerging needs, possibly for greater individualization of property rights over time.”731 
Accordingly, in a recent World Bank land reform research report, it has been argued that “in customary 
systems, legal recognition of existing rights and institutions, subject to minimum conditions, is 
generally more effective than premature attempts at establishing formalised structures”.732 As Cotula 
summarised it, “As a result of the failure of early attempts to replace customary systems with modern 
systems of land tenure, and of the recent, more nuanced perception of customary systems, a shift in 
thinking has taken place. It is now generally recognized that land policies and laws must build on local 
concepts and practice, rather than importing one-size-fits-all models. This entails legally recognizing 
local land rights, the entitlements through which most people gain access to rural land.”733  
Yet, non-formal customary systems are inherently disadvantageous because they reflect the patriarchal, 
feudal, and subsistence framework Ethiopia’s smallholder-based rural life, discriminate against women 
and other “vulnerable” groups, lack regularised amendment procedures necessary to adapt to change, 
and are unwritten, vague, and diverse. Since they reflect and reinforce the patriarchal, feudal, and 
subsistence framework Ethiopia’s smallholder-based rural way of life, emphasise traditional structures, 
values, and beliefs, and focus on upholding past relationships and maintaining the relative status quo. 
Therefore, they not only favour men and “influential” members of the community, but also prevent the 
increase in social scale, including the expansion of face-to-face socio-economic relationships and the 
reduction of dependence on family, neighbours, and “the community”, necessary to foster local, 
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regional, and national economic development. Moreover, since they lack regularised amendment 
procedures required for adaptation to change, they render the disengagement of the rural political 
economy from traditional social structures difficult, and hinder the transformation of smallholder 
agriculture from ensuring subsistence towards serving as an engine for fostering poverty alleviation 
and overall economic development. Specifically, because non-formal customary land policies and laws 
are unwritten, vague, diverse, and diffuse, which often depend on the knowledge and prerogative of 
particular traditional leaders, and the land institutions have through time become weakened, depleted, 
and corrupted, which often rely on social pressure and voluntary cooperation to induce compliance, 
they cannot offer an adequate framework for the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights with the degree of breadth, duration, and assurance required for the 
enhancement of tenure security, the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, and the authorisation 
of the collateralisation of land rights. On the other hand, selective incorporation can enable the 
government to use non-formal customary land tenure systems not only to better advance its ethnic-
based economic, social, and political agenda related to land and smallholder agriculture and reap the 
advantages they offer, but also to more successfully formulate and implement a land law reform 
programme that can be effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the 
short-run, and leading to the gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption of the non-formal customary 
land tenure systems into the formal ones and thus the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. Selective 
incorporation of non-formal customary systems can enable the government to introduce land law 
reform measures that respect diversity and reflect contextual needs and potentials, promote local 
ownership and community participation, allow decentralisation and at the same time advance regional 
and national integration, appease potential opposition and win voluntary cooperation, provide room for 
pre-existing non-formal customary systems to project a sense of continuity, stability, and predictability 
and for the newly introduced systems to move towards the set objectives, and offer opportunity to 
theoretically communicate, and practically demonstrate the advantages of formal state systems and the 
disadvantages of non-formal customary ones. Moreover, since efforts aimed at ending legal pluralism 
and establishing a uniform, functional formal state land tenure system should be the culmination of a 
long process of self-criticism, analysis, and informed, deliberate choice, selective incorporation of non-
formal customary systems would provide the government with opportunity and capacity to pilot and 
study the strengths and shortcomings of, and identify formal state and non-formal customary systems 
to be embodied in possible future land law reform initiatives that would be undertaken to progressively 
establish local, regional, and national formal state land tenure systems and thereby end legal pluralism. 
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Chapter 5 
Land Laws and the Provision of Smallholder Land Rights 
in Ethiopia 
As discussed earlier, land laws are one of the constituents of the land tenure system that land law 
reform puts into effect and through which it operates to bring about the change in the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights that it needs to bring about in order to 
deliver the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes which it is hoped can help achieve. The 
term “land law”, defined broadly here, refers to legislation pertaining to land relations, which the state 
issues through its legislative organ, or parts of the executive branch to which the legislature delegates 
lawmaking power, as part of a land law reform programme, that specifically set out binding provisions 
recognising, amending, or repealing land rights often in accordance with specifications made earlier 
upon the formulation of the land policy, through which the general statement of the land policy is 
specified, clarified, and translated into action.734 As Wily noted, land law reform “is mainly first 
articulated in new national land policies and then of necessity receives more exact (and binding) 
treatment in new land legislation.”735 Similarly, Brietzke has observed that “law can define, clarify, 
implement, and enforce policy.”736 And as Allott and Harvey suggested, in the context of a land law 
reform programme intended to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty, once the land 
policy that specifies the possible forms of property rights in land as per the essential national interest 
concerning land has been formulated, what follows is the issuance of law, an action-oriented 
discipline, to take on the process of implementation.737 Moreover, as Bruce emphasised, “Most land 
policy statements are so general that they provide only broad guidance for law reform. The law relating 
to land is a critical tool in realizing land policies. Policy reform logically precedes law reform, but law 
reform seeks to translate those policies into action. This is because, while policy determines broad 
directions, law answers the question, ‘What must be done to get us there?’ The law provides 
commands to officials and citizens alike.” Bruce has also succinctly captured the numerous critical 
roles land laws play in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the overall land law reform 
programme. He underscored that “laws relating to land provide not only rules about land rights but 
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also regulatory frameworks and administrative competences that are the basis for mobilizing non-legal 
incentives. Through enactments relating to land, the State creates property rights, determines the scope 
of the rights and obligations that accompany them, and provides for regulating use of land. Land laws 
set the terms for transactions in land; in so doing they help determine the efficiency of land markets, 
patterns of land distribution, distribution of development opportunities and incidence of poverty.”738  
In short, besides setting out provisions of smallholder land rights that are binding and directly 
applicable by executive land institutions in the course of administration of land relations exercise by 
smallholders, and enforcement by dispute resolution institutions, land laws play numerous other 
critical roles in the promulgation, implementation, and effectiveness of the overall land law reform, 
and the land policies and institutions of the land tenure system that it puts into effect and through 
which it operates to bring the change in the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights needed to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. More 
specifically, it is often through land laws that the overall land law reform programme is enacted, the 
land policy specified, given binding force, and put into action, the establishment, substantive powers, 
and procedural rules of land institutions determined, and the composition and operation of the land 
tenure system shaped. With that in mind, this Chapter briefly analyses the forms and contents of the 
land laws, both formal federal and regional state and non-formal customary, that embody provisions of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights pertaining to enhancement of tenure security, facilitation 
of transfer of rights over land, and authorisation of collateralisation of land rights in force in Ethiopia. 
5. 1.  The Forms and Contents of Provisions of 
Smallholder Land Rights 
Due largely to the continuation of the policy of state ownership of land that the Derg had introduced 
under the land law reform the EPRDF has since enacted, the forms and contents of the provisions of 
the bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights that the post-Derg land law reform 
programme might have brought about has been a subject of contestation. On the one hand, critics 
contend that the post-Derg land laws did not bring about significant change from the land laws of the 
Derg with respect to setting out provisions of such smallholder land rights.739 On the other, the 
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government and its supporters insist that the land laws of the post-Derg land law reform programme 
have brought about significant change and put in place sufficient smallholder land rights provisions.740 
For example, Yigremew has noted that “there are no fundamental differences between the legal 
framework of the Derg and the present government on rural land issues.”741 Similarly, Berhanu, 
Berhanu, and Seyoum have observed that “There are no fundamental differences between the legal 
framework of the Derg and the present government on rural land issues. More has stayed the same than 
has changed. In practical terms, there are more similarities in land administration between the two 
regimes than differences.”742 On his part, Atakilte has argued that there are hardly any differences 
between the Derg and the EPRDF as regards the land question. Ideologically, both the Derg and the 
TPLF, which constitutes the backbone of the EPRDF and its government, espoused Marxism. Both 
governments enforced state land ownership policy and controlled power to administer and distribute 
land both as instrument of power and expression of their egalitarian ideology. Both gave smallholders 
usufruct rights over the land they cultivate, excluding rights to sale and collateralise their landholdings. 
Both used rural organisations to oversee land administration and distribution at grassroots level. That 
is, PAs were used by the Derg, the “baito”743 by the TPLF, and kebele744 or village-level committees 
by the EPRDF. What is more, both used the two strands of justice as fairness principle, namely fairness 
as historical justice and as egalitarianism, to justify their approach to the land question.745 
On its part, the government continues to insist that the post-Derg land law reform programme has 
brought about sufficient smallholder land rights that will “enhance development”. It has also argued 
that “it is obvious that the contestation the rent-seekers raise has no foundation whatsoever and is a 
misguided criticism. Likewise, except obstructing the development of our country, the alternative 
proposed has no substance whatsoever.”746 Similarly, based on the assumption that the programme has 
put in place land rights sufficient for raising smallholder productivity, Gebru Mersha and Githinji have 
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argued that “Only after substantial progress has been made in both increasing farming productivity and 
providing sufficient off-farm employment can there then be an honest discussion of tenure reform.”747  
Logically, both the contestation and counter-contestation cannot be valid. One or both are not based on 
substantive data. Nonetheless, since the controversy has not been settled through empirical research, it 
has created confusion as to the forms and contents of smallholder land rights that have actually been 
provided under the post-Derg land laws. The resultant confusion has also obstructed the 
implementation, exercise, and enforcement of those smallholder land rights that have been provided. 
With that in mind, the provisions of the land laws in effect during the Derg period and of those put into 
effect as part of the post-Derg land law reform have been reviewed. The provisions have then been 
systematised and compared with respect to stipulations meant for the enhancement of tenure security, 
facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, and authorisation of collateralisation of land rights. The 
results of the analysis suggest that both the contestation and counter-contestation made by the two 
sides to the controversy are partly valid. That is, as contested by the critics, the post-Derg land law 
reform programme has made significant continuities from the Derg era in terms of the provision of the 
three bundles of productivity-raising land rights guaranteed for the country’s smallholders. At the same 
time, however, as counter-contested by the proponents, the programme has brought about significant 
changes in the form and content of the productivity-raising land rights provided for smallholders. 
5. 2.  The Enhancement of Tenure Security 
As regards tenure security, the enforcement of the policy of state ownership of land means that, 
smallholders are not owners of, and do not have title deeds for their landholdings under both the Derg-
era and post-Derg land tenure systems. Instead, they had “possessory rights” under the former748, and 
“holding rights” under the latter.749 In addition, smallholders’ right to get access to land and to 
continue to use their landholdings is conditional upon residence in the locality under both the Derg-era 
and post-Derg land tenure systems.750 During the Derg period, the most important source of tenure 
insecurity for smallholders was the programme of redistribution carried out periodically so as to 
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provide every rural resident with cultivable land sufficient for family maintenance as equal in size as 
possible, which is no larger than 10 hectares.751 Such state-sponsored redistribution of land remains 
legal during the post-Derg period, which has been provided under Article 9 of the FDRE Proclamation 
2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 14 of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Articles 
22 and 23 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. According to Articles 8 and 10 of the PMAC Proclamation 
1975, in order to secure their land use rights, smallholders were expected to comply with a number of 
land use rules and management obligations or risk confiscation. Similarly, Articles 10(1) of the FDRE 
Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Articles 19-25 of the Oromia Proclamation 
2007, and Articles 11 and 14 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007 require smallholders to “protect”, 
“properly manage”, and “conserve” their landholdings at the peril of losing their land use rights. 
Moreover, the government has power to expropriate smallholders’ landholdings for “public purpose” 
at anytime both under the Derg-era752 and the post-Derg land tenure systems.753 There are at least four 
major problems with this arrangement. First, what constitutes a “public purpose” is not provided, as in 
the case of the FDRE Constitution, FDRE Proclamation 2005b, SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, and 
Tigray Proclamation 2007; or is vaguely or broadly defined as provided under the Oromia 
Proclamation 2007, which states that “rural land use right shall be terminated if that land is required for 
more important public uses”754; or was left open-ended as was the case under the PMAC Proclamation 
1975, which allowed expropriation “for public purposes such as schools, hospitals, roads, offices, 
military bases and agricultural projects.” Second, the provisions governing compensation for 
expropriation are limited and nebulous. For example, during the Derg period, no compensation was 
given for land, forests, or tree crops; and “fair compensation” was promised only for movables and 
“permanent works on the land.”755 Even though “fair compensation” has been promised under the post-
Derg land laws, implementation is by no means guaranteed for the simple reason that the term “fair 
compensation” has no legal meaning in Ethiopia. Third, smallholders cannot claim any compensation 
on the basis of the value of their landholdings in the event of expropriation both during the Derg and 
post-Derg periods simply because land is owned by the state. Fourth, given the absence, vagueness, or 
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open-endedness of the definition of “public purpose” provided under the pertinent laws, what 
constitutes a “public purpose” is decided by local administrative officials, who are political appointees 
lacking the necessary legal and technical knowhow, often politically biased, and even corrupt. 
Furthermore, smallholders do not have the right of recourse to regular courts where, for example, they 
are aggrieved by the decision of local administrative officials concerning confiscation, expropriation, 
or compensation. During the Derg period, Article 28 of the PMAC Proclamation 1975 had annulled 
existing land cases in “ordinary courts” and barred the courts from hearing future land disputes or suits 
challenging actions taken under the Proclamation. Instead of ordinary courts, the Proclamation had 
established “judicial councils” at various levels of administration.756 Similarly, for the post-Derg 
period, Article 12 of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b has, for instance, excluded regular courts from 
adjudicating upon cases involving issues related to smallholder land rights. The problem with this 
arrangement is that the arbitrators tasked with dealing with the complaints or disputes of arising in 
connection with smallholder land rights under the formal land laws, including the proclamations, are 
often laymen with little knowledge of the applicable substantive or procedural laws.757 
However, the post-Derg land laws contain provisions that constitute a significant improvement in 
tenure security for smallholders as compared to the situation under the Derg, at least on paper. For 
example, the measurement and registration of smallholder landholdings, as well as the issuance of 
certificates that would grant lifelong usufruct rights have been introduced under Article 6 of the FDRE 
Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 15 of the Oromia Proclamation 
2007, and Article 5 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. As per Article 40(4), (7), and (8) of the FDRE 
Constitution, the rights of smallholders to “protection against eviction from their possessions”; 
ownership of investments they make on their landholdings in the form of immovable properties or 
permanent improvements they bring about with their labour or capital, including the right to transfer, 
bequeath, or remove same; and to claim compensation in the event of expropriation have been 
recognised. In addition, compulsory membership to peasant associations and the obligation of 
smallholders to pool their landholdings and be entitled to an undefined share under the endowments of 
peasant associations to secure their land rights have been abolished. Moreover, land redistribution 
programmes have been generally downscaled, though not outlawed. Specifically, even if it has not 
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outlawed redistribution altogether, the Oromia Proclamation 2007 has declared that redistribution of 
smallholder landholdings “shall not be carried out in the region, except ‘irrigation land’”.758 
5. 3.  The Facilitation of the Transfer of Rights over Land 
As for the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, both the Derg and the post-Derg reform 
programmes are led by the policy of state ownership of land, which is justified based on the perceived 
need to ensure fairness as egalitarianism and historical justice in Ethiopia’s smallholder land relations. 
That is, providing every smallholder to have equal access to the land resources of the country without 
payment, protecting smallholders from losing their landholdings, and preventing the accumulation of 
land in the hands of a few individuals who are capable to buy.759 And the only way that can be 
achieved is by putting restriction on the transfer of smallholder land rights.  
The Derg strictly adhered to this line of thinking both legally and practically. Accordingly, the transfer 
of smallholder land rights was prohibited, except through inheritance to members of immediate family, 
which includes the surviving spouse and children, upon the death of the smallholder. Article 5 of the 
PMAC Proclamation 1975 provided that “No person may by sale, exchange, succession, mortgage, 
antichresis, lease or otherwise transfer his holding to another; provided that upon the death of the 
holder, the wife or husband or minor children of the deceased, or, where they are not present, any child 
of the deceased who has attained majority shall have the right to use the land.” 
In contrast, although it professes to espouse the same state land ownership policy and principles of 
fairness as the Derg, the EPRDF has never been as strict as its predecessor in adhering to the line of 
thinking they share. That is due to several reasons, as well as the tendency of the EPRDF not to be 
bound by principles or laws out of line with the pursuit of its economic, social, and political agenda. 
First, the EPRDF had to accommodate the views and interests of its various pro-private land ownership 
internal and external economic, social, and political partners in its land law reform programme, 
particularly in relation to the governance of smallholder land rights.760 Moreover, the national 
development policy goals and the ADLI strategy’s objective of raising smallholder productivity that 
the EPRDF has been pursuing cannot be achieved based solely on considerations of fairness, but 
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through the provision and implementation of the three bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights, including the facilitation of the transfer of smallholder rights over land.761 
Consequently, although the Derg-era prohibitions on selling and mortgaging smallholder landholdings 
remain in place, significant departures have been made under the post-Derg land law reform with 
respect to facilitation of the transfer of smallholder land rights. That is despite the fairness principles of 
ensuring smallholder land equality and preventing the accumulation of land in the hands of few, which 
the EPRDF used to justify the enforcement of its state land ownership policy. For example, the right of 
smallholders to transfer their landholdings through lease has been recognised under Article 8(1)-(3) of 
the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 10 of the Oromia 
Proclamation 2007, and Article 6 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. The right of smallholders to 
transfer their landholdings through inheritance, which was previously restricted to surviving spouses 
and children, has been expanded to cover other dependents, including persons who permanently lived 
and shared their livelihoods with the deceased smallholder, under Articles 8(5), 5(2), and 2(5) of the 
FDRE Proclamation 2005b; Articles 8(5), 5(11), and 2(7) of the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007; Articles 
5(5), 9(1), and 2(16) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007; and Articles 5(1) [d] and 17 of the Tigray 
Proclamation 2007. And smallholders have been allowed to give their landholdings through donation 
to their family members or dependents under Articles 5(2) and 2(5) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b, 
Articles 5(11) and 2(7) of the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Articles 9(5) and 2(16) of the Oromia 
Proclamation 2007, and Article 5(2) and (3) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. 
5. 4.  The Authorisation of Collateralisation of Land Rights 
When it comes to the authorisation of collateralisation of smallholder land rights, the position taken 
under both the Derg and the post-Derg land law reform programmes reflect the state land ownership 
policy and the principles of fairness espoused by the two governments. Accordingly, any mechanism 
that entails the permanent transfer and loss of smallholder landholdings, with the exception of 
inheritance in the event of death, has been made illegal under both reform programmes. The 
collateralisation of smallholder land rights is one such mechanism, which, where the collateralising 
smallholder is in default of payment of the debt, can entail the permanent transfer and loss of 
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smallholder landholding, and is, therefore, banned under both reform programmes.762 
However, the EPRDF is once again less strict than the Derg in adhering to the line of thinking they 
share with regard to the issue of authorisation of collateralisation. Although it has been prohibited for 
smallholders, collateralisation of land rights has been authorised for investors engaged in commercial 
agriculture under Article 8(4) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, 
Article 15 (15) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Article 15(3) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. 
Pursuant to the EPRDF and other proponents, this provision is designed to enable “investors” to get 
access to the money they need for investment and thereby increase agricultural production, whilst 
smallholders are prohibited from collateralising their land rights for their own sake to protect them 
from the risk of using their landholdings as collateral to obtain credit, default, and end up landless.763 
Nevertheless, besides its inconsistency with the state land ownership policy and the principles of 
fairness espoused by the EPRDF and being discriminatory against smallholders, the implementation of 
this controversial provision has been problematic. After all, an “investor” acquires the land rights that 
he collateralises from the government through long-term lease, the payment of which is to be made in 
instalments over a period of several decades. That means, contrary to the proponents’ claim that an 
“investor” collateralises the land right acquired by virtue of the lease payment, which often constitutes 
the first instalment and amounts to a few thousands of Birr, in view of the fact that the money an 
“investor” often receives by way of loan is in millions of Birr, what an “investor” actually 
collateralises is not his land right, but the land itself. Hence the numerous reports concerning many 
financial institutions, particularly the big state-owned banks that dominate the market in the country, 
notably the Development Bank of Ethiopia, which under government pressure have given out billions 
of Birr in loan to such “investors” that had furnished their “land rights” as collateral, only to find out 
there was really nothing to satisfy the debt with and end up with mountains of bad loan. 
5. 5.  The Implications of Federalism and Legal Pluralism 
As mentioned earlier, the federation established by the FDRE Constitution is composed of a federal 
government and nine regional states, all of which were designed to have largely independent legal 
systems with their own legislative, executive, and judicial organs and corresponding powers that they 
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exercise on matters placed under their respective jurisdictions under the Constitution.764 The federal 
and regional governments have been assigned exclusive and concurrent powers on different matters 
depending on considerations of whether a given matter is of national or regional importance and which 
level of government is better positioned to handle it more appropriately. Accordingly, matters that 
were deemed to be of extra-regional, countrywide significance, for the handling of which the federal 
government was considered more befitted have been designated as a “federal matter” and placed under 
the jurisdiction of the federal government.765 All powers that have not been expressly given to the 
federal government exclusively or concurrently have been reserved exclusively for regional states.766 
As per Article 51 of the Constitution, which enumerates the “Powers and Functions of the Federal 
Government”, land, including land issues pertaining to smallholders, is one of the matters designated 
as a “federal matter” and placed under the jurisdiction of the federal government.767 This designation 
vests in the federal government legislative power over land. According to Article 55(1), “The House 
of Peoples’ Representatives shall have power of legislation on all matters assigned by the Constitution 
to federal jurisdiction.” The House, which is the legislative organ and “the highest authority” of the 
federal government768, shall thus “enact specific laws” concerning “the utilisation of land.”769 In 
contrast, under Article 52 of the same Constitution, which enumerates the “Powers and Functions of 
States”, regional states have been given power “to administer land in accordance with federal laws”.770 
And Article 9 (1) provides that any law, practice, or decision of the federal or regional government 
will be valid only if it does not contravene the Constitution. Otherwise, it “shall be of no effect”.771 
That is how the federal and regional division of powers on smallholder land matters has been made 
under the Constitution. Nevertheless, as long as the formal land tenure system goes, virtually all 
smallholder land relations in Ethiopia are governed by land legislations that have been issued by the 
regional governments.772 As mentioned previously, out of the nine regional states, the largest four, 
namely Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and the SNNPRS, have issued their own land legislations by the 
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time this thesis was written. The issue of how smallholder land relations are governed in the remaining 
five regions that have not yet issued their own land legislations is unclear and, as discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, controversial.773 One thing is clear, though. The land laws enacted by the 
federal government are applicable in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa - two specially administered cities 
that are directly accountable to the federal government, where virtually no smallholders reside.774 
The key question therefore is whether those regional land legislations by which virtually all of the 
country’s smallholder land relations are formally governed are constitutional. The government and its 
proponents argue that the regions issued their own land laws based on power the federal government 
delegated to them. The federal government has given regions power to “enact rural land administration 
law, which consists of detailed provisions necessary to implement this [federal] Proclamation.”775 
Moreover, the government and its proponents argue that the federal government delegated its 
legislative power to the regional states as per Article 50(9) of the Constitution. The Article states that 
“The federal government may, when necessary, delegate to the states powers and functions granted to 
it by Article 51 of this Constitution.” This argument stands on a shaky ground as the Article clearly 
authorises the federal government to delegate only its powers and functions provided under Article 51 
of the Constitution, but not the power to legislate on land matters assigned to it under Article 55(2) [a]. 
In short, it is questionable if the delegation itself and hence the land laws that have been issued based 
on it by the regional states are constitutional given the following reasons. First, land was designated as 
a “federal matter” because in view of the vital economic, social, and political importance it has in 
Ethiopia, it was considered to be of extra-regional, countrywide significance. As such, the federal 
government was deemed to be better positioned and equipped to handle land matters uniformly 
throughout the country.776 This fundamental consideration will be defeated if the federal government 
delegates its power to legislate on land matters to the regional states. 
Second, even if it were constitutional, the delegation does not bestow upon the regional states power to 
legitimately issue land laws which, as we will shortly see, contain provisions that not only deal with 
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the three bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, but also differ from each other and 
even from those of the federal land laws. After all, the federal land laws through which the delegation 
was given have made it clear that the legislative power given by delegation is valid only for enacting 
land administration laws that are necessary for the implementation of the pertinent federal land laws. 
The upshot is that the provisions of the land laws issued by each regional state must be consistent with 
the relevant provisions of the federal land laws and, therefore, with each other. 
Third, the Constitution does not define what the “power to administer land”, which it has vested in the 
regional states under Article 52(2) [d], constitutes. However, the conjunctive reading of the meaning 
of the term “land administration” provided under the two federal land proclamations through which 
the delegation was given does not imply that regions have been entrusted with power to promulgate 
their own land laws, at least not legislations regulating the bundles of productivity-raising smallholder 
land rights in markedly variant ways. According to Article 2(6) of the FDRE Proclamation 1997, 
“‘land administration’ means the assignment of holding rights and the execution of distribution of 
holdings.” Whereas, pursuant to Article 2(2) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b, it means “a process 
whereby rural landholding security is provided, land use planning is implemented, disputes between 
rural landholders are resolved and the rights and obligations of any rural landholder are enforced, and 
information on farm plots and grazing landholders are gathered, analyzed, and supplied to users.” 
In any case, five land proclamations comprise the formal land tenure system currently governing 
smallholder land rights in Ethiopia, which was established by the post-Derg land law reform 
programme within the federal arrangement that has been in effect in the country during the same 
period. The first is the FDRE Proclamation 2005b, which was issued by the federal government as per 
the legislative power to “enact specific laws” concerning “the utilisation of land” assigned to it under 
Article 55(2) [a] of the FDRE Constitution. The remaining four are the proclamations that were issued 
by the SNNPRS, Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara regional states. These regional land proclamations were 
presumably issued as per the power “to administer land in accordance with federal laws” given to 
regional governments under Article 52(2) [d] of the FDRE Constitution and the provisions of Article 
17(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b that authorises regions to “enact rural land administration law, 
which consists of detailed provisions necessary to implement this [federal] Proclamation.” 
Thus, provisions of the regional land proclamations concerning the three bundles of productivity-
raising smallholder land rights are expected to be consistent or in harmony with the pertinent 
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provisions of the federal government’s FDRE Proclamation 2005b. The regional proclamations cannot 
vary, omit, or create smallholder land right that was or was not provided under the FDRE Proclamation 
2005b. That also means the regional proclamations should be in harmony with each other. 
Any regional land proclamation that provides otherwise will be unconstitutional and illegal. It will be 
unconstitutional because it contravenes Article 52(2) [d] of the Constitution that restricts the power of 
regional governments to administering land in accordance with federal laws. It will be illegal because 
it contravenes the provisions of Article 17(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b that authorises regional 
governments to enact land administration laws containing only provisions necessary to implement it. 
That is not, however, to suggest that the provisions of the regional land proclamations should 
necessarily be the same. After all, Ethiopia is a big country composed of numerous, diverse regions 
and agro-ecological zones. As such, the farming systems in which the country’s smallholders operate 
are marked by high variability in such aspects as land availability, size, and quality; conditions of 
moisture, temperature, and disease; access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services; and 
other economic, social, and political challenges and opportunities; as well as experiences related to 
formal and non-formal customary land tenure systems.777 In view of that, putting in place formal land 
laws and institutions with various provisions pertaining to smallholder land rights across the different 
regions and agro-ecological zones that are tailored to the specific context, needs, and potentials of each 
farming system would have a significant impact in making the land law reform programme effective.  
The point is without such agro-ecological considerations and constitutional and legal bases, any 
significant inconsistency or disharmony in the smallholder land rights provisions of the regional land 
proclamations with that of the federal Proclamation would be arbitrary and counterproductive. It would 
violate the right of smallholders to equal treatment before the law and the principle of uniformity of 
law. It would also work against transparency and open room for arbitrary decisions, unethical actions, 
and corrupt practices. In short, it would create confusion, unpredictability, and unreliability in the 
formal land tenure system governing smallholder land rights and thus undermine the effectiveness of 
the post-Derg land law reform in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
Moreover, an argument that justifies any such disharmony based on gaps in the provisions of the 
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FDRE Proclamation 2005b, or that justifies the variation, omission, or creation in a regional 
proclamation of a smallholder land right that was or was not provided in the federal Proclamation 
under the guise of detailing the provisions of this Proclamation is indefensible. After all, the very 
purpose for which land was constitutionally designated as a federal matter and placed under the 
jurisdiction of the federal government is to ensure the establishment of a uniform formal land tenure 
system that governs smallholder land rights consistently in all parts of Ethiopia. This purpose would be 
defeated if any such disharmony is allowed for any reason. 
The forms and contents of the smallholder land rights provisions of the federal and regional 
proclamations have been discussed earlier. Therefore, the focus here will be on differences amongst 
the provisions that potentially undermine the bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights. It 
is also necessary to note that since the post-Derg land law reform is led by the policy of state land 
ownership778, provisions of the federal and regional proclamations, which all prohibit any mechanism 
such as sale and collateralisation that may entail permanent loss of smallholder landholdings, with the 
exception of inheritance in the event of death, are similar and thus will not be discussed here. 
To begin with the enhancement of tenure security, the biggest threats to the tenure security of 
Ethiopian smallholders that have been making them live under constant risk of losing their 
landholdings are redistribution, expropriation, and confiscation by the state. As regards redistribution, 
the pertinent provision of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b is Article 9, which provides that “In 
accordance with land administration laws of the regions, farmlands whose holders are deceased and 
have no heirs, or are gone for settlement, or left the locality on own wish and stayed over a given 
period of time shall be distributed to peasant farmers, semi-pastoralists, and pastoralists who have no 
land and who have land shortage.” This Article also declares that “Distribution may be undertaken on 
irrigable land in order to use irrigable land properly and equitably.” Moreover, the Article states that 
“upon the wish and resolution of peasants farmers, semi pastoralists and pastoralists where land 
distribution becomes the only alternative, it shall be undertaken in such a way that it shall not be less 
than the minimum size of holding and in a manner that shall not result in fragmentation of land and 
degradation of natural resources.” The Article in question not only leaves the door open for future 
state-sponsored land redistribution programmes, but also specifies the conditions under which land 
may be overtaken and be redistributed by the state. Specifically, it provides that land may be overtaken 
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and be redistributed by the state where its holders are deceased and have no heirs, or are gone for 
settlement, or have left the locality on own wish and stayed over a given period of time; or where it is 
irrigable. What is more, though it is the federal government that has been given power to decide on 
land matters under the FDRE Constitution, the Article leaves the responsibility for the implementation 
of land redistribution programmes to the regional states, which have adopted different approaches. 
Accordingly, in contrast and in addition to the conditions for the redistribution of land provided under 
Article 9 of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b, including where it is privately unoccupied, has no longer a 
legitimate holder, or is irrigable, Article 9(4) of the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007 states that “Privately 
unoccupied land as well as lands under the possession of community or government which are 
potential for agriculture shall be re-allocated to landless youths and peasants who have less farm land.” 
Yet, Article 14 of the Oromia Proclamation 2007 explicitly rules out future redistribution programmes, 
except in the case of privately unoccupied or irrigable land, which makes it the only one of the five 
land proclamations currently governing smallholder land rights in Ethiopia to declare redistribution an 
exception rather than rule. On its part, the Tigray Proclamation 2007 under Articles 22 and 23 
incorporates the conditions for the redistribution of land provided under Article 9 of the FDRE 
Proclamation 2005b, and additionally authorises the redistribution of hilly and gully lands for use by 
smallholders or agro-investors “in a manner that does not lead to soil erosion and land degradation.” 
As far as expropriation is concerned, the state maintains power to expropriate smallholders’ 
landholdings for “public purpose” at anytime as provided under Article 7(3) of the FDRE Proclamation 
2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 6(10)-(12) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and 
Article 21 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. The first major problem with this arrangement is that what 
constitutes a “public purpose” is not provided, as in the case of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b, 
SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, and Tigray Proclamation 2007; or is vaguely or broadly defined as 
provided under the Oromia Proclamation 2007, which states that “rural land use right shall be 
terminated if that land is required for more important public uses.”779 The other is that the provisions 
governing compensation for expropriation are limited and nebulous. For example, even though “fair 
compensation” has been promised under all of the five land proclamations, implementation is by no 
means guaranteed for the simple reason that the term “fair compensation” has no legal meaning in 
Ethiopia. Moreover, smallholders cannot claim any compensation on the basis of the value of their 
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landholdings in the event of expropriation simply because land is owned by the state. What is more, 
given the absence, vagueness, or open-endedness of the definition of “public purpose” provided under 
the proclamations, what constitutes a “public purpose” is determined by local administrative officials, 
who often are political appointees lacking the necessary legal and technical knowhow, biased 
depending on the political views or activities of the smallholder concerned, or corrupt. 
Confiscation basically relates to the termination of the use right and the taking over of the landholding 
of a smallholder by the state. It is imposed as a penalty where a smallholder fails to meet the 
requirement of residency in the locality in which his landholding is located, violates the duty to use his 
landholding continuously, or does not comply with his land management and preservation obligations. 
The most problematic aspect of the provisions concerning confiscation is that the duty of land 
management and protection they impose on smallholders are couched in very vague terms. 
Specifically, Articles 10(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, 
Articles 19-25 of the Oromia Proclamation 2007, and Articles 11 and 14 of the Tigray Proclamation 
2007 require smallholders to “properly use and protect”, “manage”, and “conserve” their landholdings, 
and provide that “when the land gets damaged the user of the land shall lose his use right.” These 
provisions lend themselves to political and administrative discretion, which potentially leads to the 
abuse of power and the harassment of smallholders. Stipulating clear definitions as to what exactly 
means to “properly use and protect” land, and as to when a land is considered to have got “damaged” is 
necessary to ward off such discretion and its potential repercussions. It will also help smallholders 
understand the meanings of those terms in advance and discharge their obligations accordingly.  
When it comes to the facilitation of the transfer of smallholder rights over land, all of the of the five 
federal and regional land proclamations contain provisions allowing the transfer of smallholders 
landholdings through lease.780 However, the provisions attach different restrictions to the transfer right. 
The restrictions relate to the type of smallholders who may lease out their landholdings, the identity of 
the lessee, the purpose for which land may be leased out, the part of the landholding that may be 
legitimately leased out, and the length of the period during which the lease contract may remain valid. 
Specifically, Articles 8(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b states that “Peasant farmers, semi-
pastoralists, and pastoralists who are given holding certificates can lease to other farmers or investors 
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land from their holding of a size sufficient for, the intended development in a manner that shall not 
displace them, for a period of time to be determined by rural land administration laws of regions based 
on particular local conditions.” According to this provision of the federal Proclamation, only 
smallholders who have been issued holding certificates may lease out their landholdings, to other 
farmers or investors, for the purpose of development, and part of their landholdings in a manner that 
shall not displace them. But the provision leaves the length of the period during which the lease 
contract may remain valid for regional land proclamations to determine. 
Whereas, Article 8(1) [a], [b], and [c] of the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007 stipulates, like the FDRE 
Proclamation 2005b, that only smallholders with holding certificates may lease out their landholdings, 
to other farmers or investors, for the purpose of development, and part of their landholdings in a 
manner that shall not displace them. But unlike the federal Proclamation, this Proclamation specifies 
the length of the period during which the lease contract may remain valid. It provides that the lease 
contract may remain valid for a period of up to five, ten, and twenty five years, respectively, where the 
lessee is a fellow smallholder, any investor, and an investor who cultivates “perennial” crops. 
In contrast, Article 10 of the Oromia Proclamation 2007 that governs the right of smallholders to 
transfer their landholdings through lease does not explicitly state if a smallholder needs to have a 
holding certificate to lease out one’s landholding, although Article 15(13) requires that when a 
smallholder landholding is leased out, the holding certificate shall be handed over to the lessee. 
Moreover, this Proclamation places no direct restriction as to the identity of the lessee, and does not 
specify exactly the purpose for which a smallholder landholding may be leased out. Furthermore, it 
limits the part of the land to be leased out to a maximum of half of the size of the leasing smallholders’ 
landholding, and restricts the length of the period during which the lease contract may remain valid to 
a duration of not more than three years for lessees who apply traditional farming technologies, and 
fifteen years for those who use mechanised farming methods. 
On its part, Article 6(1) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007 stipulates like the FDRE Proclamation 2005b 
that only smallholders with holding certificates may lease out their landholdings, and only to other 
farmers or investors. However, unlike the federal Proclamation, this Proclamation does not restrict the 
purpose for which the smallholder landholding may be leased out. Moreover, pursuant to Article 6(3) 
[a] and [b] of the Proclamation, a smallholder landholding lease contract shall be valid for a period of 
“up to 20 years where the lessee uses technology other than the traditional method of farming, and not 
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more than three consecutive years where the lessee uses traditional method of farming.”  
Finally, it is imperative to briefly explore the implication legal pluralism might have to the provision 
and implementation of smallholder land rights. As discussed earlier, legal pluralism is a prominent 
feature of the land tenure system in Ethiopia, as the provision and implementation of smallholder land 
rights in the country is subject to not only the formal federal and regional state land tenure systems 
established through land law reform, but also the pre-existing non-formal customary ones. Notably, as 
mentioned earlier, although the non-formal customary land tenure systems have been repealed and 
replaced by, their provisions and operations are not often consistent with, or recognised under, and 
despite lacking a hierarchy or other form of coordination with the formal state systems, studies suggest 
that they govern more than 85% of land relations in the country, including smallholder land rights. 
The findings of the field research carried out as part of this thesis, which included formal and informal 
KIIs and FGDs held with formal state officials, non-formal customary leaders, smallholders, and law 
and development analysts, practitioners, and funders involved in, or having knowledge of Ethiopia’s 
past and present land law reforms at the local level, and pilot community-level observation visits made 
to assess of the provisions and operations of non-formal customary land tenure systems on the ground, 
are generally consistent with the findings of studies previously conducted on the issue. In fact, 
effective everyday provision and implementation of smallholder land rights is carried out under non-
formal customary land tenure systems. Recourse to the formal state land tenure systems, which are 
commonly referred to as “government law” is made only rarely and exceptionally. Even in cases where 
recourse to formal state land tenure systems is made, the provision and implementation of the 
smallholder land rights they embody is often defeated by interpreting it in a way congruent with non-
formal customary systems, or in line with what is perceived would enable to maintain social order, or 
help improve the reputation and support base of the ruling political party amongst smallholder masses. 
Smallholders, who tend to be unaware or suspicious of the formal land policies, laws, and institutions 
put in place by the state, have simply continued to resort to non-formal customary land tenure systems 
for the provision, implementation, exercise, and enforcement of their land rights. Most officials of the 
local formal state executive land institutions, including at the Kebele and Woreda levels, know very 
little about the details of the provisions of smallholder land rights and the manner of implementation of 
the current formal land policies and laws, as well as their differences with the non-formal customary 
land tenure systems. Also neither do local traditional leaders in charge of ensuring the implementation, 
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exercise, and enforcement of the smallholder land rights provisions that the non-formal customary land 
tenure systems set out. The Kebele Land Administration Commission and the Social Courts are part of 
the executive organ at grassroots level, and have been assigned the function of dispute resolution in 
cases involving smallholder rights in the first instance. Nevertheless, neither the members of the 
Kebele Land Administration Commission nor the judges of the Social Courts are aware of the details 
of the provisions of formal land policies and laws, or how to apply them. 
For example, although the enhancement of tenure security is used as the main justification for the 
enforcement of the policy of state land ownership under the current formal state land tenure system of 
the country, such tenure security does not appear to be an issue of concern for most smallholders. 
Thanks in particular to the provisions of the prominent non-formal customary land tenure systems, 
most smallholders seem to believe that their land rights are secure. For instance, most smallholders 
appear to consider the land registration and certification programme undertaken by the state to be 
useful in reducing boundary conflicts rather than in enhancing tenure security. 
Similarly, despite the prohibitions and restrictions imposed under the formal state land policies and 
laws, smallholders conduct transactions involving selling, leasing, collateralising, and otherwise 
transferring land freely and widely through non-formal means. Notably, although officials of the local 
formal state institutions are fully aware of the conduct of such transactions, they do not attempt to 
intervene and stop them often because they themselves are unaware of the prohibitive and restrictive 
formal state provisions, or because enforcing those provisions is perceived to be politically risky and 
can potentially cause annoyance to the smallholder masses, and sometimes due to other factors such as 
corruption. When the officials intervene in such transactions, they are often involved as facilitators, 
negotiators, and attesters, and in many cases as paid brokers.781 
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Chapter 6 
Land Institutions and Implementation of Smallholder 
Land Rights in Ethiopia 
6. 1.  Introduction 
As discussed earlier, land institutions are one of the constituents of the land tenure system that land law 
reform puts into effect and through which it operates to bring about the change in the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights that it needs to bring about in order to 
deliver the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes it is hoped would help achieve. The term 
“land institution”, defined broadly here, refers to structures that the state establishes and runs to 
undertake the implementation of the land law’s land rights provisions in accordance with the land 
policy’s specifications, including parts of the executive through application in the course of 
administering land, managing land relations, and enabling exercise by land rights holders, as well as 
the judiciary through interpretation, explanation, and enforcement in the course of conducting dispute 
resolution.782 The critical role land institutions play in making a land law reform effective in delivering 
the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes it is hoped would help achieve is well-documented. 
In short, land institutions play a critical role because the effectiveness of a land law reform programme 
intended to help raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty is contingent on the proper 
implementation of the provisions of the land laws setting out productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights as per the specifications of the land policies, which in turn hinges on the existence of functional 
land institutions. As Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse succinctly put it, “Besides developing appropriate 
policies and laws, it is crucial to ensure the correct implementation of these instruments. [And] the 
implementation of land policies and laws [will] depend upon putting in place effective and efficient 
land institutions.”783 Mitchell has argued in a similar vein, noting that “Although many factors 
contribute to the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of laws applied to influence resource management, 
one important factor is the capacity of state and local institutions to implement such laws.”784 
Giovarelli has also observed that “Major legal changes will not be effective without a sustained effort 
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to implement the changes”.785 Bruce has also underscored that “Stipulating the desired situation in a 
law is not enough. All of us who work in this area know of elegant laws that have had little impact for 
want of implementation.”786 Similarly, Deininger et al have emphasised the criticality of 
implementation and the indispensability of land institutions. They lamented that “Although many 
African countries have adopted innovative land laws, lack of implementation thwarts their potentially 
far-reaching impact on productivity [and] poverty reduction. While such legal provisions are hugely 
attractive in theory, progress in implementing them has lagged behind. In fact, hardly any of the 
countries that introduced legal reforms have succeeded in developing a system for land administration 
at a scale sufficiently large. This made it difficult for benefits from such legislation to materialize. 
More generally, failure to implement land legislation has raised doubts regarding the institutional 
feasibility of such reform.”787 This Chapter examines land institutions, both formal federal and 
regional state and non-formal customary, that carry out implementation of provisions of land laws 
setting out productivity-raising smallholder land rights as per the current land policy specifications. 
6. 2.  Federal Executive Institutions  
As discussed earlier, the FDRE Constitution has designated land, including land matters pertaining to 
smallholders, as “federal matter” and placed under the jurisdiction of the federal government.788 This 
designation confers upon the federal government not only legislative, but also executive and judicial 
powers over land matters.789 According to Article 77(1) of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers, 
which is the highest executive organ of the federal government along with the Prime Minister790, shall 
ensure “the implementation of laws and decisions adopted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives.”  
In other words, the upshot of this designation is that as regards the issue of land, executive power is 
vested in the federal government.791 The federal executive organ, which is headed by the Prime 
Minister and is composed of the Council of Ministers and various ministries and organs of 
government, is charged with the function of execution of laws, including land laws issued by the 
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federal legislature. This function also includes enforcing judgments passed by the federal judiciary.792  
The power of the executive extends to designing and establishing - upon approval by the legislature, 
where this is required by law - as well as to coordinating and leading the activities of the institutional 
arrangement necessary to perform its functions. This has been specified under several provisions of 
the Constitution, which stipulate that the executive shall have power to decide on the organisational 
structure of ministries and other organs of government responsible for performing its law enforcement 
functions, to establish same upon approval by the legislature where so required by law, and to 
coordinate their activities and provide leadership. In the context of land matters and smallholder land 
relations, this would mean establishing and running a federal institution tasked specifically with the 
function of execution of federal land laws. Indeed, one would be excused to presume the existence and 
operation of such a discrete federal executive institution in view of the multifaceted critical importance 
of land and smallholder agriculture in the political economy of the country, and given the fact that land 
has been constitutionally and originally placed under the competence of the federal government.793   
Yet, by the time this thesis was written, no such federal institution existed. That doesn’t, however, 
mean that there is no institution that handles land matters at the federal level. In fact, there are several 
that do, including the MoA, the Investment Agency, the Environmental Protection Authority, and the 
Ministry of Water Resources. Nonetheless, these institutions do not deal with issues of land pertaining 
to smallholders. Instead, they are interested in land allocated for large-scale commercial agriculture 
investment. Even in that regard, the institutions handle land matters in an isolated manner, with little 
or no coordination and exchange of information, and only as far as required for the purpose of their 
respective mandates, which appear to be conflicting, overlapping, and vague in theory and practice.794 
Moreover, the MoA has recently established a specific department devoted to the issue of land called 
“Agricultural Investment Support Directorate”. Yet, the Directorate does not deal with land matters 
pertaining to smallholders. It is tasked with administering land allocation for large-scale commercial 
agriculture investment, and only where the size of the land involved is more than 5000 hectares.795 
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6. 3.  Regional Executive Institutions 
As discussed earlier, the FDRE Constitution has designated land as a “federal matter” and conferred 
upon the federal government not only legislative power to enact land laws setting out the provisions 
smallholder land rights, but also executive and judicial powers to undertake the implementation of 
those smallholder land rights provisions. However, by the time this thesis was written, the federal 
government has not established its own executive institution charged specifically with implementation 
of smallholder land rights provisions. Instead, the federal government has conferred upon the regions 
not only power to enact their own land laws, but also to “establish institutions at all levels that shall 
implement rural land administration and land use systems” under the same Proclamation.796  
Accordingly, the regional states of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and the SNNPRS have set up their own 
executive institutions that carry out with the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions, 
which are generally known as “Rural Land Administration and Use Authority”. In short, as it stands 
now, the institutional arrangement that deals with the implementation of smallholder land rights 
provisions in the country is made up primarily of executive institutions that have been established by 
regional states. Thus, as in the case of regional state land laws discussed above, those land institutions 
that have been established by regional states suffer from questionable constitutional and legal bases. 
There are also significant variations across regional states in the function, composition, and operation 
of those land institutions that have been established by the four regional states. Moreover, the 
functions of the land institutions are blurred both in theory and practice with those of other regional 
state institutions tasked with performing land-related functions. These include regional states’ Bureaux 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD), which have been renamed as the Bureaux of 
Agriculture (BoA) since they were re-established as such in 2010, Investment Agencies, 
Environmental Protection Authorities, and the Bureaux of Water Resources. 
For example, the allocation and transfer of land for the purpose of investment in large-scale 
commercial agriculture is carried out at the level of all regional states by the respective Investment 
Agencies of the regional states concerned. However, theoretically, the administration and allocation of 
rural land in all regional states is primarily the responsibility of the Rural Land Administration and 
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Use Authorities. Similarly, theoretically other agencies such as the Bureaux of Agriculture and the 
Environmental Protection Authorities also have relevant primary mandates. Yet, practically, neither 
the Rural Land Administration and Use Authorities, nor the Bureaux of Agriculture and the 
Environmental Protection Authorities are consulted or involved in the allocation and transfer process. 
By the same token, whilst, for instance, the environmental laws in force in all of the regional states in 
question require an environmental impact assessment prior to the allocation and transfer of land, 
investment laws do not put such assessment as a requirement. Therefore, the Investment Agencies are 
allocating and transferring land often without the necessary environmental impact assessment having 
been made. Moreover, there is no established system and often little practise pertaining to the 
coordination or exchange of information amongst these institutions. On the other hand, although the 
current federal rural land administration Proclamation was meant to serve only as framework 
legislation for regional states and was supposed to be followed by more detailed guidelines for 
implementation on the ground, such federal guidelines have not yet been issued, or not made public. 
To conclude, the function, composition, and operation of the federal and regional state land 
institutions of the land tenure system in force in post-Derg Ethiopia that deal with the implementation 
of the provisions of smallholder land rights are plagued by gaps, lack of legitimate constitutional and 
legal bases, and conflicts. In view of the fact that these institutions are supposed to ensure the 
implementation of those limited provisions of smallholder land rights that have been attenuated by 
prohibitions and restrictions, the potential implication of the gaps, lack of legitimate constitutional and 
legal bases, and conflicts cannot be underestimated. In short, since land is the most important factor of 
production for smallholders, their possible negative effect on implementation can affect the post-Derg 
land law reform’s effectiveness in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
6. 4.  Dispute Resolution and the Role of the Judiciary 
and Non-formal Customary Institutions  
There is a wealth of evidence to be drawn from law and development research and experience 
demonstrating the critical role the judiciary composed of the formal regular courts of the state plays in 
ensuring the implementation and the exercise and enforcement of provisions of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights set out in land laws, and thereby making land law reform effective in delivering 
the smallholder productivity and poverty outcomes that it is hoped can help achieve. That is first and 
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foremost by way of the interpretation, explanation, and application of those land rights that the 
judiciary conducts in the course of performing its traditional function of dispute resolution. The 
judiciary is also thought can play this critical role by way of the public confidence, expectation, and 
reliable legal environment that the mere fact of its existence out there would create.797 
However, examination of the law and the practice suggests that throughout the history of modern 
Ethiopia the judiciary has been largely excluded from performing the function of dispute resolution 
involving the interpretation, explanation, and application of the provisions of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights set out in land laws to specific land disputes. For example, during the Derg era, 
this exclusion was explicitly stipulated in the land laws that were issued as part of the Derg’s land law 
reform programme.798 In contrast, as discussed earlier, the FDRE Constitution has vested all judicial 
powers in regular courts, prohibited the establishment of special or ad hoc courts that take judicial 
powers away from the regular courts, and designated land as a federal matter.799 This designation 
confers upon the federal government judicial power over land matters. According to Articles 80 of the 
Constitution, federal courts shall have “judicial power over federal matters.” 800 
Nonetheless, despite these Constitutional declarations, the judiciary’s exclusion from performing the 
function of dispute resolution involving the interpretation, explanation, and application of provisions 
of productivity-raising smallholder land rights as set out in land laws issued as part of the EPRDF’s 
post-Derg land law reform appears to have continued. Those Constitutional provisions that bestow 
upon the judiciary exclusive judicial power have been attenuated with exclusions and restrictions 
introduced by federal and regional land laws issued subsequently. For example, courts have been 
excluded from adjudicating upon rural landholding disputes, including cases arising over smallholder 
land rights, a function they traditionally and ideally perform, under the FDRE Proclamation 2005b - 
the country’s second highest law governing smallholder land relations. Article 12 of this Proclamation, 
which is entitled “Dispute Resolution”, reads “Where dispute arises over rural landholding right, effort 
shall be made to resolve the dispute through discussion and agreement of the concerned parties. Where 
the dispute could not be resolved by agreement, it shall be decided by an arbitral body to be elected by 
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the parties or be decided in accordance with the rural land administration laws of the region.”  
Article 12 has two primary objectives. The first is to specify by whom a dispute over rural landholding 
right, to which one or more of the parties may by a smallholder, should be resolved. The Article 
provides for a three-tiered dispute resolution mechanism. Firstly, such a dispute shall be resolved by 
the parties through discussion and agreement. Secondly, where the dispute could not be resolved by 
agreement of the parties, it shall be decided by an arbitral body elected by them. Thirdly and finally, 
where the dispute could not also be resolved through arbitration, it shall be resolved in accordance 
with the rural land administration laws of the region concerned. Notably, the Article is silent as 
regards the role of regular courts in the resolution of such disputes. There is no indication as to 
whether courts have power of dispute resolution in the first instance, or even an appellate jurisdiction. 
The second objective of Article 12 is to stipulate how such disputes should be resolved. The Article 
states that where a dispute could neither be resolved by the parties nor decided by an arbitral body, it 
shall get resolution in accordance with the rural land administration laws of the region concerned. For 
a careful observer, this provision begs the question whether, in the event that a dispute is resolved by 
the parties themselves or an arbitral body elected by them, the agreement or the arbitral award should 
be delivered on the basis of law or not. Moreover, it leaves it unclear whether the dispute resolution 
role entrusted to an arbitral body could be taken as recognition by, or incorporation into the formal 
state land tenure system of the non-formal customary land tenure legal and institutional arrangements. 
However, as explained earlier, Ethiopia has been ruled as a federal state by the EPRDF during most of 
the post-Derg period. As such, laws issued by the federal government on matters that the FDRE 
Constitution has designated exclusively as “regional matters”, or that it has made division of powers 
between the federal and regional governments will apply only in parts of the country that are 
accountable to the federal government, namely the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa City Administrations. 
And land is one of those matters on which the FDRE Constitution has made division of powers 
between the federal and regional governments by bestowing the power to make land policy and laws 
upon the federal government and authorising the regional governments to administer land in 
accordance with federal laws. Nevertheless, the federal government has through the rural land 
proclamation it issued subsequently authorised the regional governments to introduce their own land 
laws and institutions. Accordingly, the Tigray, Oromia, SNNPRS, and Amhara regions have put into 
effect their own laws and institutions governing rural land relations, including smallholder land rights.  
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Therefore, in order to get a complete picture of the manner in which dispute resolution pertaining to 
smallholder land rights is dealt with throughout the country, it is imperative to explore the pertinent 
law and practice at the regional level. To be more specific, like Article 12 of the FDRE Proclamation 
2005b, Article 28(1) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007 provides that “Where a dispute arises over rural 
landholding, effort shall be made to enable the disputants to discuss and resolve the dispute by 
agreement. However, where the parties fail to reach agreement by themselves, they may resolve the 
dispute through arbitration or conciliation by elders as per the local custom.” Nonetheless, this same 
Article of the Tigray Proclamation also provides that “Where one or both of the parties are unwilling 
to have the dispute resolved through the mechanism set out under Sub-article (1) of this Article, the 
dispute shall be brought to, and resolved by the Kebele Land Administration Commission.” It further 
provides that “A party aggrieved by the decision of the Kebele Land Administration Commission may 
appeal to the regular Woreda court within 15 days from the date of rendition of the decision.”801 
In contrast, the Oromia and SNNPRS Proclamations require rural landholding disputes to be directly 
brought to the Kebele Land Administration Commission. Although the two Proclamations recognise 
the possibility of dispute resolution through discussion and agreement by the parties, or through 
arbitration by elders the parties select, they require the Commission to lead the process. According to 
these Proclamations, where a rural landholding dispute is brought to it, the Commission shall ask the 
parties to select elders and have the dispute resolved through arbitration. The two Proclamations also 
allow a party aggrieved by the decision the elders rendered to appeal to the regular Woreda court.802 
It may appear illogical for the provisions of particularly the federal and the Tigray Proclamations to 
require parties to a rural landholding dispute to discuss and resolve their dispute by agreement. After 
all, there would have been no dispute in the first place if the parties were able to discuss and resolve it 
by agreement. It may also appear superfluous for the provisions to restate the right of access to justice 
guaranteed for parties under the FDRE Constitution, as long as the dispute is about a civil case 
pertaining to the private proprietary interests of the disputants and not about a criminal case involving 
harm done to the public interest protected by the state on society’s behalf. Nevertheless, the provisions 
are important as they emphatically underscore the freedom of alternative actions available notably for 
a party that is actually or potentially a plaintiff in a civil case. For example, a party to a civil case, such 
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as a smallholder alleging to have suffered the deprivation of, or interference into their land rights by 
another and seeking compensation for the damage sustained consequently, is free to waive their right 
to put up a claim altogether, or to discuss with the party alleged to be liable and resolve the dispute by 
agreement, or to seek the resolution of the dispute by a non-formal customary institution, or to choose 
to bring the case to a regular formal state court for adjudication.803 
Studies suggest that the majority of Ethiopians prefer to resort to non-formal customary institutions for 
dispute resolution even where formal state institutions are known to operate. For instance, Baker has 
explained the reasons for this preference in what he described as “informal justice practices at the local 
level” as follows: “The Kebele is the lowest administrative unit. EPRDF party-appointed officials 
largely control administrative, social and economic activities at this level, though less so justice, which 
is still very much in the hands of locally recognised leaders, whether customary, religious, social or 
economic leaders. In practice, local communities across Ethiopia rely heavily on informal justice for 
dispute resolution. Whatever the merits of taking these issues to the formal Woreda courts, most 
people prefer to address them locally. The reasons for their preference include speedy resolution, cost 
and preference for mediation that ensures restoration and social harmony within the community.”804 
Once a person has decided to have their case resolved by non-formal customary institution, they have 
to choose which institution to take the case to. Although the non-formal customary institutions that 
exist in the country are invariably composed of locally recognised elders or traditional, religious, 
social, or economic leaders and are tasked with the function of dispute resolution, the way they are 
constituted and the type of dispute resolution role they perform vary across different communities. As 
Assefa Fiseha succinctly put it “One of the hallmarks of customary dispute resolution mechanisms 
(CDRMs) is that its management is almost always by elders, although the manner in which they are 
constituted and the roles they play may vary in different societies.”805 
Typically, non-formal customary institutions operate either as permanent or ad hoc mechanisms of 
dispute resolution. As mentioned earlier, most of the country’s ethno-cultural groups have permanent 
customary justice systems rooted in their traditional values, norms, and structures that have 
transcended the formation of the modern Ethiopian state and the establishment of the formal justice 
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system. As Assefa Fiseha further noted “Ethiopia is an amalgamation of numerous ethnic groups each 
with its own functional customary justice system [that] transcended the formation of the nation state 
and the introduction of the formal justice structure because [such systems] are rooted in societal values 
and norms and continue to be cherished through popular participation. The Gada system of the Oromo 
plays a vital role in conflict resolution. Similarly, various ethnic groups have institutions responsible 
for resolving conflicts. A common element of these institutions is they originated from traditions and 
norms of each society and remain relevant because of the continued engagement of the community.”806 
In contrast, other non-formal customary institutions of dispute resolution operate as ad hoc institutions 
established to resolve specific disputes. Such ad hoc institutions are often composed of elders selected 
by the parties in dispute. As Baker observed, “The elders used for mediation may be men chosen by 
the disputants. The elders mediate and negotiate when asked in a variety of disputes. These typically 
concern disputes within the community regarding land use. The process is one of mediation where the 
disputants themselves are encouraged by the elders to reach a joint decision. The elders, though they 
pass judgment, more often attempt to negotiate and reconcile the disputants by asking them to make 
compromises. Their popularity is based on the fact that they are accessible, quick and free. Their main 
concern is to ensure, through the restorative process, reconciliation.”807 Assefa Fiseha has made a 
similar observation on the formation and function of ad hoc non-formal customary dispute resolution 
institutions. He stressed that “In most cultures, based on their reputation, impartiality, familiarity with 
the community norms, wisdom, and rich experience, elders are elected upon the request of the parties 
in dispute often on an ad hoc basis (although some may be elected/selected several times to handle 
various disputes). Their primary function is to reconcile the differences that have arisen between the 
parties through compromise and reconciliation even though adjudication is not ruled out.”808 
Where practice is concerned, the fieldwork conducted as part of the research carried out for the thesis 
confirmed that neither regular courts belonging to the judiciary, nor the state generally is involved in 
most of the function of dispute resolution performed in relation to rural landholding cases involving 
disputes that arise over smallholder land rights. Instead, it is non-formal customary institutions that 
generally perform the function. In the few cases where the state or an institution backed by the state is 
involved, dispute resolution is conducted by the Kebele administration office or the so-called “social 
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courts”, although it should also be emphasised that the process often involves an interplay between the 
formal state and the non-formal customary institutions of dispute resolution. As Baker accurately and 
succinctly put it, “Land disputes, such as boundary disagreements, dispossession and rural land 
registration, are common across the country and their resolution frequently sees links between the 
formal and the informal. Land disputes first go to customary mediation which is chaired by the Kebele 
chairperson who is a member of the Land Administration Commission. They may also go to the Social 
courts. If disputants are dissatisfied with the decision, they can appeal to the Woreda courts”.809 
However, the practice observed on the ground is problematic and fraught with possible inconsistencies 
with provisions of the relevant law. To begin with, whether the dispute resolution function performed 
by the Kebele administration’s Land Administration Commission and social courts is lawful or not 
remains contentious. Certainly, the Kebele Land Administration Commission has been assigned a 
dispute resolution role particularly by the regional rural land proclamations. Nonetheless, the social 
courts have not been explicitly or implicitly assigned any dispute resolution function by any of the 
federal or regional rural land proclamations, which make no mention of even the name “social courts”. 
As Abera H/Mariam noted, it was the Derg that first introduced social courts in 1989 as successors to 
the “judicial tribunals” of Kebeles and Peasant Associations it had established after assuming power. 
The Derg introduced social courts to have them perform the dispute resolution function of non-formal 
customary institutions by politically accountable permanent institutions. The major objective the Derg 
assigned to social courts was to enhance “direct public participation in the administration of justice 
with a view to promoting socialist legality”. Similarly, “under the new federal arrangement almost all 
federal units have established social courts that administer justice in urban and rural Kebeles.”810 
On the other hand, the fieldwork carried out for the thesis found that there is a fusion of dispute 
resolution institutions in some areas, as the same locally recognised elders or traditional, religious, 
social, or economic leaders serve as officials of non-formal customary institutions, authorities of 
Kebele administration offices, members of Kebele Land Administration Commissions, and “judges” of 
social courts. However, although currently social courts have been established virtually throughout the 
country, their composition, jurisdiction, and relation with other dispute resolution institutions not only 
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varies across and within regions, but also deviates from the relevant provisions of the law. Social 
courts have three judges in some areas, but up to five in others. Social court judges are elected by the 
community taking into account respectability, experience in dispute resolution, familiarity with legal 
provisions, and availability to serve in some areas, whilst in others they are appointed by Kebele 
administration offices on the basis of political loyalty. The office of social court judges is not a paid 
one in some areas, whilst judges are paid a token in others. Social court judges are required to sit in 
session at least once a week in some areas, but twice in others. Social courts have jurisdiction to hear 
civil cases involving claims of up to 500 Birr and criminal cases involving petty offences that carry a 
fine of up to 300 Birr or imprisonment of up to one month in some areas, whilst in others they are 
empowered to entertain civil cases with claims of up to 1, 500 Birr and criminal cases involving petty 
offences punishable with community service. Social courts are authorised to resolve all cases involving 
rural landholding disputes in some areas, whilst in others only cases involving boundary disputes. 
Social courts are guided by the principle of seeking reconciliation between disputants in some areas, 
whilst in others they are more about adjudication than mediation. Social courts apply the provisions of 
formal state land laws in some areas, whilst in others that of non-formal customary land laws.811 
Moreover, there is a marked discrepancy between the provisions of the law and the practice on the 
ground as regards the composition and the function of the Kebele Land Administration Commission. 
For example, the Tigray Proclamation envisaged the Kebele Land Administration Commission as a 
permanent institution of dispute resolution, although it left the details pertaining to the composition, 
operation, and remuneration of the Commission to be specified by regulations.812 In contrast, the 
Oromia and SNNPRS Proclamations envisaged the Kebele Land Administration Commission as an ad 
hoc dispute resolution institution to be established to resolve specific disputes and be composed of 
elders selected by the parties in dispute, with the Kebele administration officials playing the role of 
facilitating the selection and operation of the Commission.813 
Despite those provisions of the law, however, the field research conducted for the thesis found that in 
practice, in all of the study areas the Kebele Land Administration Commission is established as a 
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  These findings are generally consistent with the findings of other studies conducted on the issue (see, for example, 
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H/Mariam, 2002:3-6).  
812
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permanent institution of dispute resolution, composed of members appointed by the Kebele 
administration, and chaired by the Kebele chairperson. In short, the Kebele administration, which 
oversees the formation, composition, and operation of the Commission, is part of the executive organ 
of the state at the grassroots-level. Therefore, although it has been assigned the function of dispute 
resolution by law, the Commission can be considered as a veritable arm of the executive organ rather 
than the judiciary. In other words, in the few cases where the state is involved in the function of 
resolution of rural landholding disputes arising over smallholder land rights, the function is performed 
by grass roots-level administrative wings of the executive organ, which often operate without applying 
the pertinent formal state land laws and are arguably there primarily to serve political purposes.  
Furthermore, the Kebele Land Administration Commission and social courts continue to be 
contentious as to whether they are constitutional or not, formal state or non-formal customary 
institutions, and part of the executive or the judiciary. First, their constitutionality is questionable 
because the FDRE Constitution has provided for the establishment of three layers of courts both at the 
federal and regional levels, including the federal first instance, high, and  supreme courts, as well as 
the Woreda first instance, the Zonal high, and the regional supreme courts; vested all judicial powers 
in these regular courts at all levels; and prohibited the establishment of special or ad hoc courts that 
take judicial powers away from the regular courts.814 Second, whether the Commission and the social 
courts are formal state or non-formal customary institutions of dispute resolution is contentious. On 
one hand, the fact that they are established and backed by the state would in a sense make them 
formal. On the other, the questionable constitutionality of their existence and lawfulness of their 
dispute resolution function, as well as their application of non-formal state substantive and procedural 
provisions in the performance of their function would make them non-formal customary institutions. 
Third, whether the Commission and the social courts are part of the executive or the judiciary is 
contentious. On one hand, the fact that the Kebele administration oversees their formation, 
composition, and operation would in a sense make them part of the executive. On the other, the 
dispute resolution function they perform would make them part of the judiciary.    
What is more, the possibility of appeal to regular Woreda courts envisaged particularly by the regional 
proclamations appears to be impractical. In fact, none of the Kebele officials, rural land administration 
authorities, Woreda court judges, and smallholders that were parties to rural landholding disputes 
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whom the researcher approached during fieldwork responded that they knew of any single case taken 
by appeal to a Woreda court. This finding is generally consistent with the findings of other studies 
conducted on the issue. For instance, according to Assefa Fiseha, since decisions rendered by 
shimaghiles (Amharic for “elders” or “customary mediators”) often enjoy the support of the disputants 
and regular courts, they are rarely appealed by the parties and reversed by the appellate Woreda 
courts.815 Similarly, Baker has found that although the law has made available the possibility of 
appealing to Woreda courts, disputants have rarely used it. Baker concluded that “Though it is very 
rare, the discontented party can appeal to the Woreda court.”816 There are several reasons for this. 
They include the fact that the first instance decisions are rendered by venerable elders or influential 
Kebele officials, who are respected or feared by the parties; lack of knowledge of law as to the 
possibility of appeal, or where and how to file it on the part of the mostly illiterate smallholder 
disputants; inaccessibility of the appellate Woreda courts, which are often located far away in Woreda 
administration capitals; inability of the typically poor smallholder disputants to afford the costs of 
transportation, accommodation, and litigation necessary for appeal; and inadequacy of the time 
allowed for appeal, which should be filed within days from the date of rendition of the decision.817 
It can therefore be argued that, despite the arguably impractical appellate jurisdiction assigned 
particularly by regional proclamations to regular Woreda courts over decisions rendered in the first 
instance by the Kebele Land Administration Commission, the judiciary has been largely excluded from 
performing dispute resolution function as regards rural landholding cases that arise over smallholder 
land rights provided in land laws. It can also be argued that the exclusion of the judiciary from the 
administration of justice pertaining to smallholder land rights impedes the exercise and enforcement, 
hence the practical implementation, of even the few productivity-raising smallholder land rights that 
have been provided by law, which are already attenuated with restrictions and prohibitions. In turn, this 
impedes the effectiveness of the land law reform programme. Conversely, it hinders the judiciary from 
playing the important role it can have in making the land law reform programme effective. 
To sum up, although it appears to be unconstitutional, the exclusion of the judiciary does not appear to 
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have been a result of innocent oversight. If that were the case, there has been enough time to rectify 
the exclusion. An alternative explanation is that the exclusion reflects a conscious decision made to 
maintain political control over land matters, including smallholder land relations, and the concomitant 
economic, social, and political rent. On the other hand, it is evident that the arrangements now in place 
allow the responsibility that comes with handling the function of rural land dispute resolution to be 
shifted in a manner that minimises the cost that would have been incurred to deal with the enormous 
caseload if regular courts were made to handle the function. At the same time, it projects an image of 
decentralisation of power, empowerment of ethnic groups to resolve disputes by their own with their 
own rules, and equitable distribution of the economic, social, and political benefits pertaining to land.  
6. 5.  The Exercise and Enforcement of Smallholder 
Land Rights by Smallholders     
The discussion of the issue of land institutions and the implementation of the provision of smallholder 
land rights would not be complete without examination of the manner of exercise and enforcement of 
those provisions by the smallholders themselves. It is particularly important to explore the question 
why most of the country’s smallholders continue to resort to the non-formal customary legal and 
institutional arrangements for the exercise and enforcement of their land rights rather than the formal 
state laws and judiciary composed of regular courts, including, for instance, the right to transfer their 
landholdings through lease, which is legal under both the formal state and non-formal customary land 
tenure systems. This Section will briefly examine the abovementioned question. In view of the 
purpose of the Section, the focus of the examination here will be the right of smallholders to transfer 
their landholdings through lease. That is because leasing is a right that requires smallholders and the 
judiciary to play an active role for its exercise and enforcement. It requires smallholders to conclude 
lease contracts, and the judiciary to adjudicate upon disputes arising in connection with such contracts. 
For example, during the Derg era, smallholders used non-formal rather than formal land laws to 
conclude land lease contracts and did not make recourse to regular courts for the adjudication of 
disputes due to restrictions imposed by law. Article 5 of the PMAC Proclamation 1975 prohibited 
smallholders from concluding contracts for the transfer land through lease. Moreover, Article 28 of the 
same Proclamation barred regular courts from adjudication of disputes arising over smallholder land 
rights. During the post-Derg period, however, those restrictions have been lifted. Federal and regional 
land proclamations issued as part of the post-Derg land law reform recognise the smallholders’ right to 
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transfer or acquire land through lease.818 And Article 79 of the FDRE Constitution has declared that 
“Judicial powers, both at federal and state levels, are vested in the courts.”819 
However, provisions of those proclamations and the Constitution bestowing upon the country’s 
smallholders the right to transfer their landholdings through lease and the judiciary exclusive judicial 
powers have been attenuated with restrictions and exclusions. To begin with smallholders, the exercise 
and enforcement of the right guaranteed for them to transfer or acquire land rights through lease 
validly by way of the formal legal and institutional arrangements is subject to compliance with several 
restrictions and preconditions. These restrictions and preconditions are attached to the identities of the 
lessor and the lessee, the purpose of the lease, the size of the landholding that may be legitimately 
leased out, and the length of the period during which the lease contract may remain valid. 
First, a smallholder may lease out his landholding validly only if he has a holding certificate issued by 
the state as per Article 8(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007 
and Article 6(1) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. Although it does not explicitly state if a smallholder 
needs to have a holding certificate in order to lease out his landholding, the Oromia Proclamation 2007 
requires under Article 15(13) that when a smallholder landholding is leased out, the holding certificate 
shall be handed over to the lessee. This is a difficult precondition to fulfil not least because many 
smallholders do not have a holding certificate as the process of certification of smallholder 
landholdings has not been fully carried out or started at all in many parts of the country. Second, a 
smallholder is allowed to lease out only part of his landholding. That is, “in a manner that shall not 
displace” him as per Article 8(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 
2007, although it is not clear what that means. Article 6(1) of the Tigray Proclamation 2007 and 
Article 10(1) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007 stipulate more clearly that a smallholder may lease out 
not more than half of his landholding. Third, a smallholder may lease out his landholding only to 
another smallholder or an “investor”, for the purpose of “development”, and for a limited period of 
time. Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the FDRE Proclamation 2005b, a land lease contract may be 
concluded “for a period of time to be determined by rural land administration laws of regions based on 
particular local conditions.” According to Article 8(1) [a], [b], and [c] of the SNNPRS Proclamation 
2007, the lease contract shall be valid for a period of up to five, ten, and 25 years where the 
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landholding is leased out by a smallholder to another smallholder, any investor, and an investor 
cultivating perennial crops, respectively. The period during which the lease contract may remain valid 
shall be “not more than three years for those who apply traditional farming, and fifteen years for 
mechanised farming” as per Article 10(2) of the Oromia Proclamation 2007; and “up to 20 years 
where the lessee uses technology other than the traditional method of farming, and not more than three 
consecutive years where the lessee uses traditional method of farming” pursuant to Article 6(3) [a] and 
[b] of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. Fourth, the land lease contract must cumulatively fulfil the strict 
formality and validity requirements specified for transactions pertaining to immovable properties 
under the Civil Code of Ethiopia. According to the Ethiopian law of obligations governing contractual 
undertakings, contracts relating to immovables, including smallholder land lease contracts, must be 
made in writing. Moreover, they must be signed by all the contracting parties and attested by at least 
two capable witnesses.820 Fifth, the land lease contract may not be valid even if it has fulfilled all of 
the preceding strict formality and validity requirements. In addition, it must be examined, approved, 
and registered by the appropriate governmental authority as provided under Article 8(2) of the FDRE 
Proclamation 2005b and the SNNPRS Proclamation 2007, Article 10(3) of the Oromia Proclamation 
2007, and Article 10 of the Tigray Proclamation 2007. In other words, the formal validity of a 
smallholder land lease contract hinges on an affirmative decision by a political appointee. 
Clearly, those formality and validity requirements are onerous by any standards. But they are even 
more onerous given the practical situation of Ethiopian smallholders in terms of the so-called 
transaction costs, information asymmetry, financial means, and the like. Compliance with all those 
strict requirements cumulatively requires at least some form of basic literacy, information, knowledge 
of law, access to competent state institutions, money to conclude contracts, etc. None of these are at 
the disposal of the vast majority of the country’s smallholders. Ethiopian smallholders are not also 
accustomed to those requirements, as they traditionally conclude contracts, including land lease 
contracts, orally, which are valid and enforceable under the non-formal customary arrangements.  
The implication of the onerousness of those formality and validity requirements is critical. First, the 
requirements are vital for validity. That means, a smallholder land lease contract that has not fulfilled 
one of the requirements outlined above is void ab initio – null and void, or nonexistent in the eyes of 
the state and its formal legal system. Therefore, such a “contract” and any right or obligation that a 
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smallholder might have assumed as a result will not be recognised, exercised, and enforced through a 
court of law for the simple reason that, legally speaking, the transaction is “no contract but a mere 
draft.”821 Moreover, the requirements have a critical probative importance. In the event of a dispute, 
the only evidence admissible to prove the terms and contents of a land lease contract involving 
smallholders, is the document of the contract itself. Such a contract or any statement it contains may 
not be proved by witnesses or presumptions, unless it is established that the document of the contract 
has been destroyed, stolen, or lost. Therefore, a smallholder who is party to such a contract and wishes 
to avail himself of this exceptional alternative way of proof should first establish three things: that the 
contract, which is the bone of contention, has been duly concluded in conformity with all the formality 
and validity requirements; that the document of the contract has been destroyed, stolen, or lost; and 
that the destruction, stealing, or loss was due to force majeure or an accident beyond his control.822 
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Chapter 7 
Making Legal Pluralism Work through Land Law Reform 
in Ethiopia 
7. 1.  Preliminary Considerations  
As discussed in the preceding Chapters, the treatment accorded to legal pluralism under the land law 
reform programmes enacted by successive governments of the modern Ethiopian state is informed 
mainly by the perception of those in state power as regards the nature and the possible implication of 
non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions to economic, social, and political 
development. The perception of non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions as tribal, 
religious, and traditional mores and superstructures that are backward, reactionary, and anathema to 
economic development, social integration, and political unity, which will eventually disappear under 
the pressure of education and modernisation as society progresses, led to their virtual abandonment, 
de-legitimisation, and abolition under the land law reforms those governments enacted in the country. 
For example, as Brietzke observed, “Although David, the Civil Code draftsman, recognizes ‘customs’ 
as the substance of private law, he denies them the status of law, viewing them as mores that will 
gradually evolve under the pressure of education. The Codes are the ‘real’ law, as they are to conquer 
Ethiopia as Roman law conquered Europe. Further, there is no place for traditional laws as such in a 
codification based solely on national interest”.823 As Minasse suggested, the perception that “tribalism, 
religion, and other parts of the superstructure will eventually disappear as society progresses”824 
generally underpinned the treatment of the non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions. 
In contrast, only formal land policies, laws, and institutions the state introduced through land law 
reform were perceived as “real” laws that could lead to economic development, social integration, and 
political unity. Even worse, those state-sanctioned formal land policies, laws, and institutions that were 
supposed to be “real” laws and expected to foster overall economic development, social cohesion, and 
national political culture in Ethiopia were largely unmodified foreign transplantations. In short, the 
formal state land policies, laws, and institutions introduced through land law reforms enacted by 
successive governments of the modern Ethiopian state might have been designed for and evolved 
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within the “social field” of their countries of origin, including the interplay of institutional structures, 
physical constraints, ideologies, traditions, values, and other factors determining the realm of 
individual and judicial choices.825 But they did not reflect the challenges and opportunities of the pre-
existing indigenous land tenure systems and the values, needs, and land rights of smallholders of 
Ethiopia. Nor did they take into account the specific economic, social, and political conditions and 
potentials of the country. It would not therefore be surprising that those land law reforms have yielded 
“little law and less development”.826 Neither the modern, national formal land tenure system, 
agricultural growth, and poverty alleviation envisaged, nor the other economic, social, and political 
development objectives set by successive governments have been achieved. As mentioned earlier, 
despite having been theoretically repealed, de-legitimised, and replaced by the formal state land 
policies, laws, and institutions, the non-formal customary ones have continued to exist, operate, and be 
used by society to govern around 85% of land relations in Ethiopia. Moreover, Ethiopia had amongst 
the world’s lowest smallholder productivity - averaging around 1.0 ton/hectare, and worst poverty by 
many standards - ranking 174th out of 187 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index, in 2011. 
However, with the failure of the previous Law and Development Movements that sought the 
transplantation of Western-styled legal systems, institution building, and rule of law promotion in 
order to spur economic development in developing countries, and the emergence of globalisation, 
decentralisation, and community empowerment as top international development agenda, the role of 
legal pluralism and non-formal customary land tenure systems have received increasing attention from 
law and development analysts, practitioners, and funders in recent years.827 They have also become the 
focus of the relevant literature. There has also been a slight shift in policy on the national front. 
Perhaps recognising that both legal pluralism and non-formal customary land tenure systems are a fact 
of life, to better advance its ethnic-based agenda related to land and smallholder agriculture, and 
acknowledging the risk of subjecting disputes over land to the jurisdiction of the understaffed, 
underfunded, overloaded, inept, and often corrupt lower tiers of the regular formal state courts, the 
current government has made a slight shift in policy towards incorporating non-formal customary land 
institutions as regards dispute resolution. As Baker succinctly put it, due to these set of challenges, “the 
government has had to evaluate what it wants and what it can achieve from formal and informal justice 
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and to establish a pragmatic middle way. In practice it has led to the government reassessing its 
attitude to informal justice as part of a nationwide justice sector review since 2009. It has developed 
new policies and programmes which aim to enhance community security and justice, not only to crime 
and violence, but also to community-level conflicts and peace building.”828 Specifically, the current 
federal land proclamation contains a provision, which has been validated under the regional state land 
proclamations, requiring that “Where dispute arises over rural landholding right, effort shall be made 
to resolve [it] through discussion and agreement of the concerned parties. Where the dispute could not 
be resolved through agreement, it shall be decided by an arbitral body to be elected by the parties”.829 
Nonetheless, there are several problems with this approach. First, it is not clear whether those arbitral 
tribunals should be guided by the provisions of the formal state or non-formal customary land policies 
and laws in the course of performing the function of dispute resolution they have been assigned. 
Second, the constitutionality of provisions of the federal and regional land proclamations that entrusted 
dispute resolution role to non-formal customary institutions is questionable. Besides conferring all 
judicial powers upon the judiciary, the FDRE Constitution has made it clear that “Special or ad hoc 
courts which take judicial powers away from the regular courts or institutions legally empowered to 
exercise judicial functions and which do not follow legally prescribed procedures shall not be 
established.”830 Third, no clear hierarchy, or other form of formal coordination or relation between the 
formal state and the non-formal customary dispute resolution institutions has been put in place. 
With that in mind, this Chapter will briefly explore the scope and mechanisms available for 
intervention through land law reform to treat the legal pluralism and the non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions in the land tenure system in a manner that would enable to avoid the 
abovementioned problems, help improve the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights, and make the land law reform effective in helping raise smallholder 
productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia. The Chapter will first consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of the non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions. It will then highlight 
the alternative models developed in established law and development research and experience for the 
formal treatment of the non-formal customary arrangements using land law reform, along with the 
forms and contents, potential benefits and possible drawbacks, and practical examples of each model. 
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7. 2.  The Advantages of Non-formal Customary Land 
Tenure Systems 
As mentioned earlier, non-formal customary land tenure systems have a number of advantages to offer 
in terms of the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights. It is 
probably because of those advantages that despite having been theoretically repealed, de-legitimised, 
and replaced by the formal state systems they have practically continued to be more popular and 
important in the governance of smallholder land relations particularly in sub-Saharan African 
countries like Ethiopia. This Section will briefly highlight the advantages that the non-formal 
customary land tenure systems are perceived to have over their formal state counterparts in this regard. 
Generally, non-formal customary land tenure systems are often more accessible and affordable, 
provide service in the absence of the formal state ones, and their non-state nature allows participation 
and spurs trust in society, particularly where the state is seen as a remote or suspicious entity as in 
most of rural sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, since non-formal customary land policies and laws are 
products of local values, norms, and practices, they enjoy a degree of belongingness, familiarity, and 
legitimacy, which their formal counterparts often lack. Non-formal customary land institutions are also 
more accessible and affordable even to the remotest and poorest people. They also depend on social 
pressure, cooperation, and participation to induce compliance, provide service in local languages, and 
have relatively more familiar and informal procedures. Moreover, since the justice non-formal dispute 
resolution institutions render is often conciliatory and aimed at restoring social harmony, justice, and 
peace, rather than enforcing abstract legislation, it would be a more appropriate solution, particularly 
when the infraction is relatively minor, as parties would have to continue to coexist and cooperate 
closely.831 Those advantages seem to explain why, as DFID estimated, “in many developing countries, 
customary legal systems account for 80% of total cases”, which is significant as a large proportion of 
the people who use such legal systems often happen to live in rural areas and be smallholders.832 
The other advantage of the non-formal customary land tenure systems is their negotiability, flexibility, 
and adaptability to changing circumstances. Although earlier approaches emphasised the continuity 
and rigidity of “customs” and “traditions” that underpin non-formal customary land tenure systems, 
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more recent studies have identified the dynamism inherent in such systems. As Cotula, Toulmin, and 
Hesse succinctly put it, “These systems are not static, but continually evolving as a result of diverse 
factors like cultural interactions, socio-economic change and political processes. In this context, 
“traditions” are continuously reinvented”.833 Crook et al have also argued that “local community-based 
and ‘customary’ forms of land rights are constantly being reinvented in response to changing 
circumstances and changing power relations”.834 Similarly, Cotula has observed that “the central role 
played by negotiation in those systems enables flexibility and adaptability”.835 
Moreover, non-formal customary land tenure systems are cheaper in terms of the infrastructural, 
financial, and personnel resources necessary to establish and run them. Being mostly products of the 
values, practices, experiences of society, non-formal customary systems are often already in place, in 
contrast to formal state systems introduced through land law reform, which require considerable 
infrastructural, financial, and personnel resources to establish, staff, equip, and operate. As Connolly 
noted in reference to non-formal dispute resolution institutions, “the fact that traditional mechanisms 
may already be in place allows disposition to begin without first having to rebuild institutions.”836 
Non-formal customary land tenure systems are often viewed as less efficient with respect to the land 
use rights they put in place. However, there are aspects that would make non-formal customary 
systems more advantageous in this regard. For example, such systems often allow a given piece of 
land to be used by multiple resource users for various purposes. As Cotula succinctly put it, “For a 
given piece of land, customary systems may cater for multiple resource uses (e.g. pastoralism, 
farming, fishing) and users (farmers, residents and non-resident herders, agro-pastoralists; women and 
men; migrants and autochthones; etc), which may succeed one another over different seasons.”837 
Furthermore, most formal land tenure systems introduced through land law reform employ a one-size-
fits-all approach to land rights-related issues and establish state control over land. In contrast, since 
non-formal customary systems are mostly products of the values, practices, experiences of particular 
communities, they provide more localised, context-based solutions and affirm the control of local 
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communities over land. As UNSO suggested, non-formal systems play a critical role in “Affirming the 
rights of local populations to control resources takes power away from the state administration and 
allocates this power to a particular group of rural producers, which tends to be sedentary farmers.”838 
What is more, contrary to the dominant and stereotypical view, not all non-formal customary land 
tenure systems discriminate against, marginalise, or exploit “vulnerable” groups, such as women and 
children, or those with weaker bargaining power, such as the elderly, the disabled, and the “minority” 
members or “non-members” of the community. In fact, though not all, many such systems across sub-
Saharan Africa, including Ethiopia, have mechanisms through which they not only guarantee and 
protect the land rights of, but also assist in the ploughing, weeding, and harvesting tasks of particularly 
such groups as widowed women, orphaned children, the elderly, the disabled, non-member “guests” of 
the community. Moreover, particularly in communities with matrilineal systems of administration, 
such as the Afar and several other ethnic groups in Ethiopia, since land rights devolve through the 
mother’s line and are generally held in women’s name, though controlled and cultivated by men, 
women tend to have greater land rights, and thus enjoy higher economic and social status than men.839 
7. 3.  The Disadvantages of Non-formal Customary Land 
Tenure Systems 
The advantages that the non-formal customary land tenure systems are perceived to have over their 
formal state counterparts have been briefly discussed in the preceding Section. However, non-formal 
customary land tenure systems also have inherent disadvantages. And due to those disadvantages, they 
cannot serve as replacement for the formal ones, or by themselves provide adequate framework for the 
establishment of a land tenure system that would enable to promote the provision and implementation 
of productivity-raising smallholder land rights and thereby help raise smallholder productivity and 
tackle poverty. This Section will briefly highlight the disadvantages of non-formal customary systems. 
The first disadvantage of non-formal customary systems is to do with their nature. Since non-formal 
policy, legal, and institutional provisions are not often based on unwritten rules, proof of their 
existence, composition, and operation often depends largely on the memory, knowledge, and 
experience of a few traditional leaders, elders, and experts of particular communities. As such, the 
                                                 
838
  UNSO, 1994:13. 
839
  See, for example, Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997. 
202 
 
very definition of “custom”, or what constitutes a given non-formal customary land tenure system may 
be a subject of contestation even amongst members of the same community. Moreover, although the 
negotiability, flexibility, and dynamism inherent in non-formal customary land tenure systems could 
be considered as an advantage, it also constitutes a disadvantage for several reasons. First, since they 
lack regularised, systematised amendment procedures, it would be difficult to shape the land tenure 
system towards the direction of improving the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights and thereby helping achieve the objectives of raising smallholder productivity 
and tackling poverty. As Brietzke noted in reference to such systems, “The regularized amendment 
procedures necessary for the adaptation of law [to] change are lacking.”840 Second, because “customs” 
and “traditions” underpinning non-formal customary land tenure systems are often specific to 
particular communities, numerous, and diverse, the negotiability, flexibility, and dynamism inherent in 
such systems can be used in a way that is quite contrary to helping promote smallholders’ tenure 
security, transfer of rights over land, and collateralisation of land rights. As Cotula, Toulmin, and 
Hesse suggested, “‘traditions’ [could be] continuously reinvented to back conflicting claims of 
different social groups.”841 Third, since non-formal policy, legal, and institutional provisions are not 
often based on unwritten rules, but dependent on the knowledge of the traditional leaders of particular 
communities, their negotiability, flexibility, and dynamism can open way for manipulation. As Cotula 
suggested, “Far from being the idealised, ‘community-based’ systems described by some, customary 
land tenure regimes (and elite manipulation thereof) provide backdrop for exploitation and exclusion. 
While negotiation enables flexibility and adaptability, it can also lead to marginalisation of those with 
weaker bargaining power. And, while the position of women under customary tenure varies 
considerably, many such systems contain norms and practices that are gender discriminatory”.842 
Moreover, since the origin, provision, and operation of non-formal customary land tenure systems is 
often inextricably tied to the goal of protecting the interest and fostering the interdependence of 
particular families, neighbours, and communities, such systems do not provide a suitable framework to 
promote smallholder tenure security, transfer of rights over land, and collateralisation of land rights in 
a wide-scaled, interactive way that can enable to raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in 
unrestricted, broad-based manner. Such systems can also hinder the reduction of reliance on families, 
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neighbours, and communities and the expansion of wide-scaled face-to-face relationships necessary to 
foster broad-based local, regional, and national economic, social, political integration and 
development. As Wilson and Wilson observed, broad-based integration and development requires a 
wide-scaled society. And in the context of land relations, a wide-scaled society requires a land tenure 
system that promotes increase in broad-based face-to-face interaction and dependence, and decrease in 
interrelation and reliance confined to immediate families, neighbours, and communities.843 
In short, non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions are inherently disadvantageous 
because they reflect and reinforce the patriarchal, feudal, and subsistence framework Ethiopia’s 
smallholder-based rural way of life, emphasise traditional structures, values, and beliefs, and focus on 
upholding past relationships and maintaining the relative status quo. Therefore, they not only favour 
men and “influential” members of the community and often discriminate against women and other 
“vulnerable” groups, such as children, the elderly, the disabled, the low caste and the “minority” 
members or “non-members” of the community, but also prevent the increase in social scale, including 
the expansion of face-to-face socio-economic relationships and the reduction of dependence on family, 
neighbours, and “the community”, necessary to foster local, regional, and national economic 
development. Moreover, since they lack regularised amendment procedures required for adaptation to 
change, they render the disengagement of the rural political economy from traditional social structures 
difficult, and hinder the transformation of smallholder agriculture from ensuring subsistence towards 
serving as an engine for fostering poverty alleviation and overall economic development. Specifically, 
because non-formal customary land policies and laws are unwritten, vague, diverse, and diffuse, which 
often depend on the knowledge and prerogative of particular traditional leaders, and the land 
institutions have through time become weakened, depleted, and corrupted, which often rely on social 
pressure and voluntary cooperation to induce compliance, they cannot offer an adequate framework 
for the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights with the degree of 
breadth, duration, and assurance required for the enhancement of tenure security, the facilitation of the 
transfer of rights over land, and the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights. To use the 
words of Brietzke, “By definition, the traditional laws of a given community cannot move ahead of 
prevailing traditional - not necessarily contemporary - structures, values, and beliefs. The regularised 
amendment procedures necessary for adaptation during periods of change are lacking. Traditional law 
places relatively greater emphasis on past relationships and relative status of the parties to a dispute, 
                                                 
843
  Wilson and Wilson, 1965:24, 88, 108, and 162. 
204 
 
rendering the disengagement of the rural economy from traditional structures more difficult.”844 
To sum up, the decentralised, vague, and diverse nature of Ethiopian customary legal and institutional 
arrangements, as well as the fact that the social pressures inducing compliance with them are too 
diffuse, makes them ill-adapted to foster development. Different ethnic, cultural, religious, and land 
tenure groups have different rules, impairing the efficiency of centralised rural development 
administration. Unwritten custom, as applied to a particular dispute, is vague, since it depends upon 
the knowledge and origin of particular judges or jurors. People cannot predict the consequences of 
their actions with the degree of certainty required for development. Transactions and relations between 
persons with differing traditional laws are made more difficult by the diversity of rules. A codification 
of traditional laws, such as was attempted in Kenya, could only result in a lowest common 
denominator type of law, which would not only mean little to a person of a particular cultural group, 
but also be ill-adapted to advance development.845 Other disadvantages of the non-formal customary 
land tenure systems include the lack formal legality and accountability, the backing of the state and its 
more effective enforcement machinery, clearly defined and widely known substantive and procedural 
rules, unpredictability and inconsistency, impediment and obstruction of the penetration of the formal 
state land policies, laws, and institutions introduced through land law reform, and deprivation of the 
state its exclusive sovereignty, monopoly over legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and 
considerable revenues it could have earned by way of transaction taxes and administration fees.846 
7. 4.  Models for the Treatment of Non-formal 
Customary Tenure Systems    
As discussed in the preceding Sections, although non-formal customary land tenure systems have 
numerous advantages over their formal state counterparts, since they also have as many inherent 
disadvantages, they cannot provide an adequate development framework that enables to use the land 
tenure system in a way that helps promote the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights, thereby raise smallholder productivity, and tackle poverty. As things stand 
now particularly in countries like Ethiopia, the same holds true also for formal state land tenure 
systems. Moreover, as the failure of past attempts demonstrates, efforts aimed at substituting one 
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system by another and eliminating legal pluralism would likely be unfeasible, if not unsuccessful, in 
the foreseeable future. However, though not serve as a replacement, the two systems can complement 
one another. The key question therefore is what scope and mechanisms are available to use land law 
reform to recognise legal pluralism, treat non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions in 
a way that enables to take the advantages and avoid the disadvantages they have, and establish a land 
tenure system that helps promote the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder 
land rights, thereby raise smallholder productivity, and tackle poverty in the short-run; as well as to 
possibly bring about the gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption of non-formal systems into the 
formal system and the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. As Rolfes observed, “Eventually, land 
rights will come under the umbrella of formal law in places where customary or informal practices 
currently predominate. Though this may take decades, it is inevitable. Thus, the question is how to 
make the transition to formal law in a manner that causes minimum disruption, respects rights created 
by customary or informal practices, preserves practices that work well, protects poor people, and 
delivers a formal legal regime that people will accept as legitimate and useful.”847 
This Section briefly explores models developed in established research and experience that offer 
alternative ways for intervention through land law reform to make legal pluralism in the land tenure 
system work in a way that combines the advantages of non-formal customary land policies, laws, and 
institutions, such as societal legitimacy, economy of time and money, familiarity and informality of 
rules, and accessibility and affordability of institutions, with the advantages of the formal state ones, 
such uniformity, impartiality, legality, and enforceability. It should, however, be emphasised at the 
outset that the Section will not attempt to develop a “general theory” for the treatment of legal 
pluralism. It will only attempt to consider the possible alternative models that the state may adopt 
under land law reform towards the treatment of non-formal customary land tenure systems, as well as 
to highlight the potential benefits and problems and the practical examples of those models. As Benda-
Beckmann observed, “any generalisation as to the relationship between national legal systems and 
indigenous systems is likely to be problematic: much must depend on the nature of a particular 
indigenous system and how members of the society concerned exploit it.”848 Nonetheless, this does not 
mean analysis of the possible mechanisms for the treatment of non-formal customary land tenure 
systems should not be attempted. However, since this Section only attempts to establish a basic 
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framework for that analysis, and neither the list of the models examined, nor the discussion made here 
is exhaustive, more research is necessary to develop the numerous variations within each model and to 
consider the many practical examples of each variation to more precisely determine their implications. 
7. 4. 1. The Total Abolition Model  
The first possible model for the treatment of non-formal land tenure systems under land law reform is 
the total abolition model. This model involves repealing and replacing all non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions by formal state ones put into effect through land law reform. As Morse 
suggested, the model is driven by the perception that non-formal customary land tenure systems are 
primitive, tribal superstructures that are reactionary to progress, which therefore need to be abolished 
and replaced in their entirety in order to foster overall economic, social, and political development.849 
This model was taken up by successive governments in Ethiopia. It was also attempted by the Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial administrations in Latin America, which tried to eradicate and replace the pre-
existing customary land tenure systems by formal states ones that they imported and transplanted from 
their home countries.850 This model had also been more recently adopted by many sub-Saharan 
African states that gained independence in the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to replace the pre-
existing indigenous African customary land tenure systems with a “modern” formal state system 
mostly based on the Western concepts of property rights involving the privatisation and registration of 
land rights.851 As Cotula noted, “African governments have sought to replace customary land tenure 
systems with a ‘modern’ system based on state legislation, European concepts of ownership and land 
titling and registration. This is partly because customary land tenure was held not to provide adequate 
tenure security, thereby discouraging investment and negatively affecting agricultural productivity. 
African states took on regulating land relations - either directly, through nationalisation, or through 
registration aimed at creating private ownership rights. This was to promote agricultural development 
on the one hand, and to control a valuable asset and source of political power on the other.”852 
The “advantage” of this model is that it is perceived to be cheap and short-cut. As Brietzke succinctly 
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put it, “this is the cheapest law reform in the short-run.”853 For example, according to David, the chief 
draftsman of the Civil Code that mostly embodied Ethiopia’s first comprehensive and systematised 
land law reform enacted under Haile Sellassie I, the wholesale replacement of the indigenous non-
formal customary land tenure systems by the French-modelled formal state ones was necessary 
because the country “cannot wait 300 or 500 years to construct in an empirical fashion a system of 
law, as was done in two different historical eras by the Romans and the English.” David further 
asserted that “The development and modernization of Ethiopia necessitate the adoption of a ‘ready-
made’ system; development and modernization force the reception of a foreign system of law”.854 
However, research and experience demonstrate that this model, which views all indigenous customary 
land tenure systems as anathema to a modern system of law and national development, whilst it 
perceives all the foreign-modelled formal state ones in line with the thinking that “good law in one 
place is good law any place else”, has generally been a failure, as it produced neither law nor 
development. On one hand, the states in the countries where the land law reform programmes based on 
this model were enacted lacked the legal resources necessary to formulate provisions of the received 
formal land policies and laws in a way that is adapted to the specific social fields of their countries, or 
that offers a viable alternative to the pre-existing non-formal customary arrangements. They also 
lacked the administrative capacity, particularly the institutional means to carry out proper 
implementation, as well as the financial, human, and infrastructural resources needed to allow popular 
participation in the formulation and implementation process; and to communicate, propagandise, and 
familiarise the substantive rights and obligations, the procedural forms and contents, and the overall 
operation and implication of the programmes. Moreover, the states lacked the political capital required 
to induce voluntary compliance with its newly-introduced formal arrangements, or to use coercion to 
force the abandonment of the non-formal customary ones partly because that can entail a vacuum in 
the absence of viable alternative, or even risk political backlash as it would mean complete disruption 
of arrangements most valued by society at large; and partly because once utilised to meet the 
enormous demands of internal and external security, the state would be left with few coercive 
resources to push the programme.855 As Bruce accurately observed, “In many developing countries 
that came to independence in the 1960s and 1970s - Africa provides many examples - the 
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independence government’s succession to the State’s ‘monopoly of law’ was a heady experience that 
inspired a generation of land laws that were never implemented. Most often, those governments 
aspired to take over control of land allocation from traditional authorities, a task well beyond their 
financial and staff resources.”856 On its part, society simply ignored, subverted, and even developed 
contempt and disrespect towards law and state, as the newly-introduced formal state land policies, 
laws, and institutions did not reflect its values, needs, and potentials; are relatively unfamiliar, 
inaccessible, and unaffordable; and happen to be mostly facilitative rather than coercive in nature, as, 
for example, smallholders would not be bound by their provision and implementation unless they opt 
to, for instance, conclude land lease contracts as per their requirements. And as Cotula concisely 
summarised it, “in rural Africa, lack of financial resources and of institutional capacity in government 
agencies, lack of legal awareness and, often, lack of perceived legitimacy of official rules and 
institutions have all contributed to limit the outreach of state interventions. Where land registration has 
been pursued, this has proved slow, expensive, difficult to keep up-to-date and hard for poor people to 
access. As a result, very little land has been registered (across the continent formal tenure covers only 
between 2 and 10 percent of the land), and customary land tenure systems continue to be applied.”857  
According to Connolly, “the abolition model has not been a popular approach, perhaps largely because 
of its impracticability.”858 In addition, due to the failure of the formal state land tenure systems to take 
roots and provide a viable alternative to the pre-existing non-formal customary ones, let alone to 
produce the hoped-for vibrant, systematised law and development, as well as the change in the 
perception of non-formal customary systems, there has been a shift in thinking. As a result, the model 
of total abolition of non-formal customary systems has been increasingly sidelined in recent years. 
7. 4. 2. The Full Non-Interference Model   
The second possible model for the formal treatment of legal pluralism and non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions is the full non-interference model. This model allows the non-formal 
customary and formal state land tenure systems to coexist within the same country or territory. 
However, there will be no interrelation between the two land tenure systems.  
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As with Native American tribes in the United States, the state may constitutionally or through treaty or 
legislation create an autonomous, self-governing territory wherein an isolated, independent indigenous 
population claiming to have endured illegitimate domination and the suppression of its “societal 
cultures” could exercise jurisdiction over certain matters, including power to interpret, apply, and 
change its own customary legal norms. But this approach entails embracing the customary 
arrangements with all their challenges and shortcomings. It is also impractical and undesirable because 
of the state’s reluctance to surrender self-government that effectively amounts to ceding full 
sovereignty within its territory, the possible human rights violations resulting from the bias inherent in 
most customary arrangements toward less powerful segments of those groups, including women, 
children, the elderly, and the disabled, and the lack of protection that could be suffered by dissenting 
individuals within the groups. As Post explained, “From the perspective of minorities, any disparity 
between what is normal in the nation and what is normal within the smaller jurisdiction carries the 
potential for tension and dissonance. In the United States, significant sovereignty has been devolved to 
Indian reservations, with the consequence that women have been deprived of rights they would enjoy 
in national jurisdictions. Indian women in reservations must thus face two distinct understandings of 
the entailments of their citizenship. The disparity generates structural instability. To the extent they are 
disadvantaged, minorities have reason to pressure the nation to restrict devolution of sovereignty.”859 
Another variation of this model allows the non-formal customary land tenure arrangements to exist, 
operate, and be used by society despite not being consistent with, or recognised under the formal state 
ones. However, the lack of clear hierarchy or other form of coordination between the formal state and 
non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions can create confusion in the land tenure 
system and adversely affect the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights. For example, 
parties to disputes over smallholder land rights may invoke different land laws to support competing 
claims, or may choose different institutions that they feel would likely be favourable to their cause.860  
7. 4. 3. The Complete Incorporation Model  
The third possible model for the formal treatment of legal pluralism and non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions is the complete or full incorporation or recognition model. Although it 
allows a number of variations, this model often involves the full incorporation or recognition of 
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customary land tenure arrangements in the formal land tenure system of the state. For example, the 
state may pass legislation that directly incorporates or makes reference to the provisions of customary 
land laws, thereby rendering them formally applicable in the relevant cases. Institutionally, the 
customary arrangements may be made to comprise one section of the lowest tier of courts within the 
entire formal legal system. Alternatively, specialised formal courts may be established to hear only 
those disputes arising under the customary land laws.  Parties before those courts may then be able to 
appeal to higher courts within the ordinary or specialised formal court system.861 
One advantage of this model is that it will help address the challenges associated with the customary 
land tenure arrangements, including problems related to bias and the lack of legality, accountability, 
and effective enforcement machinery. Complete incorporation gives the substantive and procedural 
provisions of the customary legal arrangements legitimacy within the formal legal system, whilst in a 
way also increasing the legitimacy of the formal laws in the eyes of society.862 The incorporation of 
the customary institutions in the formal court system will enable to preserve the fundamental identity 
of the customary institutions and the local nature of dispute resolution, ensure that issues of bias or 
denial of a fair trial have the opportunity to be heard within the formal system, and bring to bear the 
enforcement machinery of the state on customary decisions that may otherwise be less effective.863  
Nevertheless, the complete incorporation of non-formal customary laws and institutions in the formal 
state land laws and institutions can undermine advantages that the non-formal customary land tenure 
systems have to offer, and can eventually lead to the failure of the model. The full formalisation of 
their provisions may freeze the evolutionary process of the customary legal arrangements, whose 
flexibility and dynamism are often among their central characteristics and advantages. The voluntary 
participation that characterises the customary institutional arrangements would be compromised by the 
coerciveness of state enforcement, procedural requirements become much more important as a result, 
and the flexibility of the customary institutions may be lost owing to the setting of their structure in 
line with the formal state hierarchy.864 In short, complete incorporation would make the non-formal 
customary land tenure systems part and parcel of the formal state system. This would thus bring to an 
end the non-state nature that makes the non-formal customary land tenure systems advantageous. 
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7. 5. The Model of Selective Incorporation of the Non-
formal Customary Systems  
The other possible model for the formal treatment of legal pluralism and non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions is the selective incorporation or recognition model. Specifically, this 
model allows the non-formal customary land institutions to exist independently of the formal state 
ones, whilst embedding them in low-level surveillance and accountability mechanisms and allowing 
for cross-referrals. For example, under this model, non-formal customary dispute resolution 
institutions may be made to have limited jurisdiction over smallholder land rights-related cases arising 
in specified areas relating to the communities in which they operate. On their part, the formal state 
institutions, particularly regular courts, may be made to retain general jurisdiction, which may include, 
for example, granting formal state courts appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the 
customary institutions - thereby enabling the state to exercise surveillance over the latter.865 
This model may also enable non-formal customary systems to maintain their fundamental nature and 
legitimacy, as well as to gain increased autonomy. It will also enable the state to pursue its economic, 
social, and political objectives more effectively without having to surrender its sovereignty and forfeit 
its ability to ensure the observance of the human rights. As Levy observed, using this approach, “the 
state recognises the survival of law based on customary rules and usages of the indigenous 
community, without conceding sovereignty to that community.”866 Above all, the model can enable to 
selectively accommodate non-formal customary land tenure systems within the framework of the 
formal state land tenure system in a manner that enables to capitalise on the opportunities they offer 
and address the challenges they pose. That is, “to combine the virtues of traditional legal institutions 
(accessibility, informality, economy of time and money, and familiarity of legal norms) with those of 
the state legal system (impartiality, uniformity of law and procedures and [state] legitimacy).”867  
On the other hand, selective incorporation can enable the government to use non-formal customary 
land tenure systems not only to better advance its ethnic-based economic, social, and political agenda 
related to land and smallholder agriculture and reap the advantages they offer, but also to more 
successfully formulate and implement a land law reform programme that can be effective in helping 
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raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the short-run, and leading to the gradual evolution, 
extinction, or absorption of the non-formal customary land tenure systems into the formal ones and 
thus the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. Selective incorporation of non-formal customary 
systems can enable the government to introduce land law reform measures that respect diversity and 
reflect contextual needs and potentials, promote local ownership and community participation, allow 
decentralisation and at the same time advance regional and national integration, appease potential 
opposition and win voluntary cooperation, provide room for pre-existing non-formal customary 
systems to project a sense of continuity, stability, and predictability and for the newly introduced 
systems to move towards the set objectives, and offer opportunity to theoretically communicate, and 
practically demonstrate the advantages of formal state systems and the disadvantages of non-formal 
customary ones. Moreover, since efforts aimed at ending legal pluralism and establishing a uniform, 
functional formal state land tenure system should be the culmination of a long process of self-
criticism, analysis, and well-informed, deliberate choice, selective incorporation of non-formal 
customary systems would provide the government with opportunity and capacity to pilot and study the 
strengths and shortcomings of, and identify formal state and non-formal customary systems to be 
embodied in possible future land law reform initiatives that would be undertaken to progressively 
establish local, regional, and national formal state land tenure systems and thereby end legal pluralism. 
In view of its relative advantages, notable law and development analysts, practitioners, and funders 
now generally agree that the model of selective incorporation is the most appropriate model for the 
treatment of the non-formal customary land tenure systems. For example, Deininger and Binswanger 
have concisely captured the nature and advantages of this model, noting that “Clarification and 
formalization of informal property rights in a process that increases the accountability of local leaders, 
establishes a transparent and implementable legal basis, and provides for adjudication of boundary 
disputes across communities must precede any effort to award formal titles. Adopting a flexible 
institutional structure that gives communities freedom of choice in accomplishing these goals is 
therefore of great importance.”868 Similarly, Cotula has noted that “It is now generally recognized that 
land policies and laws must build on local concepts and practice, rather than importing one-size-fits-all 
models. This entails, among other things, legally recognizing local land rights, which are the 
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entitlements through which most people gain access to rural land.”869  
Finally, it should be emphasised that since non-formal customary policy, legal, and institutional 
provisions are unwritten, numerous, and diverse, and the needs and potentials for their accommodation 
varies across countries, regions, and even localities, the particular treatment that is most appropriate in 
a given case will largely depend on the historical and cultural background and context, as well as the 
interaction and interrelationship between the state and the society concerned. The brief examination 
here only attempted to establish a basic framework for that analysis. However, since neither the list of 
the models examined, nor the discussion made is exhaustive, more research is necessary to develop the 
numerous variations within each model and to consider the many practical examples of each variation 
and their implications, as well as to more precisely determine the treatment of legal pluralism and non-
formal customary land tenure systems that may be appropriate in a particular context. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Recommendations   
8. 1.  Summary and Evaluation 
This thesis sought to explore the challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty 
in Ethiopia, an issue which has been at the top of the national development agenda under successive 
governments, a major preoccupation of local and international law and development analysts, 
practitioners, and funders, and a subject of examination and contestation in the law and development 
literature since Emperor Menelik II founded the modern Ethiopian state parallel to the colonial 
scramble for Africa at the end of the 19th century and introduced the 1908 land law reform. Ethiopia 
has since experimented with land law reforms linked to agriculture-led national development strategies 
and proclaimed to have been designed to help raise productivity in its smallholder-based agriculture, 
thereby tackle poverty, and foster overall economic development under Emperor Haile Sellassie I, who 
was crowned in 1930 after a period of power struggle that followed the end of Menelik II’s in 1913, 
the Derg military junta, which assumed power in the 1974 Revolution that deposed Haile Sellassie I, 
and the incumbent EPRDF, which is composed of ethnic-based liberation movements that fought, 
helped overthrow, and succeeded the Derg in May 1991. Yet, Ethiopia had amongst the world’s lowest 
smallholder productivity averaging just around 1.0 ton/hectare, and remained one of the poorest by 
many standards, ranking 174th out of 187 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index in 2011. 
The goal this thesis was set to accomplish is to synthesise, analyse, and contribute to the debate that 
this disappointing outcome has inevitably drawn about the challenges of land law reform, smallholder 
productivity, and poverty in Ethiopia, specifically concerning the issues why land law reform might 
have failed in the past and whether and how it can be used to help raise smallholder productivity and 
tackle poverty in the future. The core hypothesis the thesis sought to examine was the proposition that 
the most important challenge of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty in Ethiopia is 
the effect that the way land law reform treats the legal pluralism it gave rise to in the country’s land 
tenure system, which comprises both state-introduced “formal state” land policies, laws, and 
institutions and pre-existing “non-formal customary” arrangements that govern land relations, 
including who may acquire, use, and transfer land, for how long, and under what conditions, has on the 
provision and implementation of smallholder land rights with a bearing on their productivity. And the 
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central argument of the thesis is that recognising legal pluralism in the short-run is the most effective 
way to make use of legal pluralism in the medium-run and possibly end legal pluralism in the long-run.  
In other words, by analysing evidence drawn from the relevant research and experience established in 
the law and development literature in general, and in Ethiopia in particular, in the light of the specific 
contexts, needs, and potentials of the country, the study has arrived at the following three overall 
conclusions. First, the thesis argued that land law reform can be used to help raise smallholder 
productivity if designed to change the land tenure system’s land policies, laws, and institutions to 
improve the provision and implementation of bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights 
leading to the enhancement of tenure security, facilitation of transfer of rights over land, and 
authorisation of collateralisation of land rights, and is accompanied by agrarian reform measures 
addressing technical problems related to access to modern agricultural inputs, such as improved seeds, 
fertilisers, and pesticides, advanced ploughing, weeding, and harvesting implements, and credit, 
research, communication, and marketing services. The thesis also argued that since Ethiopia is a 
country where smallholder agriculture is the primary source of livelihood and the mainstay of the 
economy, land law reform can help tackle poverty, as growth in smallholder productivity it would help 
achieve can enable smallholders and the rural and urban poor to have access to cheaper and more food, 
raise their real and disposable incomes, and increase their expenditure on nutrition, health, education, 
and other goods and services, which would improve their life expectancy, literacy, standard of living, 
and even productivity. Furthermore, the thesis considered that land law reform can even help foster 
overall economic development, because as smallholder agriculture continues to modernise and supply 
cheap food, release labour, provide raw materials, expand market, and boost demand for nascent 
manufacturing and service industries, the growth in smallholder productivity it would help achieve can 
lead to the transformation of the economy from one that is largely agricultural to one more extensively 
based on manufacturing and service industries. As to why land law reform failed to help raise 
smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the past, the thesis argued that it was because land law 
reform has not been designed to change the land tenure system’s land policies, laws, and institutions in 
a way that brings about improvement in the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights. Instead, successive governments sought to use land law reform to abruptly 
eliminate legal pluralism through blanket abolition of home-grown non-formal customary 
arrangements and wholesale transplantation of foreign-modelled formal state land policies, laws, and 
institutions that they perceived would help not only establish a national, functional formal land tenure 
system, but also achieve overall economic, social, and political development by fostering 
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economically, smallholder-driven agricultural growth and poverty alleviation, socially, cultural 
cohesion and integration; and politically, nation-building and unity. However, such land law reform 
produced neither the law nor development it was intended to. Quite contrary to abruptly eliminating it, 
land law reform perpetuated legal pluralism and exacerbated its effect on the provision and 
implementation of smallholder land rights. Instead of a nationwide functional formal land tenure 
system, land law reform established a disorganised, dysfunctional land tenure system that comprises 
state-sanctioned formal land policies, laws, and institutions, which, though theoretically legal, are 
practically ineffectual, as well as the pre-existing non-formal customary arrangements, which, though 
have been theoretically illegalised, repealed, and replaced by the state, continue to be considered 
legitimate and used by society to govern more than 85% of land relations in the country. Basically, 
since the challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty are factors to do with 
the specific economic, social, and political background and the geographical, demographical, 
ecological, and historical setting of a given country, an effective land law reform programme requires 
formulation and implementation involving a contextualised, particularistic approach that adequately 
takes into account the conditions, needs, and potentials of the country concerned. The land law reforms 
that successive governments introduced in Ethiopia, which involved wholesale transplantation of 
foreign-modelled formal state land policies, laws, and institutions that might have been originally 
designed with the conditions, interests, and aspirations of their countries of origin in mind, failed 
because their formulation and implementation was not based on a contextualised, particularistic 
approach that adequately took into account the country-specific challenges they were expected to help 
resolve, exceeded the limited legal resource, administrative capacity, and political capital of the state, 
and did not reflect the values, needs, and potentials of the people they were supposed to govern. The 
state lacked the legal resource necessary to carry out an effective land law reform programme in a way 
that reflects the precise content of the Ethiopian social field, including the possible economic, social, 
and political reasons for compliance with, deviance from, or failure to follow the formal state land 
policies, laws, and institutions; or that offers viable alternative to the pre-existing non-formal 
customary arrangements. Similarly, it lacked the administrative capacity, particularly the institutional 
means to carry out proper implementation, as well as the financial, human, and infrastructural 
resources needed to allow popular participation in the formulation and implementation process; and to 
communicate, propagandise, and familiarise the substantive rights and obligations, the procedural 
forms and contents, and the overall operation and implication of the programme. The state also lacked 
the political capital required to induce voluntary compliance with its newly-introduced formal 
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arrangements, or to use coercion to force the abandonment of the non-formal customary ones partly 
because that can entail a vacuum in the absence of viable alternative, or even risk political backlash as 
it would mean complete disruption of arrangements most valued by society at large; and partly because 
once utilised to meet the enormous demands of internal and external security, the state would be left 
with few coercive resources to push the programme. On its part, society simply ignored, subverted, and 
even developed contempt and disrespect towards law and state, as the newly-introduced formal state 
land policies, laws, and institutions would not reflect its values, needs, and potentials; are relatively 
unfamiliar, inaccessible, and unaffordable; and happen to be mostly facilitative rather than coercive in 
nature, as, for example, smallholders would not be bound by their provision and implementation unless 
they opt to, for instance, conclude land lease contracts as per their requirements.  
Furthermore, the thesis argued that land law reform can be used to help raise smallholder productivity 
through recognition of legal pluralism involving selective incorporation of non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions that do not constrain the provision and implementation of smallholder 
land rights, which can enable to not only make the legal pluralism work, reap benefits the non-formal 
customary arrangements offer, and undertake effective land law reform in the short-run, but also lead 
to gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption of non-formal customary systems into the formal state 
system and the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. As to how land law reform might be used to help 
raise smallholder productivity by changing the land tenure system’s land policies, laws, and 
institutions to improve the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights, the thesis highlighted the possibility of employing land law reform to adopt hybrid state-private-
customary land policy that within the framework of the current policy of state land ownership 
introduces state, private, and communal landholdings and combines the advantages of the state land 
ownership policy that the government enforces, private ownership that critics mostly favour, and non-
formal customary land tenure systems that society frequently uses. It also outlined how within this 
hybrid state-private-customary land policy land law reform may be used to issue land laws boosting 
the provision of productivity-raising smallholder land rights that enhance tenure security by specifying 
the definition and relationship of state, private, and communal landholdings, requiring the registration 
and certification of lifelong usufructuary land rights, stipulating stricter eviction and confiscation 
procedures, and setting out clearer expropriation and compensation mechanisms; facilitate the transfer 
of rights over land by easing lease, donation, and succession restrictions; and authorise the 
collateralisation of land rights conditionally. It then demonstrated how land law reform may be used to 
establish land institutions that improve the implementation of the specifications of the hybrid state-
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private-customary land policy and the smallholder land rights provisions of the land laws by 
selectively incorporating customary land institutions, establishing a federal executive institution, 
clarifying the mandates of the regional institutions, and assigning the judiciary dispute resolution role. 
8. 2.  Lessons Learned and Suggested Ways Forward  
This Section highlights the major lessons learned in the course of the study on whether land law reform 
can be used to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty, as well as why, how, and to what 
extent legal pluralism in the land tenure system might influence land law reform’s outcomes regarding 
the provision and implementation of smallholder land rights and the conditions of smallholder 
productivity and poverty in Ethiopia. On the basis of those lessons, the Section also offers suggested 
ways forward on how the country may effectively use land law reform to improve the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, thereby help raise smallholder 
productivity, and tackle poverty in the future. It specifically outlines the scope and mechanisms 
available to use land law reform to make the legal pluralism work to contribute towards the 
improvement of the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights and 
the effectiveness of land law reform in the short-run, and possibly towards ending the legal pluralism 
itself in the long-run. Though the Section in particular, and the thesis in general deal mainly with the 
case of Ethiopia, they can be used to draw lessons for further research and possible action in sub-
Saharan African and other developing countries in roughly comparable position with Ethiopia. 
8. 2. 1.  Land Law Reform’s Role and Potential regarding 
Smallholder Productivity and Poverty  
The first major lesson learned in the course of the study is that land law reform can be used to help 
raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty, particularly in countries with smallholder-based 
economies at early stage of development like Ethiopia. However, the challenges of land law reform, 
smallholder productivity, and poverty are factors to do with the specific economic, social, and political 
background, as well as the geographical, demographical, ecological, and historical setting of the 
country concerned, which would therefore require a contextualised, particularistic approach. As such 
there are no standardised, universalistic suggested ways forward for the formulation and 
implementation of a land law reform that can help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
The second major lesson learned is that land law reform can be effective in helping raise smallholder 
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productivity and tackle poverty only if using a contextualised, particularistic approach that adequately 
takes into account the specific economic, social, and political background and geographical, 
demographical, ecological, and historical setting of the country concerned, it is  designed to change the 
land tenure system’s land policies, laws, and institutions to bring improvement in the provision and 
implementation of bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights enhancing tenure security, 
facilitating transfer of rights over land, and authorising collateralisation of land rights. Moreover, in 
order to be effective, land law reform should be accompanied by other measures. For example, it is 
necessary to take agrarian reform measures aimed at addressing technical problems of the smallholder 
sector related to the lack of access to modern agricultural inputs, implements, and services, which is 
considered the second major contributing towards low smallholder productivity in countries like 
Ethiopia besides structural problems of the land tenure system. Other measures that are critical for 
success include ensuring provision of credit, research and extension, and transportation and marketing 
services, as well as building the capacity of smallholders by raising their knowledge about the newly 
introduced land policies, laws, and institutions, the rights they offer, and the obligations they impose. 
The third major lesson learned is that a land law reform that does not involve a contextualised, 
particularistic approach, or that exceeds the limited legal resources, administrative capacity, and 
popular receptivity available, or that is not designed to change the land tenure system’s land policies, 
laws, and institutions in a way that brings about improvement in the provision and implementation of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights should not be attempted. A land law reform that does not 
adequately take into account the country-specific problems it is expected to help resolve, or that does 
not reflect the values, needs, and potentials of the people it is supposed to govern, or that exceeds the 
legal resources, administrative capacity, and popular receptivity available cannot be expected to be 
effective. Quite to the contrary, it could be ignored, subverted, and even yield disrespect for law and 
the state. Similarly, the payoff from a land law reform introducing land policies, laws, and institutions 
that are not designed to bring improvement in the provision and implementation of the bundles of 
productivity-raising smallholder land rights could only be adding a new layer of legal, but ineffectual 
land policies, laws, and institutions that would make the pre-existing land tenure system dysfunctional 
and constrain tenure security, the transfer of rights over land, and the collateralisation of land rights. 
Conversely, to make land law reform effective, it is particularly necessary to recognise legal pluralism 
in the land tenure system at least in the short-run and change only those formal state or non-formal 
customary land policies, laws, and institutions that most constrain the provision and implementation of 
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productivity-raising smallholder land rights. This can make the land law reform one that takes into 
account the specific contexts of the country concerned, reflects the values, needs, and potentials of the 
people it governs, concentrates the limited legal resources, administrative capacity, and popular 
receptivity upon the problems it seeks to resolve, and establish land policies, laws, and institutions that 
would be effective in bringing improvement in the provision and implementation of productivity 
smallholder land rights and, through that, in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
To sum up, since the challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty are factors 
to do with the specific economic, social, and political background, as well as the geographical, 
demographical, ecological, and historical setting of the country concerned, the formulation and 
implementation of an effective land law reform programme requires a contextualised, particularistic 
approach that involves the collaboration of all disciplines that matter. The collaboration should 
particularly focus on scientifically determining such issues as what the available needs and potentials 
are in terms of raising smallholder productivity and tackling poverty; what changes are necessary to 
achieve those outcomes; which land policies, laws, and institutions of the land tenure system must be 
changed; which values, practices, and interests need to change in order to change the stakeholders; 
whether those changes can be embodied in, and achieved through land law reform, and how success or 
failure can be evaluated and the necessary adjustments be made. For example, economists should 
produce empirical research demonstrating the optimal contribution that land law reform can make in 
terms of raising smallholder productivity and tackling poverty. Sociologists should study how a land 
law reform can establish the best means of social control with respect to the formal state and non-
formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions that constitute the land tenure system. Political 
scientists should provide empirical research outlining the possible positive or negative implications 
that a land law reform can have politically so as to enable politicians to make an informed, sound 
policy choice. On their part, geographers, demographers, ecologists, and historians should come up 
with studies elaborating the past experiences, analysing the present conditions, and predicting the 
future evolutions of the country as regards issues falling within the scope of their respective expertise 
that are to do with the challenges of land law reform, smallholder productivity, and poverty in 
Ethiopia. Once that has been secured, lawyers can then be able to formulate a land law reform with 
formal state and non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions comprising a land tenure 
system that would enable to improve the provision and implementation of productivity-raising 
smallholder land rights and, through that, help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
Throughout this process, the role of law, which is an action- and decision-oriented discipline, would be 
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to articulate the criteria for choice, and to expose them to reasoning, deliberation and, ultimately, the 
test of use. Law can also secure effective implementation of the overall land law reform programme. 
8. 2. 2. Land Policies and the Choice of Land Ownership Policy 
Promoting Smallholder Land Rights  
This thesis argued that it is possible and preferable for Ethiopia to adopt a hybrid state-private-
customary land policy that would enable to combine the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of 
each of the formal state and private land ownership policies and non-formal customary land tenure 
systems through a process that involves an initial stage starting with enforcement of the current policy 
of state land ownership, passes through a transitional period during which land would be categorised, 
administered, and used as state, private, and communal landholdings, and culminates in the installation 
of the policy of private land ownership. Accordingly, the land law reform proposed here should begin 
with the formulation and adoption of the hybrid state-private-customary land policy in question within 
the framework of the current policy of state land ownership. This is in consideration of the fact that the 
argument of each side to the debate emphasising the advantages of the land ownership policy that it 
supports and stressing the disadvantages of the policy that it opposes has not been proved based on 
substantive empirical data does not necessarily imply that it has been disproved. However, the policy 
of state land ownership has significant disadvantages in terms of enhancing tenure security, facilitating 
the transfer of rights over land, and authorising the collateralisation of land rights. Moreover, the 
current approach whereby the state uses sizable proportion of the country’s scarce resources to ensure 
allocation of the ever dwindling land to every adult citizen in need free of charge, oversee the 
provision and implementation of land rights, and control and administer land relations is neither 
sustainable nor favourable to effectively use land law reform to help raise smallholder productivity and 
tackle poverty. Likewise, selective incorporation of non-formal customary land tenure systems would 
enable to reap the advantages they offer in terms of the provision and implementation of smallholder 
land rights and to formulate and implement land law reform that can be effective in helping raise 
smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the short-run, as well as to possibly bring about the 
gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption of the non-formal customary land tenure systems into the 
formal ones and thus the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. Yet, non-formal customary systems are 
disadvantageous because they reflect the patriarchal, feudal, and subsistence framework Ethiopia’s 
smallholder-based rural life, discriminate against women and other “vulnerable” groups, lack 
regularised amendment procedures necessary to adapt to change, and are unwritten, vague, and diverse. 
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In contrast, although its implementation may be costly and entail difficulty particularly at the initial 
stage, the policy of private land ownership has a proven record of superior performance as regards 
promoting productivity-raising smallholder land rights and thereby helping raise smallholder 
productivity, tackle poverty, and even foster overall economic development. This has been practically 
demonstrated in the “more developed” Western countries, where the policy has long been enforced, as 
compared to the “less developed” countries in parts of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, where it has 
been recently put into effect or not at all. Privatisation may be evil given the problems that it can entail, 
such as inequality, unemployment, inflation, corruption, and social exclusion, as well as the periodic 
global crisis like the one currently going on in the capitalist world. Nonetheless, it is a lesser evil as 
compared to living without it in what seems to be a perpetual state of low smallholder productivity, 
pervasive poverty, and lack of overall economic development, as has been the case in Ethiopia for 
close to half a century now since the introduction of the policy of state ownership of land. 
The proposed land law reform should also introduce three types of landholdings, namely state, private, 
and communal, as per the hybrid state-private-customary land policy adopted. Private landholding 
would be one that is claimed and recognised as an individual landholding. Whereas, a communal 
landholding would be one that is jointly controlled, administered, and used in accordance with the 
pertinent non-formal customary land tenure systems. In contrast, all land that has not been claimed and 
recognised as private or communal would fall under state landholding to be administered by the state. 
8. 2. 3.  Land Laws and the Provision of Smallholder Land Rights  
Although the formulation of the hybrid state-private-customary land ownership policy to be adopted is 
a necessary first step, it is not a sufficient condition to make the land law reform proposed here 
effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia. In order to be 
effective, the proposed land law reform must also involve the issuance of land laws, through which the 
land ownership policy will be explained, given binding treatment, and translated into action. Based on 
the lessons learned in the course of the study, the suggested ways forward concerning the formulation 
of the forms and contents of the land laws necessary to make the proposed land law reform effective, 
which would improve the provisions of the three bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights, including the enhancement of tenure security, the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, 
and the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights for smallholders, have been outlined below. 
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Addressing Questions regarding the Constitutionality and Legality of Regional State Land Laws 
The FDRE Constitution, which has been in force in Ethiopia as the supreme law of the land during 
most of the post-Derg period, conferred upon the federal government power to make land laws, whilst 
it gave regional states power “To administer land in accordance with Federal laws”. The Constitution 
did not authorise the federal government to delegate its power to make land laws to the regional states, 
define what the power “to administer land” that it gave to the regional states constitutes, or suggest if 
that would include power to make land laws. Nonetheless, since the federal government has in the land 
law it issued given the regional states power to “enact rural land administration law” and the regional 
states of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and the SNNPRS have accordingly promulgated their own land 
laws, the provision of smallholder land rights in post-Derg Ethiopia has been subject to five different 
land laws. However, the constitutionality and legality of the land laws issued by the regional state is 
questionable. Even if it is claimed that the regional state land laws were issued based on the lawmaking 
power the federal government delegated to the regional states, the constitutionality of the delegation 
itself is questionable, as the Constitution designated land a federal matter in view of its vital economic, 
social, and political importance and because the federal government was deemed better positioned to 
handle land matters uniformly throughout the country. Moreover, even if the delegation is considered 
constitutional, provisions of the regional state land laws that set out productivity-raising smallholder 
land rights are significantly different from each other and from those of the federal land law. 
In view of that, although the FDRE Constitution is so rigid that the amendment of its provisions is 
close to impossible, since it has designated land as a federal matter and entrusted power to enact land 
laws to the federal government, the land law reform proposed here should include the issuance of a 
federal land law that unequivocally clarifies the division of federal and regional powers on smallholder 
land matters, defines what the power “to administer land” given to regional states constitutes, and 
makes regional state land laws subordinate to federal land laws in the hierarchy of laws of Ethiopia. 
The federal land law to be issued should also require the harmonisation of provisions of the regional 
state land laws setting out productivity-raising smallholder land rights with each other and with those 
of the federal land law, and render null and void provisions of regional state land laws that do not 
comply with the requirement. In addition, the federal land law to be issued should require periodic 
follow-up and monitoring by the federal government to see to it that all federal land policies and laws 
concerning smallholder land rights are appropriately, uniformly, and consistently applied throughout 
the country. This would enable to address lingering questions about the constitutionality and legality of 
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regional state land laws, avoid the unconstitutionally unequal, differential treatment given to 
smallholders in Ethiopia under land laws governing the provision of productivity-raising smallholder 
land rights, ensure the uniform and consistent application of federal land laws as per the Constitution, 
and more generally prevent the uncertainty, unpredictability, and arbitrariness of laws and practices. 
The Enhancement of Tenure Security 
Defining State, Private, and Communal Landholdings: 
Although the federal and regional state land laws currently in force in the country recognise state, 
private, and communal landholdings, they do not clearly define the constituents of those landholdings. 
Similarly, although the land rights of pastoralists, which is communal in nature, has been recognised 
under the federal and regional constitutions, the regional states where most of the country’ pastoralists 
live have not yet promulgated their own land laws, and the land laws now in force do not define the 
constituents of pastoralist landholdings. The absence of such definition has created confusion as to 
what constitutes state, private, and communal landholdings, and the enforcement of the current policy 
of state land ownership has led to widespread perception, particularly on the part of state authorities, 
that all land falls under state landholding. Moreover, the land laws now in force leave the conversion 
of landholdings into state or other forms of landholding largely to the discretion of the federal and 
regional governments. This, coupled with the current push to transfer swathes of land for large-scale 
commercial agriculture, has opened way for state authorities to expropriate and give away land as they 
deem fit, often without consenting and paying compensation to possible private and communal 
landholders. Therefore, in order to enhance tenure security particularly for private and communal 
landholders, the federal and regional land laws to be issued under the land law reform proposed here 
should have provisions clearly defining the constituents of state, private, and communal landholdings. 
Developing a Rural Land Use Master Plan and Information System: 
The current land laws had envisaged the development of a guiding rural land use master plan that 
shows the types, boundaries, and uses of rural landholdings, outlines the identities, rights, and 
obligations of the landholders, and describes the holders of adjacent landholdings, as well as of a land 
information system, whereby rural land-related information is gathered, analysed, and distributed to 
users in all parts of the country. However, neither the land use master plan nor the information system 
has been developed in any region. This has created tenure insecurity, as, for example, all types of rural 
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landholdings are being transferred for commercial agriculture investment in the name of state 
landholding, and arbitrary confiscation of smallholder landholdings is taking place under the guise of 
non-compliance with use restrictions. Thus, to bring about the enhancement of tenure security, the land 
laws to be issued under the land law reform proposed should have provisions that require development 
of the land use master plan and information system and put in place stringent mechanisms for its 
implementation. These may include specifying the establishment of an institution composed of 
representatives of the state, traditional leaders, and ordinary citizens to oversee the development 
process, as well as assigning resources and stipulating a reasonable, strict timeframe for the process. 
Completing the Process of Rural Land Measurement, Registration, and Certification: 
The land laws issued by the federal government and the four regional states have envisaged the 
measurement, registration, and certification of rural landholdings, particularly private and communal 
landholdings. Accordingly, the process of measuring, registering, and certifying rural landholdings has 
been started in those four regional states, and research and experience show that the process has 
produced encouraging results in terms of the enhancement of tenure security and the benefits thought 
would flow from it. However, the process has not yet been completed in the four regional states and 
not even started in the regional states that have not promulgated their own land laws, where the transfer 
of land for large-scale commercial agriculture investment is mostly taking place. This undermines 
tenure security, as those smallholder landholdings that have not been measured, registered, and 
certified are relatively more vulnerable to arbitrary eviction and confiscation, and hinders the transfer 
of smallholder land rights, as even those land transitions that are formally lawful, such as lease, are 
conditional upon having certificates. Therefore, to bring about enhancement of tenure security, the land 
laws to be issued under the proposed land law reform should contain provisions that stringently require 
the completion of the process of measurement, registration, and certification of private and communal 
landholdings in all parts of the country, and that assign institutions, resources, and timetables for it. 
Clarifying the Conditions and Procedures for the Conversion of Rural Landholdings: 
Although the current land laws recognise state, private, and communal landholdings, they do not 
clearly define the constituents of those landholdings and specify the conditions for the conversion of 
landholdings from one form into another. This, coupled with the absence of a rural land use master 
plan and information system, has unduly widened the discretion of state authorities concerning the 
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conversion of landholdings and thus undermined smallholder tenure security. Thus, to bring about the 
enhancement of tenure security, the land laws to be issued under the proposed land law reform should 
contain provisions that clarify the conditions necessary particularly for the conversion of private and 
communal landholdings into state landholding, including specifying who may decide the conversion, 
the procedures how, and under what circumstances. The provisions should also stipulate ways in which 
outstanding claims that may arise in relation to conversion will be dealt with, including institutional, 
substantive, and procedural mechanisms that will enable smallholders to be heard and seek remedy. 
Establishing Land Bank for the Administration, Distribution, and Utilisation of State Landholding: 
The land laws to be issued under the land law reform proposed here should contain provisions that 
require the establishment of a land bank for the administration, distribution, and utilisation of state 
landholding, wherein all rural land that has not been claimed as private or communal landholding 
would be designated and administered as state landholding, and information concerning state 
landholding, including size, type of use, level of fertility, and borders, would be gathered, analysed, 
and disseminated. The provisions should also specify that only one-half of state landholding may be 
transferred for large-scale commercial agriculture, and require that the remaining half be distributed 
amongst smallholders who are in need and entitled. This can lead to the enhancement of tenure 
security, as it would entail at least tentative delimitation of state, private, and communal landholdings 
and reduce the necessity of carrying out redistribution to meet the demands of the growing population. 
Specifying Clearer Expropriation and Compensation Mechanisms: 
The current federal and regional constitutions and land laws contain provisions that authorise the 
government to expropriate smallholder landholdings for “public purpose” against payment of “fair 
compensation”. However, these provisions have become a major source of tenure insecurity because 
what constitutes “public purpose” or “fair compensation”, how, and by whom it is decided has not 
been specified, smallholders may claim and be paid “compensation” only for the value of the 
improvement or investment they might have made on their landholdings, but not for the expropriated 
landholding simply because all land is owned by the state, and procedures enabling smallholders to be 
heard and seek judicial remedy have not been put in place. Therefore, to bring about the enhancement 
of tenure security, the land laws to be issued under the land law reform proposed here should have 
provisions that clearly define what constitutes, how, and who decides “public purpose” and “fair 
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compensation” for the expropriation of smallholder landholding and the payment of compensation for 
improvements and investments made, require the provision of a substitute for the expropriated 
landholding, and establish procedures that enable smallholders to be heard and seek judicial remedy. 
Establishing Stricter Confiscation Procedures: 
The current land laws make the land rights of smallholders conditional upon compliance with several 
land management and protection obligations. Those laws also authorise confiscation by the state where 
smallholders leave their landholdings unused for two consecutive years, or “when the land gets 
damaged”. These obligations are presumably intended to bring about efficient and sustainable land use. 
However, they tend to create tenure insecurity because the provisions are implemented inconsistently, 
the details of on what basis, when, and by whom if a smallholder landholding has been “damaged” is 
decided and confiscation imposed has not been provided, and procedures enabling smallholders to be 
heard and seek judicial remedy have not been put in place. Therefore, in order to motivate smallholders 
to use their landholdings efficiently and sustainably and enhance their tenure security, the land laws to 
be issued under the land law reform proposed here should have provisions that clearly define 
smallholders’ land management and protection obligations, require consistent implementation of those 
provisions, and establish procedures that enable smallholders to be heard and seek judicial remedy. 
Amending the Residency Requirement: 
The current land laws make the land rights of smallholders subject to residency in the area where their 
landholdings are situated, presumably to give people a means of living in the areas of their residence, 
prevent the concentration of land in the hands of absentee landlords, and reduce rural-urban migration. 
Those laws also authorise the state to deprive land rights to smallholders who do not fulfil the 
residency requirement or have left their localities on own wish and “stayed over a given period of 
time”. However, this residency requirement is discriminatory against smallholders because it does not 
apply to large-scale commercial farmers who are mostly foreign investors and absentee landlords. It 
also undermines smallholder tenure security, as it is implemented inconsistently largely because the 
details of what constitutes, how, and by whom staying “over a given period of time” is determined has 
not been provided. Moreover, it constrains the transfer of smallholder land rights, ties smallholders to 
their landholdings and prevents them from switching or diversifying their livelihoods, and restricts the 
constitutional right of smallholders to freely choose their residence and means of living. Therefore, in 
228 
 
order to bring about the enhancement of tenure security, the land laws to be issued under the land law 
reform proposed here should have provisions that amend the residency requirement in such a way that 
authorises the state to take over landholdings only where it is proved that smallholders have left their 
landholdings for good at their own initiative without administrators during the period of their absence.   
Intensifying Resettlement Programmes:  
Although Ethiopia is generally thought to have enormous land suitable for agriculture, the resource is 
not evenly distributed across the country. Consequently, whilst some areas have abundant agricultural 
land waiting to be exploited, others suffer from severe scarcity. In view of that, the current land laws 
had envisaged the possibility of voluntary resettlement programmes. Accordingly, programmes 
involving resettlement of smallholders to areas where land scarcity is less severe have been attempted 
and produced encouraging results. However, such resettlement programmes have been stalled partly 
because the country’s administrative units within the current federal system were formed mainly along 
ethnic lines, and partly due to the lack of commitment on the part of the government. This adversely 
affects tenure security because, given the ever dwindling supply of land, it increases the likelihood of 
large-scale state-sponsored smallholder landholding redistribution programmes to meet the demands of 
the growing population for agricultural land, which, though downscaled, have not been outlawed 
altogether. Therefore, to bring about the enhancement of tenure security, the land laws to be issued 
under the proposed land law reform should contain provisions that require the government to intensify 
voluntary resettlement of smallholders at least within the same ethnic-based administrative units, and 
assign institutions, resources, and timetables necessary for the implementation of such programmes. 
Outlawing Large-scale State-sponsored Smallholder Landholding Redistribution Programmes:  
Although large-scale state-sponsored smallholder landholding redistribution programmes have been 
generally downscaled under the current land laws as compared to the Derg era, they have not been 
outlawed altogether. Such redistribution programmes are widely believed to be the primary cause of 
smallholder tenure insecurity during the Derg era. However, though downscaled, the possibility of 
large-scale state-sponsored smallholder landholding redistribution programmes continues to be a major 
source of smallholder tenure insecurity, particularly given the ever scarcer supply of land, growing 
population, and expanding large-scale commercial agriculture. Therefore, to enhance tenure security, 
the land laws to be issued under the land law reform proposed here should have provisions completely 
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outlawing future large-scale state-sponsored smallholder landholding redistribution programmes. 
The Facilitation of the Transfer of Rights over Land 
Allowing the Transfer of Private and Communal Landholdings through Sell Conditionally: 
Although in line with the current policy of state land ownership the land laws now in force in the 
country prohibit the selling of land, research and experience show that despite the prohibition imposed, 
the transfer of smallholder landholdings through sell is freely and widely carried out through 
“informal” means. This, amongst other things, undermines the sense of legality, jeopardises the 
sovereign power of the state to regulate and control land relations, deprives the state of the revenues it 
could have collected by way of transaction tax and administrative fees, and inhibits the growth of 
smallholder land prices and markets. Therefore, in order to bring about the facilitation of the transfer of 
rights over land, the land laws to be issued under the land law reform proposed here should contain 
provisions that allow the transfer of private and communal smallholder landholdings on which 
significant land improvement and investment activities have been conducted through sell conditionally. 
The conditions should include that the sell price is equivalent to the current market price of the value 
of the improvement and investment activities carried out on the land, the seller proves securing another 
permanent means of living for oneself and family dependants, the buyer demonstrates that the land 
would be used for agriculture or other development activity beneficial to the local community and 
compatible with the surrounding ecology, and that the fulfilment of the above conditions having been 
verified, the sell transaction is approved, registered, and certified by the competent formal state land 
institutions. Moreover, in the case of a communal smallholder landholding, the conditions should also 
include that the right of pre-emption is reserved for other members of the community who can buy 
with the current market price of the land, and that the fulfilment of the above conditions having been 
verified, the sell transaction is approved by the pertinent non-formal customary land institutions. This 
would not only enhance tenure security, encourage land improvement and investment practices, and 
facilitate the transfer of land rights, but also lead to the replacement of the current policy of state land 
ownership by the policy of private ownership across the country through a gradual, controlled process. 
Lifting the Restrictions Placed on the Transfer of Smallholder Landholdings through Lease: 
Although the current land laws had guaranteed smallholders the right to transfer their landholdings 
through lease, the exercise and enforcement of this right has been in jeopardy due to the restrictions 
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imposed by law. The transfer of smallholder landholdings through lease is particularly important in 
bringing about the facilitation of transfer of rights over land and the benefits thought would flow from 
it in Ethiopia because it is in line with the policy of state land ownership and the provisions of land 
laws now in force in the country. Moreover, it would not require payment of a large sum of money by 
the lessee and entail permanent loss of livelihood by the lessor. Therefore, to enable smallholders to 
exercise and enforce their right to transfer landholdings through lease, the land laws to be issued under 
the proposed land law reform should have provisions that lift the restrictions placed on it. Specifically, 
the provisions should make the right to transfer one’s landholding through lease conditional only on 
proof that the lessor has secured another reliable means of living for oneself and family dependants for 
the duration of the lease contract, and lift all other restrictions, such as possessing holding certificate, 
leasing only part of one’s landholding to another smallholder or “investor” for the purpose of 
“development”, and concluding the lease contract for a limited period. They should also make the form 
and proof required for smallholder land lease transactions the same as that usually required for other 
contracts at the place where the lease transaction is concluded, and thus abolish the existing formality, 
validity, and probative requirements that a lease contract be made in writing, signed by all parties, 
attested by two capable witnesses, and approved and registered by the competent state institutions. 
Relaxing Restrictions Imposed on the Transfer of Landholdings through Donation and Succession: 
Although the current land laws provide smallholders with rights to transfer their landholdings through 
donation and succession, the exercise and enforcement of these rights has been in jeopardy due to the 
restrictions imposed by law. Therefore, to enable smallholders to exercise and enforce those rights, the 
land laws to be issued under the proposed land law reform should have provisions relaxing the 
restrictions. Specifically, the provisions should make the right to transfer one’s landholding through 
donation or succession conditional only on proof that the transferor has secured a comparable, reliable 
means of living for oneself and family dependants for the foreseeable future, and that the transfer has 
been approved by the transferor’s spouse, children, dependents, creditors, and other parties of interest, 
such as other members of the community where the transfer involves a communal landholding. They 
should also make the form and proof required for the transfer the same as that usually required for 
other contracts at the place where the transfer is carried out, and thus abolish the existing formality, 
validity, and probative requirements that such a transfer be made in writing, signed by all parties, 
attested by two capable witnesses, and approved and registered by the competent state institutions. 
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The Authorisation of the Collateralisation of Land Rights 
Although land laws issued as part of the post-Derg land law reform have authorised collateralisation of 
land rights by “investors” engaged in commercial agriculture, they left the blanket prohibition that the 
Derg’s land law reform had imposed on smallholders intact. This not only discriminates against 
smallholders, but also continues the legacy of restriction of land rights, fragmentation and degradation 
of landholdings, and deterioration of smallholder productivity and poverty conditions. The prohibition 
would prevent smallholders from obtaining the means they need to acquire more land, undertake better 
land management and improvement practices, invest in modern agricultural inputs, implements, and 
services, diversify or switch their livelihoods, and get insurance for the loss of land or sustenance. 
Therefore, the land law reform proposed here should include the issuance of land laws that bring about 
the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights for smallholders within the framework of the 
hybrid state-private-customary land ownership policy to be adopted. The land laws to be issued should 
contain provisions that conditionally authorise the use by smallholders with private or communal 
landholdings of their land rights as collateral to obtain credit in cash or in kind in the form of modern 
agricultural inputs, implements, and services from institutions or individuals that would take 
smallholder landholdings as collateral, accept repayment in cash or in kind in the form of agricultural 
products or labour, and be allowed to cultivate or lease the collateralised landholding for a period 
sufficient to satisfy the debt in the event of non-payment before restoring it to the debtor. This can help 
achieve more efficient and sustainable land use, raise smallholder productivity, and tackle poverty, as 
it would enable smallholders to obtain the means they need to acquire more land, undertake better land 
management and improvement practices, invest in modern agricultural inputs, implements, and 
services, diversify or switch their livelihoods, and get insurance for the loss of land or sustenance. 
To ensure implementation, the conditions that the land laws to be issued would require for the 
collateralisation of land rights by smallholders should only include proof that the credit to be obtained 
using one’s land rights as collateral will be utilised to advance, diversify, or switch one’s agricultural 
livelihood, commitment to repay the debt as per the terms of the contract, and demonstration that the 
debtor has a means of living roughly comparable with the present for oneself and family dependants 
for the period during which the collateralised landholding may be taken over to satisfy the debt in the 
event of non-payment. The land laws should also contain provisions that encourage the involvement of 
the private sector, as well as require the establishment, and specify the substantive and procedural 
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powers of cooperative and state-owned rural land credit institutions, that would take smallholder 
landholdings as collateral to provide credit in cash or in kind, accept repayment in cash or in kind in 
the form of agricultural products or labour, and be allowed to cultivate or lease the collateralised 
landholding for a period sufficient to satisfy the debt in the event of non-payment before restoring it to 
the debtor. Issuing land laws with provisions that authorise the collateralisation of smallholder land 
rights alone will not guarantee success, as research and experience suggest that existing financial 
institutions, such as banks, are reluctant to accept smallholder landholdings as collateral and provide 
smallholders with credit in countries like Ethiopia, where land is owned by the state, banking tradition 
is yet to develop, and smallholders can be unwilling or unable to repay the credit they might take. 
Moreover, the land laws to be issued should contain provisions that abolish the existing formality 
requirement pertaining to the conclusion of contracts concerning immovable properties, which requires 
that in order to be valid, such contracts as those relating to the collateralisation of land rights must be 
made in writing, signed by all contracting parties, attested by at least two capable witnesses, and 
approved and registered by the competent state institution. Unless this formality requirement, which is 
onerous for anyone by any standards, is abolished, the issuance of land laws with provisions that 
authorise the collateralisation of smallholder land rights will be meaningless, as most Ethiopian 
smallholders lack the basic literacy, information, legal knowledge, financial means, and access to 
competent state institutions that they need in order to exercise and enforce this right. Instead, the 
provisions of the land laws to be issued should declare as valid contracts involving the collateralisation 
of smallholder land rights that are made in the form the parties choose by agreement, or that are 
concluded orally, in writing, or in any other form normally used for conclusion of contracts in the area. 
Furthermore, the land laws to be issued should set out provisions that abolish the existing rules 
governing proof of the existence and contents of contracts that the law requires to be made in writing, 
including contracts concerning immovable properties, such those relating to the collateralisation of 
smallholder land rights. In order to prove the existence and contents of such contracts, the existing 
rules make admissible as evidence only the document issued by the state institution that has approved 
and registered the transaction, which is onerous by any standards and would therefore jeopardise 
exercise and enforcement by smallholders even if the right to use one’s landholding as collateral is 
allowed for smallholders. Therefore, the provisions of the land laws to be issued should make 
admissible as evidence for contracts involving the collateralisation of smallholder land rights proof that 
may be adduced in the form of writings, witnesses, presumptions, a party’s admission or oath, or in 
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any other form normally used as evidence to prove the existence and contents of contracts in the area. 
8. 2. 4.  Land Institutions and the Implementation of Smallholder 
Land Rights Provisions   
Although the formulation of the hybrid state-private-customary land ownership policy to be adopted, 
and the issuance of land laws designed to improve the provisions of the three bundles of productivity-
raising smallholder land rights are necessary first and second steps, they are not sufficient conditions to 
make the land law reform proposed here effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle 
poverty in Ethiopia. The effectiveness of the proposed land law reform is contingent upon the 
implementation of the specifications of the land policy and the provisions of the land laws. The issue 
of implementation is an equally significant problem as the provision of smallholder land rights 
particularly in Ethiopia. Research and experience suggest that the effectiveness of past land law 
reforms intended to help raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the country was limited 
not only because of the prohibition and restriction of the provisions of smallholder land rights set out 
in land laws, but also due to the lack of implementation of even those provisions. In short, to make the 
proposed land law reform effective, the land policy specifications and the land law provisions must be 
implemented. And to ensure implementation, there must be land institutions. Based on the lessons 
learned in the course of the study, the suggested ways forward about the establishment, composition, 
and operation of the land institutions necessary for implementation have therefore been outlined below. 
Establishing a Federal Institution for the Implementation of Smallholder Land Rights Provisions 
The FDRE Constitution designated land as a federal matter. This designation confers upon the federal 
government not only legislative, but also executive power over matters of land, including smallholder 
land rights. According to the Constitution, the Council of Ministers, which is the executive organ of 
the federal government headed by the Prime Minister, shall ensure “the implementation of laws and 
decisions adopted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives”, which is the legislative organ of the 
federal government. However, by the time this thesis was written, the federal government has not 
established an executive land institution that specifically deals with the implementation of smallholder 
land rights provisions that have been set out in federal land laws. Yet, the federal government has in 
the land law it issued conferred upon region states power to “establish institutions at all levels that 
shall implement rural land administration and land use systems.” Accordingly, the regional states of 
Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPRS have put into effect their own executive land institutions 
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dealing with the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions. But just like the land laws, the 
executive land institutions that have been put into effect by the four regional states to deal with the 
implementation of smallholder land rights provisions suffer from questionable constitutionality and 
legality. Nonetheless, the federal government has not even set up an institution that would follow-up 
and monitor to ensure the proper, uniform, and consistent implementation of federal land policies and 
laws pertaining to the provision of smallholder land rights by all regional states throughout the country. 
In view of that, the land laws to be issued as part of the land law reform proposed here should contain 
provisions that require the establishment of a federal land institution dealing with the implementation 
of smallholder land rights provisions set out in federal land laws. These provisions should also entrust 
to this same federal institution the function of following-up and monitoring the proper, uniform, and 
consistent implementation of federal land policies and laws pertaining to the provision of smallholder 
land rights by regional states throughout Ethiopia, and make the regional land institutions accountable 
to it. This will enable to address lingering questions about the constitutionality and legality of regional 
land institutions, ensure the proper, uniform, and consistent application of federal land policies and 
laws governing the provision of smallholder land rights in line with the Constitution, limit the unduly 
wide discretion of regional land institutions, avoid unethical and corrupt practices, as well as ethnic, 
religious, and political favouritism in the administration and allocation of smallholder land rights. 
Clarifying the Mandates and Improving the Coordination amongst Regional Land Institutions  
Besides suffering from questionable constitutionality and legality, the mandates of the regional land 
institutions that have been established by the four regional states to deal with the implementation of 
smallholder land rights provisions are blurred both in theory and in practice with those of other 
regional institutions that are charged with such matters as agriculture, investment, environment, and 
water. Moreover, there is inadequate link and coordination amongst those regional institutions that are 
involved in the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions both horizontally and vertically. 
This, coupled with the absence of a federal institution tasked with implementing and following-up and 
monitoring the proper, uniform, and consistent implementation of federal land policies and laws 
concerning the provision of smallholder land rights, has unduly extended the discretion of regional 
land institutions, worked against transparency and opened way for unethical and corrupt practices and 
ethnic, religious, and political favouritism in the administration and allocation of smallholder land 
rights. Therefore, the land laws to be issued as part of the land law reform proposed here should 
contain provisions that clarify the mandates and improve the coordination amongst the regional 
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institutions carrying out the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions. These provisions 
should particularly subordinate the powers and functions, and entrust the coordination of the regional 
institutions involved in the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions to the regional land 
institution that has been established to specifically deal with smallholder land rights. They should also 
require that mechanisms enhancing transparency and accountability be put in place at each of the 
regional institutions that undertake the administration and allocation of smallholder land rights. 
Addressing the Legal and Practical Impediments that may Prevent Exercise and Enforcement  
As discussed earlier, despite the existence and operation of formal land policies, laws, and institutions 
backed by the state, smallholders in Ethiopia resort to the non-formal customary land policies, laws, 
and institutions far more frequently than they do to the formal state ones to claim, exercise, and 
enforce their land rights. This is largely because of the advantages that the non-formal customary land 
tenure arrangements offer in terms of simplicity and familiarity of land policies and laws, accessibility 
and informality of institutions, as well as economy of time and money. However, it is also partly due to 
the existence of numerous legal and practical impediments that prevent smallholders from resorting to 
the formal state land policies, laws, and institutions to claim, exercise, and enforce their land rights. In 
any case, the situation undermines the implementation of formal land policies and laws, the relevance 
of formal land institutions, and the effectiveness of the overall land law reform sanctioned by the state. 
In order to deal with this situation, the land laws to be issued as part of the land law reform proposed 
here should contain provisions that authorise selective recognition or incorporation of the non-formal 
customary land policies, laws, and institutions under, or into the formal state ones, and that require 
measures designed to alleviate the legal and practical impediments that can prevent the country’s 
smallholders from resorting to formal state land policies, laws, and institutions to claim, exercise, and 
enforce their land rights to be taken. Specifically, these provisions should require selective formal 
recognition of non-formal customary land policies and laws pertaining to the acquisition, transfer, and 
collateralisation of smallholder land rights that are advantageous in terms of simplicity and familiarity; 
as well as selective formal incorporation of non-formal customary land institutions that are 
advantageous in terms of accessibility and informality and economy of time and money, which would 
involve the establishment, staffing, and equipment at least at a Kebele level of such institutions to take 
part in the administration and allocation of smallholder land rights and management of related 
transactions. To address the legal impediments, most of which are to do with requirements of formality 
and proof associated with contracts involving the transfer or collateralisation of smallholder land 
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rights, the provisions should require the measures that were discussed above in relation to the 
formulation and issuance of land laws improving the provision of productivity-raising smallholder land 
rights to be taken. And to alleviate the practical impediments, which relate to the smallholders’ lack of 
basic literacy, legal knowledge, information, financial means, and access to, familiarity with, or 
favourable attitude towards formal state land institutions, those provisions should require that basic 
literacy, legal training, and awareness-raising sessions be organised for smallholders and community 
leaders, and that taxes imposed on, or administrative fees charged for services provided through the 
formal means in connection with such matters as transactions involving the transfer or collateralisation 
of smallholder land rights be abolished, lowered, or waived, as much as is possible and necessary.   
Dispute Resolution: Legalising, Strengthening, and Linking Non-formal Customary Institutions 
and Assigning the Judiciary Greater Role  
Basically, a rural landholding dispute often involves a civil case pertaining to the private proprietary 
interests of the disputants, in which a smallholder alleges to have suffered the deprivation of, or 
interference into their land rights by another and seeks compensation for the damage sustained 
consequently. Therefore, the mechanisms in place for the resolution of such a dispute should be made 
to reflect the nature of the case involved and the freedom of alternative actions available particularly 
for the plaintiff smallholder, which include waiving their right to put up a claim altogether, or 
discussing with the party alleged to be liable and resolving the dispute by agreement, or seeking the 
resolution of the dispute by a non-formal customary institution, or choosing to bring the case to a 
regular formal state court for adjudication.  
However, in practice, most disputes arising over the land rights of smallholders who decide to put up a 
claim and are unwilling or unable to discuss with the party alleged to be liable and settle the dispute by 
agreement are currently resolved by non-formal customary institutions, which operate either as 
permanent institutions embodied in the traditional values, norms, and structures of most of the 
country’s ethno-cultural groups, or as ad hoc institutions established to resolve specific disputes by 
elders that the parties in dispute select. It appears the non-formal customary institutions are preferred 
because of the advantages they offer, which include accessibility, timeliness, affordability, legitimacy 
and appropriateness, restorative capacity, participatory proceedings, predictable processes and 
outcomes, community-backed enforceability of decisions, avoidance of coercive measures, and 
building community cohesion. Yet, they have several disadvantages, which include being biased 
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against such groups as women, children, and minorities, ignorance of the provisions of the pertinent 
substantive and procedural laws, non-compliance with human rights standards, undermining individual 
rights by treating disputes as communal rather than individual, and lack of consistency in their 
decisions. They also suffer from serious legal and practical limitations, including blurred local and 
material jurisdictions, unclear relation particularly with formal state dispute resolution institutions, and 
questionable constitutionality, as the FDRE Constitution bestows all judicial powers upon regular 
courts and restricts the power of non-formal customary institutions just to family and personal matters. 
In cases where a state institution is involved, disputes over smallholder land rights are resolved by the 
Kebele Land Administration Commission or social court. However, the Kebele Land Administration 
Commission and social courts are contentious as to whether the dispute resolution function they 
perform is lawful or not, and if the institutions are constitutional or not, formal state or non-formal 
customary institutions, and part of the executive or the judiciary. Moreover, although the possibility of 
appeal to regular Woreda courts has been envisaged particularly by regional proclamations, it appears 
to be impractical, as decisions are rarely appealed by the parties or reversed by the appellate courts. 
Therefore, in view their pervasive existence, critical importance, and multiple advantages, it is 
recommended that the dispute resolution function of the non-formal customary institutions be 
legalised by relaxing the constitutional restriction placed on their jurisdiction to include disputes 
involving smallholder land rights. The land laws to be issued as part of the land law reform proposed 
here should also be made to contain provisions that assign them exclusive power to decide in the first 
instance relatively minor and more prevalent cases involving smallholder land rights, such as 
boundary disputes, and that clearly define their local and material jurisdictions. These provisions 
should legalise only those  non-formal customary institutions that can be reformed in terms of the 
equal treatment of such vulnerable groups as women, children, and minorities, application of the 
pertinent substantive and procedural laws, compliance with human rights standards, upholding of the 
individual rights of disputants by treating disputes as individual rather than communal, and rendition 
of consistent decisions as much as possible. The provisions should thus require the strengthening of 
such institutions through the provision of training concerning the abovementioned issues on which 
they need to be reformed, financial support to cover costs of operation and personnel remuneration, 
office premises and equipment, and media coverage to promote their operations and publicise their 
decisions. What is more, the provisions should require measures designed to establish stronger link 
between those non-formal customary institutions and formal state institutions, particularly the Woreda 
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courts in regions and first instance courts in administrations accountable to the federal government.  
The measures should specifically involve formally abolishing the Kebele Land Administration 
Commission and “social courts”, which unconstitutionally and unlawfully perform the function of 
dispute resolution, and outlining clearer division of jurisdiction in which non-formal customary 
institutions assume power to decide in the first instance relatively minor and more prevalent cases, 
whilst regional Woreda and federal first instance courts assume appellate jurisdiction, as well as power 
to decide in the first instance relatively major and less prevalent cases, such as claims of title over 
smallholder landholdings. This would not only allow the judiciary to exercise oversight on the 
activities of the non-formal customary institutions, but also ease court congestion and enable the 
formal state courts to concentrate on more serious cases. The measures should also include requiring 
formal state courts to execute decisions rendered by non-formal customary institutions, which will 
make the enforceability of their decisions backed by the state, and assigning the non-formal customary 
institutions role in facilitating the execution of decisions rendered by the formal state courts, which 
will relieve the workload of courts. Furthermore, the measures should include requiring the regional 
Woreda and federal first instance courts to set up rotating panels at the Kebele level so as to exercise 
their first instance and appellate jurisdictions. This would make the formal regular courts and the non-
formal customary institutions accessible and affordable, as well as legitimate and acceptable in the 
eyes of both the state and society. It would also enable to make feasible the currently impractical 
possibility of appeal to Woreda courts envisaged particularly by regional proclamations, allow the 
establishment of a system of dispute resolution that combines the virtues of formal regular courts and 
non-formal customary institutions, and address lingering issues of unconstitutionality by restoring 
judicial power to the judiciary in line with the Constitution. Above all, it would enable the judiciary to 
play the appropriate role in ensuring the implementation of smallholder land rights provisions and 
making land law reform effective in helping raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty. 
8. 2. 5.  Making Legal Pluralism Work through Land Law Reform  
This thesis proposes the recognition of legal pluralism because recognising legal pluralism in the short-
run is the most effective way to make use of, and possibly to end legal pluralism in the long-run. In 
other words, the recognition of legal pluralism is proposed not as an end in itself, but as a means to use 
and then end legal pluralism itself. The recognition of legal pluralism is necessary for several reasons. 
First, established law and development research and experience demonstrates that past land law reform 
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initiatives intended to help raise smallholder productivity and thereby tackle poverty that involved 
attempts to totally abolish and replace non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions with 
formal state ones in Ethiopia and other sub-Saharan African countries have brought about neither law 
nor development, as they resulted in pluralised, disorganised, and dysfunctional land tenure systems 
that constrained the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and 
adversely affected the conditions of smallholder productivity and poverty. Moreover, the recognition 
of legal pluralism can help make the land law reform proposed here effective in helping raise 
smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in Ethiopia, as it would enable to reap the advantages and 
avoid the disadvantages that the non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions have as 
regards the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights, and allow the 
state to concentrate scarce resources needed for the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the 
proposed land law reform upon changing only the most constraining formal or non-formal land 
policies, laws, and institutions of the pre-existing land tenure system. Furthermore, the recognition of 
legal pluralism would enable the pre-existing non-formal customary land policies, laws, and 
institutions to continue to operate alongside the newly introduced formal state ones and contribute to a 
stable, predictable legal environment acutely needed during the period of transition, and provide room 
for the gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption of non-formal customary land tenure arrangements 
into the formal state land tenure system – thereby leading to the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. 
What then does the recognition of legal pluralism involve and how is it carried out? The recognition of 
legal pluralism should involve the identification and selective incorporation into the formal state land 
tenure system of those non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions that do not constrain 
the provision and implementation of the three bundles of productivity-raising smallholder land rights 
pertaining to the enhancement of tenure security, the facilitation of the transfer of rights over land, and 
the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights. Specifically, the identification process should 
involve accepting as non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions those land tenure 
arrangements other than the formal state ones that are considered, operated, and used as such by social 
actors or members of the community concerned. The identification process should not involve or 
require the documentation or codification of the non-formal customary policies, laws, and institutions 
to be incorporated for the following reasons. First, it is unnecessary because the whole purpose here is 
not to elevate, promote, or eternalise, but to make use of in the short-run, and then to bring about the 
gradual evolution, extinction, or absorption into the formal state land tenure system of the non-formal 
customary land policies, laws, and institutions in the long-run. Second, because there are non-formal 
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customary land tenure arrangements that are as numerous and diverse as ethnic, cultural, and religious 
groups that exist in the country, the task will be too costly, if not impossible. Third, besides their 
unwritten, vague, and decentralised nature, since proof of the existence, composition, and operation of 
the non-formal customary land tenure arrangements often depends largely on the memory, knowledge, 
and experience of a few traditional leaders, elders, and experts in the community, documentation or 
codification would be an exercise in futility, as it will more likely involve the non-formal customary 
arrangements as maintained or understood by the more influential groups or members of the same 
community, which will thus be as alien and meaningless as the formal state ones to others. 
But why should the recognition of legal pluralism involve selective rather than complete incorporation 
of non-formal customary land tenure systems? Complete incorporation entails the full absorption of the 
non-formal customary land tenure systems into the formal state land tenure ones, which means the 
rejection of legal pluralism and the forfeiture of the benefits that would have been possible to gain 
from the non-formal customary land tenure systems only if they were allowed to stay as they are: non-
formal. In contrast, selective incorporation will allow taking up those non-formal customary land 
policies, laws, and institutions that are more likely to promote or not to constrain the provision and 
implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights and dropping those that are not – 
thereby enabling to reap the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of the non-formal customary land 
tenure systems. Basically, non-formal customary land policies, laws, and institutions are 
disadvantageous because they reflect and reinforce the patriarchal, feudal, and subsistence framework 
Ethiopia’s smallholder-based rural way of life, emphasise traditional structures, values, and beliefs, 
and focus on upholding past relationships and maintaining the relative status quo. Therefore, they not 
only favour men and “influential” members of the community and often discriminate against women 
and other “vulnerable” groups, such as children, the elderly, the disabled, the low caste and the 
“minority” members or “non-members” of the community, but also prevent the increase in social scale, 
including the expansion of face-to-face socio-economic relationships and the reduction of dependence 
on family, neighbours, and “the community”, necessary to foster local, regional, and national economic 
development. Moreover, since they lack regularised amendment procedures required for adaptation to 
change, they render the disengagement of the rural political economy from traditional social structures 
difficult, and hinder the transformation of smallholder agriculture from ensuring subsistence towards 
serving as an engine for fostering poverty alleviation and overall economic development. Specifically, 
because non-formal customary land policies and laws are unwritten, vague, diverse, and diffuse, which 
often depend on the knowledge and prerogative of particular traditional leaders, and the land 
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institutions have through time become weakened, depleted, and corrupted, which often rely on social 
pressure and voluntary cooperation to induce compliance, they cannot offer an adequate framework for 
the provision and implementation of productivity-raising smallholder land rights with the degree of 
breadth, duration, and assurance required for the enhancement of tenure security, the facilitation of the 
transfer of rights over land, and the authorisation of the collateralisation of land rights. 
On the other hand, selective incorporation can enable the government to use non-formal customary 
land tenure systems not only to better advance its ethnic-based economic, social, and political agenda 
related to land and smallholder agriculture and reap the advantages they offer, but also to more 
successfully formulate and implement a land law reform programme that can be effective in helping 
raise smallholder productivity and tackle poverty in the short-run, and leading to the gradual evolution, 
extinction, or absorption of the non-formal customary land tenure systems into the formal ones and 
thus the end of legal pluralism in the long-run. Selective incorporation of non-formal customary 
systems can enable the government to introduce land law reform measures that respect diversity and 
reflect contextual needs and potentials, promote local ownership and community participation, allow 
decentralisation and at the same time advance regional and national integration, appease potential 
opposition and win voluntary cooperation, provide room for pre-existing non-formal customary 
systems to project a sense of continuity, stability, and predictability and for the newly introduced 
systems to move towards the set objectives, and offer opportunity to theoretically communicate, and 
practically demonstrate the advantages of formal state systems and the disadvantages of non-formal 
customary ones. Moreover, since efforts aimed at ending legal pluralism and establishing a uniform, 
functional formal state land tenure system should be the culmination of a long process of self-criticism, 
analysis, and well-informed, deliberate choice, selective incorporation of non-formal customary 
systems would provide the government with opportunity and capacity to pilot and study the strengths 
and shortcomings of, and identify formal state and non-formal customary systems to be embodied in 
possible future land law reform initiatives that would be undertaken to progressively establish local, 
regional, and national formal state land tenure systems and thereby end legal pluralism. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Table 1 - Total Smallholder Land Area Cultivated in Ethiopia by 
Farm Size and Agro-ecology (2008)   
Source:  Computation by Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, (Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, 
2011:4) based on data from CSA’s Agricultural Sample Survey 2007/2008, (CSA, June 2008).  
Note:  Each farm size interval (quintile) contains 20 percent of Ethiopia’s smallholder household 
farms, approximately 2.57 million smallholder household farms. 
 Appendix 2:  Table 2 - Farm Size, Percentage of Smallholders, and Average 
Landholding Size in Hectare in Ethiopia (2008)    
Source:  CSA, June 2008:13. 
Note:  Total number of smallholder households = 13,254,840. 
 Average landholding size of each smallholder household (in ha) = 0.93. 
Farm 
Size 
(in ha) 
Moisture 
Reliable Cereal 
Moisture 
Reliable Enset 
Humid 
Lowland 
Drought 
Prone 
Pastoralist Total 
(in Thousand Hectares) 
0.0 - 0.25 111.7 133.2 6.5 76.9 6.8 335.1 
0.25 - 0.52 364.3 298.7 17.1 271.2 22.1 973.4 
0.52 - 0.90 884 355.7 31 474.3 39.4 1784.4 
0.90 - 1.52 1739.5 330 47 824.8 70.5 3011.8 
1.52 - 25.20 4153.2 272.4 94.4 1617.8 140.3 6278.1 
Total 7252.7 1390 196 3265 279.1 12382.8 
 Percentage of National Total (in %) 
0.0 - 0.25 0.9 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 2.7 
0.25 - 0.52 2.9 2.4 0.1 2.2 0.2 7.9 
0.52 - 0.90 7.1 2.9 0.3 3.8 0.3 14.4 
0.90 - 1.52 14.0 2.7 0.4 6.7 0.6 24.3 
1.52 - 25.20 33.5 2.2 0.8 13.1 1.1 50.7 
Total 58.6 11.2 1.6 26.4 2.3 100.0 
Farm Size                   
(in hectares) 
Percentage of  
Smallholders (in %) Average Landholding Size (in hectares) 
Under 0.10 4.95 0.04 
0.10-0.50 26.36 0.24 
0.51-1.0 25.34 0.6 
1.01-2.0 26.58 1.16 
2.01-5.00 15.48 2.24 
5.01-10.00 1.22 4.36 
Over 10.0 0.07 8.22 
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Appendix 3:  Table 3 - Number of Smallholders, Size of Cultivated Land, and Type 
and Amount of Crops Produced in Ethiopia during the Main 
Meher Production Season (2004/05-2007/08 Average) 
Type of 
Crop 
Number of 
Smallholder 
Households 
Size of Cultivated Land  Amount of Crop Produced 
Size 
(in hectares) 
Share in Total Area 
Cultivated (in %) 
Amount  
(in quintals) 
Share in Total 
Production (in %) 
Grain 11,519,148 10,382,365 92.7 140,902,733 79.8 
 Cereals 11,156,837 8,230,211 73.4 120,629,724 68.3 
  Teff  5,462,782 2,337,850 20.9 24,079,480 13.6 
  Barley  3,842,462 1,024,390 9.1 13,264,217 7.5 
  Wheat 4,118,164 1,439,098 12.8 22,933,077 13.0 
  Maize 7,287,931 1,595,238 14.2 33,142,865 18.8 
  Sorghum  4,253,534 1,429,886 12.8 22,161,808 12.5 
 Pulses 6,377,027 1,384,499 12.4 14,955,466 8.5 
 Oilseeds 3,127,131 767,655 6.9 5,317,543 3.0 
Vegetables 4,936,741 106,585 1.0 4,248,252 2.4 
Root Crops 4,757,733 174,826 1.6 14,732,919 8.3 
Fruit Crops 2,658,415 51,078 0.5 4,034,590 2.3 
Chat 2,068,262 141,881 1.3 1,264,269 0.7 
Coffee 3,049,120 305,940 2.7 2,106,711 1.2 
Hops 1,685,422 23,457 0.2 263,111 0.1 
Source:  Computation by Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh (Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, 2011:2).  
Appendix 4:  Table 4 - Smallholder Productivity, Cultivated Land Area, and Output Decade 
Averages and Growth Rates of Cereals in Ethiopia since the 1960s 
Decade 
FAO CSA 
Productivity 
(tons/ha) 
Cultivated Land         
Area (in mn has) 
Output 
(in mn tons) 
Productivity 
(tons/ha) 
Area 
(in mn has) 
Output 
(in mn tons) 
1961/62-1969/70 0.73 6.23 4.53 N/A     N/A* N/A 
1970/71-1979/80 0.90 5.25 4.63 N/A N/A N/A 
1980/81-1989/90 1.15 4.89 5.63 1.14 4.30 4.89 
1990/91-1999/00 1.18 5.87 6.88 1.20 5.60 6.67 
2000/01-2008/09 1.30 8.24 10.68 1.41 7.72 10.94 
 Average Growth Rates (from logarithmic regressions) 
1961/62-1969/70 0.8% 1.1% 1.9% N/A N/A N/A
1970/71-1979/80 3.7% -4.9% -1.4% N/A N/A N/A
1980/81-1989/90 -0.8% 0.5% -0.3% -1.7% 2.4% 0.6% 
1990/91-1999/00 -0.7% 5.9% 5.1% -0.5% 5.8% 5.2% 
2000/01-2008/09 3.6% 2.7% 6.5% 3.5% 3.1% 7.0% 
Source:  Computation by Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, (Alemayehu, Dorosh, and Sinafikeh, 
2011:11) based on data from FAO for 2000/01 to 2007/08 and from CSA for 1980/81 to 1989/90. 
Note:  N/A stands for not available; CSA data is not available for decades marked N/A because the 
CSA was established in 1981/82; CSA data is for smallholder Meher season only and the levels 
and growth rates are based on interpolated data (constant logarithmic growth rates); FAO 
refers to 2007/08 as 2007. 
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Appendix 5:  Table 5 - Gross Domestic Product by Sector in Ethiopia from 1960-
2004 (at 1980/81 constant factor cost) 
Political 
System 
GDP (in millions of Birr) Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP (in %) 
Year Agriculture Industry Service Total Agriculture Industry Service Total 
The Imperial 
Government 
under 
Emperor 
Haile 
Sellassie I 
1960 3,884.68 357.52 883.09 5,125.29     
1961 3,953.02 392.00 971.97 5,316.99 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.01 
1962 4,069.44 417.16 1,032.92 5,519.53 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 
1963 4,164.69 461.21 1,133.54 5,759.44 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.02 
1964 4,320.41 508.49 1,292.41 6,121.30 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.04 
1965 4,356.64 573.46 1,395.48 6,325.59 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.01 
1966 4,504.46 637.07 1,441.02 6,582.55 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.02 
1967 4,551.99 671.86 1,578.80 6,802.65 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01 
1968 4,651.84 710.38 1,690.69 7,052.91 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 
1969 4,762.85 723.54 1,808.83 7,295.23 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 
1970 4,860.38 789.03 1,918.46 7,567.87 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.01 
1971 4,936.88 823.87 2,044.02 7,804.77 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 
1972 5,007.90 849.22 2,158.41 8,015.53 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 
1973 5,059.09 846.46 2,289.25 8,194.80 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.00 
The Derg 
Government 
1974 5,083.63 833.21 2,370.44 8,287.28 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 
1975 5,124.68 781.31 2,437.42 8,343.42 -0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 
1976 5,144.83 803.92 2,480.00 8,428.75 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
1977 5,162.65 778.81 2,439.72 8,381.18 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 
1978 5,208.72 892.07 2,682.24 8,783.04 -0.02 0.12 0.07 0.02 
1979 5,449.15 978.70 2,781.06 9,208.91 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 
1980 5,384.81 1,011.80 2,927.94 9,324.55 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 
1981 5,189.69 1,097.57 3,028.10 9,315.36 -0.04 0.08 0.03 0.00 
1982 5,895.30 1,162.25 3,196.25 10,253.80 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.07 
1983 5,155.85 1,231.76 3,220.58 9,608.19 -0.15 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 
1984 4,079.02 1,284.79 3,313.10 8,676.91 -0.23 0.01 0.00 -0.12 
1985 4,732.64 1,369.17 3,434.21 9,536.02 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.06 
1986 5,620.43 1,478.61 3,775.72 10,874.76 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.10 
1987 5,465.02 1,422.50 3,981.46 10,868.98 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 
1988 5,521.26 1,327.81 4,056.99 10,906.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 
1989 5,814.40 1,265.29 4,269.89 11,349.58 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.01 
1990 6,114.89 1,024.13 3,799.22 10,938.24 0.02 -0.22 -0.14 -0.07 
The Current 
Government 
under the 
EPRDF 
1991 5,947.60 951.28 3,635.73 10,534.61 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 
1992 6,308.32 1,221.90 4,268.57 11,798.79 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.08 
1993 6,078.00 1,307.05 4,614.20 11,999.25 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 
1994 6,284.00 1,412.54 4,947.81 12,644.35 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03 
1995 7,206.20 1,488.87 5,292.01 13,987.08 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.07 
1996 7,453.90 1,530.57 5,655.80 14,640.27 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
1997 6,620.60 1,566.60 6,241.90 14,429.10 -0.14 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 
1998 6,873.50 1,700.90 6,719.70 15,294.10 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 
1999 7,024.70 1,731.30 7,356.34 16,112.34 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.02 
2000 7,831.10 1,821.40 7,705.20 17,357.70 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05 
2001 7,651.00 1,864.00 8,057.80 17,572.80 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.02 
2002 6,687.00 1,943.40 8,252.70 16,883.10 -0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.07 
2003 7,953.80 2,080.60 8,783.80 18,818.20 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.08 
2004 9,154.80 2,228.60 9,349.30 20,732.70 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.07 
Source:  Computation by Rashid, Meron, and Gezahegn based on data from the National Bank of 
Ethiopia (Rashid, Meron, and Gezahegn, 2007:37). 
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Appendix 6:  Table 6 - Population, Food Production, and Landholding in 
Ethiopia (1960-1990) 
Year  Population  Landholding per capita Food Output per capita 
1960/61 23,550,000 0.28 ha 240.2 kg 
1969/70 28,784,400 0.25 ha 242.7 kg 
1979/80 36,663,300 0.13 ha 204.4 kg 
1989/90 48,648,800 0.10 ha 141.7 kg 
Source:  Befekadu and Berhanu (Befekadu and Berhanu, 2000:85). 
Appendix 7:  Table 7 - Economic Growth and Structural Change in Ethiopia 
(1960/61-2004/05) 
Item/Sector 
Political System 
The Imperial 
Government under 
Haile Sellassie I 
The Derg Regime 
 
The Current 
Government under 
the EPRDF 
Growth 
Rates* 
Shares 
in Total 
GDP 
Growth 
Rates 
Shares 
in Total 
GDP 
Growth 
Rates 
Shares in 
Total GDP 
Total GDP  3.7 100.0 2.0 100.0 4.6 100.0 
Agriculture  2.0 68.0 0.6 55.6 2.3 47.3 
Industry  7.0 9.4 3.6 11.4 5.3 11.0 
Services  7.3 23.1 3.8 33.0 6.9 42.0 
Source:  Computation by Rashid, Meron, and Gezahegn based on data from the National 
Bank of Ethiopia (Rashid, Meron, and Gezahegn, 2007:28).  
Note: Growth rates were calculated by fitting a log-linear trend. 
Appendix 8:  Table 8 - Sectoral and Overall Economic Growth Patterns in 
Ethiopia from 1960-2002 (in percent) 
 1960-1973 1974-1991 1992-2002 Average (1960-2002) 
Real GDP at constant 
factor cost 3.71% 1.84% 4.18% 2.60% 
Agriculture  2.10% 0.70% 1.53% 1.35% 
Industry  7.04% 2.81% 7.74% 3.35% 
Services 7.33% 3.44% 6.97% 4.70% 
Source:  Computation by Mulat, Fantu, and Tadele based on data from the EEA/EEPRI 
database (Mulat, Fantu, and Tadele, 2006:4). 
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Appendix 9:  Table 9 - Sectoral and Overall GDP Growth Patterns in Ethiopia 
from 2003/04-2009/10 (in percent) 
Year GDP Growth Rates at Constant Basic Price Agriculture Industry Services Overall GDP 
2003/04  16.9%  11.6%  6.3%  11.8 % 
2004/05  13.5%  9.4%  12.8%  12.7 % 
2005/06  10.9%  10.2%  13.3%  11.8 % 
2006/07  9.4%  9.5%  15.3%  11.8%  
2007/08  7.5% 10.1%  16.0%  11.4%  
2008/09  6.4%  9.7%  14.0%  10.1%  
2009/2010  7.6% 10.6%  13.0%  10.4%  
Source:  Computation by Kassahun based on data from MoFED (Kassahun, 2012:7). 
Appendix 10: Table 10 - Proportion of Cereal Crops Used for Own Consumption 
and Market Sale in Ethiopia in 2010  
Type of 
Crop 
Total 
Production (in quintals) 
Amount Used for Own 
Consumption (in %) 
Amount Used for 
Market Sale (in %) 
Total Cereals 155,342,280 65.9 16.4 
 Teff  31,793,743  53.4 27.4  
 Barley  17,504,436   62.9  13.4  
 Wheat 30,756,436  58.5  19.5  
 Maize 38,971,631  75.0 11.6 
 Sorghum  29,712,655  72.9 12.1 
Finger Millet 5,241,911  70.2  14.2  
Pulses 18,980,473 61.8  20.6  
Vegetables 5,573,568  79.7  17.4  
Root Crops 18,063,778  71.5 16.5 
Source:  Computation by Lavers (Lavers, 2011:4) based on data from CSA (CSA, 2010a). 
Appendix 11:  Table 11 - Agricultural Growth Linkages: International Evidence 
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
Region  
 
Additional Income Growth Source of Linkages (%) 
Initial 
Agricultural 
Income 
Growth 
Other 
Agriculture 
Non-farm 
Activities Total Consumption Production 
Asia 1.00 0.06 0.58 0.64 81.00 19.00 
Africa 1.00 0.17 0.30 0.47 87.00 13.00 
Latin America 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.26 42.00 58.00 
Source:  Diao (Diao, 2010:22), citing computations by Haggblade and Hazell (Haggblade and 
Hazell, 1989).  
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Appendix 12:  The FDRE Constitution  
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Appendix 13:   FDRE Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No. 456/2005 
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Appendix 14:  Tigray Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No. 136/2007 
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